Large v. State, No. 24680.

• Docket Nº: No. 24680.
• Citation: 200 Ind. 430, 164 N.E. 263
• Case Date: December 19, 1928
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

200 Ind. 430
164 N.E. 263

LARGE
v.
STATE.

No. 24680.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 19, 1928.

Appeal from Vigo Circuit Court; John P. Jeffries, Judge.

Willard Large was convicted for maintaining a nuisance, and he appeals. Reversed, with instructions.

Sweet & Littlefield and Wm. E. Horsley, all of Terre Haute, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., for the State.

WILLOUGHBY, J.

The appellant was charged with maintaining a nuisance as described in section 20, p. 25, c. 4, of the Acts of 1917. Said act, so far as necessary to consider it in this case, is as follows:

“Any room, house, building, boat, structure or place of any kind where intoxicating liquor is sold, manufactured, bartered or given away in violation of law, or where persons are permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquor as a beverage, or any place, building or club where such liquor is kept to be drunk as a beverage by the members thereof or any other persons, or any place where such liquor is kept for sale, barter, or delivery in violation of the laws of this state, and all intoxicating liquor and all property kept in and used in maintaining such a place, are hereby declared to be a common nuisance; and any person who maintains or assists in maintaining such common nuisance, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred ($100) dollars nor more than five hundred ($500) dollars and imprisoned in the county jail for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than six (6) months, ***.”

The affidavit upon which appellant was tried, omitting the caption and signature, is as follows:

“Will A. Church, for amended swears that Willard Large, late of said county, on or about the 5th day of March, A. D. 1924, at said county and State aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully keep, maintain, and assist in keeping and maintaining a common nuisance, to wit: a room, house, building, structure and place where intoxicating liquors were then and there kept for sale, barter, delivery and given away in violation of the laws of the State of Indiana, and where persons were then and there permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage in violation of the laws of the State of Indiana, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.”

[164 N.E. 264]

The appellant filed a motion to quash the affidavit for statutory reasons, viz.: That the facts stated in the affidavit do not constitute a public offense. That the affidavit does not state the offense with sufficient certainty. Section 2227 (2065), Burns' 1926. The motion to quash was overruled, and appellant pleaded not guilty. A trial by the court without a jury resulted in a finding of guilty upon which the court rendered judgment. A motion in arrest of judgment was made and overruled. A motion for a new trial was then overruled. The defendant appealed and assigned as error: (1) That the court erred in overruling his motion to quash the affidavit. (2) That the court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial.

At the time the defendant was charged with the commission of the alleged offense the mere possession of intoxicating liquor was not unlawful. Crabbs v. State, 193 Ind. 248, 139 N. E. 180.

By the act of 1923 (Acts 1923, p. 70, c. 23), the law which made it an offense to keep intoxicating liquor with intent to sell, barter, exchange, give away, furnish, or otherwise dispose of the same was repealed, and therefore it appears that on the 5th day of March, 1924, it was not unlawful to keep intoxicating liquor with intent to sell, barter, exchange, give away, furnish, or otherwise dispose of the same. Smith v. State, 194 Ind. 686, 144 N. E. 471.

The affidavit further charges that the appellant permitted persons to resort to his place for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage in violation of the laws of the state of Indiana. It does not appear from such affidavit what particular act of the appellant in permitting the drinking of intoxicating liquor was an offense, or why it was unlawful. The affidavit does not allege facts showing that such drinking was unlawful.

It is the constitutional right of the defendant to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a copy thereof. Article 1, § 13, Constitution of Indiana, McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 388.

[1] In Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N. E. 418, it is said the words “nature and cause of the accusation” have a well-defined meaning and had such meaning at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. That meaning is that the gist of an offense shall be charged in direct and unmistakable terms. In passing upon the same provision of the Federal Constitution in United States v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 557 (23 L. Ed. 588), the court said: “In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws of the United States, the accused has the constitutional right ‘to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.’ Amend. VI. In United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 142 [8 L. Ed. 636], this was construed to mean that the indictment must set forth the offense ‘with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged.’ And in United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 174 [21 L. Ed. 538], that ‘every ingredient of which the offense is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged.’ It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by Statute, ‘includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species; it must descend to particulars.”’ See, also, Sopher v. State, 169 Ind. 177, 81 N. E. 913, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172, 14 Ann. Cas. 27.

In Mayhew v. State, 189 Ind. 545, 128 N. E. 599, it is said: “The particular crime with which the accused is charged must be preferred with such reasonable certainty by the essential averments in the pleading as will enable the court and jury to distinctly understand what is to be tried and determined, and fully inform the defendant of the particular charge he is to meet. The averments must be so clear and distinct that there may be no difficulty in determining what evidence is admissible thereunder.” See also,...