Larkin v. Roseberry
Decision Date | 03 March 1944 |
Docket Number | No. 295.,295. |
Citation | 54 F. Supp. 373 |
Parties | LARKIN et al. v. ROSEBERRY et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
William B. Gess, of Lexington, Ky., for plaintiffs and petitioners.
John T. Metcalf, U. S. Atty. and Ben L. Kessinger, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Lexington, Ky., Howard V. Campbell, Principal Atty. for U. S. Department of Agriculture, of Washington, D. C., for defendants and respondents.
Plaintiffs are owners of certain agricultural lands located in Fayette County, Kentucky, known as Poplar Hill Farm, upon which tobacco is produced for market subject to the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 52 Stat. pp. 31-71, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1281-1407.
Defendants constitute the Local Review Committee appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture to review, upon application, the established marketing quota of any dissatisfied farmer of the county, pursuant to section 363 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1363.
The Review Committee having denied their application for an increase in the tobacco marketing quota established for their farm for the year 1943, plaintiffs instituted this proceeding in the Circuit Court of Fayette County, Kentucky, seeking a court review of the determinations made by the Committee. The proceeding was removed to this Court upon the ground that it is a suit of a civil nature arising under a law of the United States. Judicial Code, Sections 24 and 28, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41 and 71.
The plaintiffs have moved to remand the case to the State Court upon the grounds, (1) that it is not a "suit of a civil nature", within the meaning of sections 24 and 28 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41 and 71, (2) that it is not a suit arising under a law of the United States, within the meaning of the phrase "arising under," as used in the statute, and (3) that removal of the proceeding is precluded by section 367 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1367.
So far as pertinent to the questions involved, the provisions of the Act authorizing judicial review of the action of the Review Committee are as follows:
* * *"7 U.S.C.A. § 1365.
* * *"7 U.S.C.A. § 1366.
7 U.S.C.A. § 1367.
The plaintiffs' contention that the proceeding is not "a suit of a civil nature" within the meaning of the removal statute seems clearly untenable. Section 365, supra, describes the authorized proceeding as "a bill in equity against the review committee as defendant." In Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 464, 7 L.Ed. 481, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, said: Also see Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 20, 23 L.Ed. 524; Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407, 25 L.Ed. 206, Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 477, 10 S.Ct. 651, 34 L.Ed. 196, and Com'rs of Road Imp. District v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 547, 560, 42 S.Ct. 250, 66 L. Ed. 364.
That the Act is a law of the United States regulating interstate commerce within the meaning of subsection 8 of section 24 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(8), is not disputed. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 46, 59 S.Ct. 648, 83 L.Ed. 1092.
In their petition for review, the plaintiffs charge: "* * * that the County Committee and/or the Fayette County Agricultural Conservation Association, through its officers, agents and employees, established said quotas and yields upon bases and factors other than those as provided in the aforementioned Act, as amended, and in violation thereof; that said Review Committee failed and refused to take into consideration that the County Committee and the aforenamed association considered various and sundry factors and asserted conditions in fixing and determining the quotas and allotments for Poplar Hill Farm entirely outside of and beyond the scope of the terms and provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, and in violation thereof; * * *."
The prayer of the petition is "* * * that it be adjudged that these plaintiffs and petitioners are entitled to an acreage and marketing allotment of 15 acres for the year 1932", a measure of relief which could be granted by the court only if the Act be construed to extend the power of the court far beyond the limitations prescribed by section 366.
It thus appears from the face of the petition that this proceeding not only has its origin in a law of the United States, but it really and substantially involves a controversy as to "the scope of the terms and provisions" thereof which govern the establishment of marketing quotas as well as the construction and effect of its provisions relating to the relief which may be granted by the reviewing court. The result of the suit obviously depends upon the determination of these controversies. According to the standard prescribed in a long line of decisions, a proceeding which involves such controversies in respect to a law of the United States is one which "arises under" such law. State of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569, 32 S.Ct. 704, 56 L.Ed. 1205, and Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70.
The plaintiffs' contention that removal of this proceeding is precluded by the provisions of section 367 of the Act proceeds upon the theory that sections 365 and 367, supra, create a unique and distinctive procedure for judicial review of administrative findings which is complete within itself and to which the removal statute is not applicable. The necessary effect of plaintiffs' contention is that sections 365...
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