Laresca v. American Tel. & Tel.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. Civ:99-5097 (WGB).,Civ:99-5097 (WGB).
• Citation: 161 F.Supp.2d 323
• Parties: Paul D. LARESCA, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH, a corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

161 F.Supp.2d 323

Paul D. LARESCA, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH, a corporation, Defendant.

No. Civ:99-5097 (WGB).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

May 10, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert M. McCaffery, Leib, Kraus, Grispin & Roth, Scotch Plains, NJ, for plaintiff.

David H. Ganz, Colleen P. Tandy, Collier, Jacob & Mills, P.C., Somerset, NJ, for defendant.

OPINION

BASSLER, District Judge.

Defendant American Telephone & Telegraph ("Defendant" or "AT & T") moves for summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.¹ Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

In 1984, Plaintiff Paul D. LaResca ("Plaintiff") began working for AT & T as a data processing clerk. Because of seizures caused by his epilepsy, Plaintiff was unable to drive to and from work. Accordingly, Plaintiff relied on family, friends, co-workers to drive him. Beginning in 1996, AT & T's managers, aware of Plaintiff's epilepsy, accommodated Plaintiff by scheduling him for the 12:00 noon until 8:00 p.m. second shift. Then in or about May 1996, Plaintiff elected to take a leave of absence to care for his father, who had become ill.

Plaintiff was scheduled to return to work in September 1997. At that time, there was one opening in the office where he was to work, in the same job title that he held prior to taking leave. That position required him to work the night shift, from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. Plaintiff advised AT & T that he was unable to drive and could not obtain public transportation to get home from the train station after working the night shift; therefore, Plaintiff requested that AT & T accommodate his handicap by scheduling him for work during the day shift, from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. According to Plaintiff, rather than accommodating his handicap, AT & T simply terminated his employment.

Plaintiff maintains that because his performance reviews were outstanding, AT & T should have accommodated his handicap by: (1) asking employees who worked the day shift to switch shifts with him; (2) rearranging the shifts to allow him to work during the day shift; (3) allowing him to look for other positions within AT & T; (4) accommodating him as AT & T had done in the past.

AT & T disagrees, contending that it had no legal obligation to accommodate Plaintiff's commute to work notwithstanding that AT & T had accommodated Plaintiff in the past. Moreover, AT & T claims that had it assigned Plaintiff to the day shift, it would have violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") by infringing on the rights of more senior employees. The CBA governed the terms and conditions of all union-represented employees. Plaintiff was a member of the Communications Workers of America during the entire time Plaintiff worked for AT & T. The CBA that covered the last several years of Plaintiff's employment became effective May 28, 1995 ("1995 CBA"). Article 38 of the 1995 CBA, applicable to Data Processing Associate I ("DPA I") employees, such as Plaintiff, provided that twice a year, employees could choose what shift or "tour" they wanted to work, but the ultimate assignments would be made based on seniority. (1995 CBA attached to Appendix in Support of Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment as Dep. Ex. D-24, §§ 3(h)(1)(ii) and (iii).)

AT & T also denies having fired Plaintiff. It insists that Plaintiff was removed from the payroll due to job abandonment after Plaintiff failed to report to work for five consecutive days. AT & T claims that rather than try to get to work, Plaintiff simply stayed home although he knew that he was expected to show up for work.

B. Procedural History

On September 13, 1999, Plaintiff filed suit against AT & T. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on his handicap (epilepsy) and failure to accommodate in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq., (First Count), breach of contract (Second Count), and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Third Count).

Contending that Plaintiff's discrimination claim arose under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, et seq., AT & T removed this case to this Court on October 29, 1999, based on federal question as well as diversity jurisdiction.

AT & T now moves for summary judgment on several grounds. It argues that Plaintiff's accommodation, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims must be dismissed because they are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. It also contends that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge and that the breach of contract and breach of implied contract claims are facially deficient and untimely. Finally, AT & T also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Whether a fact is material is determined by the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue involving a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1219 n. 3 (3d Cir.1988).

The moving party has the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials" of its pleading, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), but must produce sufficient evidence to reasonably support a jury verdict in its favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and not just "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court must resolve "all inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility ... against the moving party." Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.1972)); accord Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1077 n. 1 (3d Cir.1996).

Since a motion for summary judgment is designed to go beyond the pleadings, factual specificity is required of a party who opposes such a motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a party may not merely restate the allegations of his complaint. Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D.Pa.1988). Moreover, a party cannot rely upon self-serving conclusions, unsupported by specific facts in the record. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A non-moving party must point to concrete evidence in the record which supports each essential element of his case. Id. If the party fails to provide such evidence, then he is not entitled to a trial and the moving-party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, however, the Court's role is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the party opposing summary judgment has exceeded the "mere scintilla" threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the Court cannot credit the movant's version of events, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. Big Apple BMW v. BMW of N. Am., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992).

B. Preemption Standard

Section 301 of the LMRA states:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In enacting § 301, Congress intended for a uniform body of federal law to govern disputes arising out of labor contracts. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). The Supreme Court has held that "questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort." Id.

Despite the fact that Section 301 was found to preempt numerous claims arising from a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court stopped short of finding that Section 301 fully preempted all state law claims:

[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301 or other provisions of federal labor law ... Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. In extending the preemptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct,...