Larkin v. State, 29738

Decision Date03 December 1959
Docket NumberNo. 29738,29738
Citation240 Ind. 161,162 N.E.2d 515
PartiesNancy LARKIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Orval W. Anderson, Thomas R. Fadell, Gary, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Merl M. Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

JACKSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction in the Lake Juvenile Court. The appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of contributing to the delinquency of minors, the affidavit, omitting the formal parts thereof, signature and jurat, reads as follows:

'Upon Information and belief Martin J. Mulley, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says, that on or about the 17th day of July, A.D.1958, at and in the County of Lake and State of Indiana

'Ronald Lee Sutton, Born 11-11-1941, and Jerry Mulloy, born 7-9-42, were then and there minor children, under the age of eighteen years and that NANCY LARKIN, age 46, late of Lake County, Indiana, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully cause and encourage said children to violate laws, municipal ordinances and regulations to wit:

'(1) To patronize and visit a room and place wherein there is a bar where intoxicating liquors are sold;

'(2) To use intoxicating liquor as a beverage

'(3) To deport themselves so as to then and there willfully injure and endanger the morals and health of themselves and others; in this to-wit:

'Count 1: On July 17, 1958, defendant, the proprietor of Nancy's Lounge, 710 Washington Street, Gary, Lake County, Indiana, did serve alcoholic beverages, to wit: beer to Ronald Lee Sutton, a minor, and Jerry Mulloy, a minor, and permit said minors to consume the beer on said premises;

'Count 2: It is further alleged that on 7-17-58 defendant did sell four six-packs of beer to Jerry Mulloy, a minor, and said minor did then and there carry the beer from Nancy's Lounge and subsequently participate in consuming said alcoholic beverage;

'Count 3: It is further alleged that on 7-17-58, defendant did sell four six-packs of beer to Ronald Lee Sutton, a minor, and said minor did then and there carry the beer from Nancy's Lounge and subsequently participate in consuming said alcoholic beverage;

'Then and there contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'

Thereafter the defendant filed an affidavit for a change of venue from the regular judge, which change was granted and George Krstovich was selected and qualified as such special judge.

The statute upon which prosecution was based, Acts 1945, ch. 218, § 1, p. 1011, being § 10-812, Burns' 1956 Replacement reads in pertinent parts as follows:

'Contributing to delinquency of child.--It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or encourage any boy under the full age of eighteen years, or any girl under the full age of eighteen years, to commit any act which would cause such boy or girl to become delinquent child as defined by the laws of this state; * * *

'Or for any person by any continued negligence or wilful act, to encourage, or cause any such boy or girl to become a delinquent child as defined by the laws of this state;

'And, any person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars [$500] to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed six months.'

This court has previously held that the above statute must be construed in pari materia with Acts 1945, ch. 347, being §§ 9-3101 to 9-3124, Burns' 1956 Replacement, and Acts 1945, ch. 356, being §§ 9-3201 to 9-3224, Burns' 1956 Replacement. State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court, 1945, 223 Ind. 375, 391, 61 N.E.2d 168. The pertinent statute to be so construed in the instant case Acts 1945, ch. 356, § 4, p. 1724, being § 9-3204, Burns' 1956 Replacement, reads in pertinent parts as follows:

"Delinquent child' defined.--The words 'delinquent child' shall include any boy under the full age of eighteen years and any girl under the full age of eighteen years who:

'(1) Violates a law or municipal ordinance or regulation of the state or any subdivision thereof; except in proceedings concerning any child over sixteen years who has violated any of the traffic laws of the state or any traffic ordinance of a subdivision of the state;

* * *

* * *

'(10) Unaccompanied by parent, patronizes or visits any room wherein there is a bar where intoxicating liquors are sold;

* * *

* * *

'(14) Uses intoxicating liquor as a beverage, or who uses opium, cocaine, morphine or other similar drugs without the direction of a competent physician; * * *.'

There is some conflict in the evidence in this case and when this is true this court does not weigh the evidence, and all presumptions are in favor of the trial court.

Appellant's assignment of error consists of four separate specifications, viz.:

'1. That the Court erred in overruling Appellant's Motion for a New Trial.

'2. That the appellant was not accorded her constituional rights to a fair and impartial trial as required by Article I, Section 12 and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana.

'3. That the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter.

'4. That the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the person of the appellant.'

Specifications two, three and four do not present any question here on appeal, the record discloses that the appellant waived arraignment and trial by jury and admitted the venue.

The appellant's motion for a new trial likewise contains four specifications, which motion, omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows:

'Comes now the Defendant, in the above entitled cause, and moves the Court for a new trial thereof upon the...

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3 cases
  • Gilman v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 10 Mayo 1979
    ...361 N.E.2d 202. Of similar importance, the Burden rests on Gilman to establish that reversible error has occurred. See Larkin v. State, (1959) 240 Ind. 161, 162 N.E.2d 515; Smith v. State, (1961) 241 Ind. 598, 172 N.E.2d Gilman first alleges error in refusing to dismiss the information for ......
  • Scruggs v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 16 Octubre 1974
    ...his waiver of jury trial or that he objected to his trial before the court prior to raising this issue on appeal. See Larkin v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 160, 162 N.E.2d 515 and Bramlett v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 662, 87 N.E.2d 880. We find no Erroneous Sentence At the close of his trial by th......
  • Scruggs v. State, 3--1273A175
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 16 Octubre 1974
    ...prior to raising this issue on appeal. Therefore, Arlene Scruggs's second contention of error is without merit. See Larkin v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 161, 162 N.E.2d 515 and Bramlett v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 662, 87 N.E.2d Erroneous Sentence Arlene Scruggs's final contention of error concer......

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