Larimer Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Colo. Prop. Tax Adm'r
| Decision Date | 11 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 07CA0422,11CA0725 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Larimer County Board of Commissioners, Grand County Board of Commissioners, Board of Assessment Appeals, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Colorado Property Tax Administrator, Respondent-Appellant, and YMCA of the Rockies, Intervenor-Appellant. |
VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Opinion by JUDGE CARPARELLI
¶1 In this property tax exemption case, the Young Men's Christian Association of the Rockies (the YMCA) and the Colorado Property Tax Administrator appeal the Board of Assessment Appeals orders finding that the YMCA is not entitled to a charitable use exemption or a religious purposes exemption from property taxes, except for its chapels and religious activity center. We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over the tax administrator's appeal and, therefore, dismiss that appeal. With regard to the YMCA's appeal, we conclude that the Board erred as a matter of law. We vacate the Board's order finding that the YMCA is not entitled to a charitable use exemption and is not entitled to a religious purposes exemption, except for the chapels and religious activity center. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶2 The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of this appeal. The YMCA owns and operates facilities in Grand County and Larimer County. The first property, Snow Mountain Ranch, consists of 40 cabins, 12 vacation homes, and 61 campsites located on approximately 2,187 acres of land in Grand County. It also has a chapel, conference facilities, dining halls, a library, a swimming pool, athletic and recreational facilities, a laundromat, and maintenance and administration buildings.
¶3 The second property, the Estes Park Center, consists of 179 cabins, 25 vacation homes, and 451 lodge rooms located on approximately 860 acres of land in Larimer County near Rocky Mountain National Park. It also has a chapel, a museum, a library, conference facilities, auditoriums, dining halls, a swimming pool, a skate park and skating rink, a miniature golf course, a laundromat, and maintenance and administration buildings.
¶4 Snow Mountain Ranch and the Estes Park Center offer a wide variety of recreational activities, including hiking, fishing, mountain biking, snowshoeing, cross-country skiing, horseback riding, hayrides, swimming, tennis, ice skating, roller skating, basketball, softball, volleyball, miniature golf, ropes courses, fitness rooms, and crafts. The facilities also offer special activities and family programs, including Bible studies, worship services, archery, soccer, nature hikes, yoga, arts and crafts, story time at the library, scavenger hunts, and other games. Most activities are free or offered at nominal cost to guests. The YMCA gives arriving guests a list of all activities that are offered for the week, but does not require guests to participate in any of the activities or religious services.
¶5 In December 2003, the YMCA submitted applications for exemption from state property tax for Snow Mountain Ranch and the Estes Park Center.' It asserted that large portions of both properties were entitled to exemption under the religious purposes and charitable use exemptions.
¶6 In February 2005, after a state property tax specialist analyzed the applications and conducted field inspections, the specialist recommended granting the religious purposes exemption for both properties, except for areas the YMCA did not include in the applications. The specialist did not consider the YMCA's request for a charitable use exemption at that time. In May 2005, the property tax administrator determined that the properties identified in the applications were used exclusively for religious purposes and, therefore, were exempt from taxation, effective as of January 1, 2002.
¶7 In June 2005, the Grand County Board of Commissioners, the Larimer County Board of Commissioners, and several individual property owners (collectively, the Counties) appealed the tax administrator's determination to the Board. They argued that the YMCA's use of the properties was commercial rather than religious.
¶8 The Board conducted a hearing in August 2006, and issued an order in February 2007 in which it affirmed the tax administrator's determinations that the chapels and religious activities center were exempt, but reversed the decision as to all other areas.
¶9 The YMCA appealed the Board's order to the Court of Appeals. A division of this court stayed the appeal to enable the tax administrator to rule on the YMCA's application for a charitable use exemption.
¶10 In October 2009, a state property tax specialist recommended granting the charitable use exemption for both properties, except with regard to a small percentage of guests who used the properties for non-exempt purposes. In November 2009, the tax administrator granted Snow Mountain Ranch a 96% exemption and the Estes Park Center a 97% exemption, based on their charitable nonresidential use.
¶11 As before, the Counties appealed the tax administrator's determination to the Board, asserting that the YMCA's use of the properties was not exclusively for charitable purposes. After the Board conducted a hearing in June 2010, it issued an order in March 2011 denying the charitable use exemption. The Board found that the YMCA had not provided sufficient documentation of its guests' actual use to support its application.
¶12 After the YMCA appealed the Board's order denying its application for a charitable use exemption, a division of this court lifted the stay on the YMCA's appeal regarding the religious purposes exemption. We now consider the consolidated appeals.
¶13 The Counties argue that neither the tax administrator nor the YMCA has "standing to pursue these appeals" and that we do not have jurisdiction to entertain their appeals. We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the tax administrator's appeal and, therefore, dismiss that appeal. However, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear the YMCA's appeal.
¶14 The Counties use the terms "standing" and "jurisdiction" interchangeably in their briefs to argue that these appeals are not properly before us. However, as explained by the supreme court in Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1323 (Colo. 1989), standing and jurisdiction are distinct legal concepts.
¶15 Here, the Counties rely solely on section 39-2-117(6), C.R.S. 2012, which pertains to appellate jurisdiction, not to standing.2 Accordingly, we limit our analysis of the Counties' contention to whether we have jurisdiction to consider the appeals under section 39-2-117(6).
¶16 Section 39-2-117(5)(b), C.R.S. 2012, provides:
An appeal from any decision of the administrator may be taken by the board of county commissioners of the county wherein such property is located, or by any owner of taxable property in such county, or by the owner of the property for which exemption is claimed if exemption has been denied or revoked in full or in part. Any such appeal shall be taken to the board of assessment appeals pursuant to the provisions of section 39-2-125 no later than thirty days following the decision of the administrator.
¶17 "Section 39-2-117(6) outlines the availability of judicial review of Board decisions on appeals from the Administrator's determinations on property tax exemption applications." Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1321. This provision states:
If the decision of the board is against the petitioner, the petitioner may petition the court of appeals for judicial review thereof according to the Colorado appellate rules and the provisions of section 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. If the decision of the board is against the respondent, the respondent, upon the recommendation of the board that it is a matter of statewide concern, may petition the court of appeals for judicial review according to the Colorado appellate rules and the provisions of section 24-4-106(11), C.R.S.
¶18 The Counties contend that we do not have jurisdiction to entertain the tax administrator's appeal. They argue that they petitioned the Board to review the tax administrator's decision and that the administrator was the respondent. Based on section 39-2-117(6), they assert that, because the Board did not recommend that the matter is of statewide concern, the tax administrator may not appeal. We agree.
¶19 The supreme court considered whether the tax administrator could appeal from an adverse Board decision in Maurer. In that case, Young Life applied for religious purposes and charitable use exemptions from property taxes. After the tax administrator denied the application, Young Life appealed to the Board. Following a remand, the Board reversed the tax administrator's determination and granted the religious purposes exemption to Young Life. The Board certified the matter as one of statewide concern and the tax administrator...
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