State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court

• Decision Date: 21 May 1945
• Docket Number: 28093.
• Citation: 61 N.E.2d 168,223 Ind. 375
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GANNON v. LAKE CIRCUIT COURT et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

61 N.E.2d 168

223 Ind. 375

STATE ex rel. GANNON v. LAKE CIRCUIT COURT et al.

No. 28093.

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 21, 1945

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Gavit & Richardson, of Gary, for relator.

George E. Hershman, of Crown Point, Victor K. Roberts, of Lowell and Ray C. Hedman, of Crown Point, for respondents.

RICHMAN Judge.

Relator was appointed Judge of the Juvenile Court of Lake County pursuant to an act creating the court, approved March 9, 1945, which will be Chap. 347 of the Acts of 1945 when published. It gives to the new court exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile and related cases formerly within the jurisdiction of respondent court. We issued a temporary writ of prohibition against respondents from exercising any jurisdiction attempted to be conferred by the act upon relator or the court of which he is judge, and enjoining them from interfering with the exercise of the duties and functions of said court. Respondents' return asserts that the act is unconstitutional. Otherwise no defense is suggested except that such a writ may not run against individuals. To this we accede as will appear by the mandate herein. Respondents concede that in their official capacities they are proper parties. A writ directed against the Lake Circuit Court would bind its officers so they are not necessary parties, but in the absence of such concession there would be no harm in including them. State ex rel. Spencer v. Criminal Court, Marion County, 1938, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020, 16 N.E.2d 888.

'To prevent the encroachment by one (court) on the jurisdiction of the other is within the legal scope of a writ of prohibition * * *.' State ex rel. Cook v. Circuit Court of Madison County, 1923, 193 Ind. 20, 138 N.E. 762, 765, citing State ex rel. Harkness et al. v. Gleason, Judge, et al., 1918, 187 Ind. 297, 119 N.E. 9, 10, wherein the court says:

'The legislative act conferring original jurisdiction on this court to issue writs of prohibition to certain inferior courts named therein to confine such courts to their respective lawful jurisdiction does not extend or enlarge the scope of the writ of prohibition as it was known and recognized at common law. * * * The power of superintending control will not be exercised in the place of appellate jurisdiction or where another remedy exists. * * * It is not the policy of courts to exercise such power on slight occasion, but only in special emergency cases to prevent great impending present injury.'

See also 42 Am.Jur.Prohibition § 5 and note in 77 A.L.R. 245.

It would seem to follow that the issues in such a proceeding should be narrowly drawn. Accordingly we shall confine our inquiry herein to the jurisdictional dispute. If the legislature violated no constitutional provision in creating the Juvenile Court of Lake County and endowing it with exclusive jurisdiction as defined in § 3 of the act, and if relator is its present judge, the respondent court may be prohibited from exercising such jurisdiction.

The title is as follows:

'An Act providing for juvenile courts defining their powers and jurisdiction, providing for the appointment of probation officers, referees and other employees outlining their duties and authorities and specifying their compensation; providing for procedure in such courts including time and place of trial, providing for keeping records of such courts, the appointment of officers for same, fixing the term and salary of judges, the manner of election, the payment of salaries, the transfer of cases to such courts, conferring juvenile jurisdiction in certain counties in circuit and superior courts, making an appropriation, and repealing of laws or parts of laws in conflict therewith, and declaring an emergency.'

The first section, applicable to counties with 250,000 or more inhabitants (Lake and Marion), creates 'a special court to be known as the juvenile court,' to have an elective judge with a four year term, the first election to be in 1948, his term to begin January 1, 1949. The interim vacancy (in Lake County) is to be filled by appointment of the governor. Relator claims under such appointment which is not questioned except upon the constitutional grounds hereinafter considered.

Section 2, 3 and 12 are as follows:

'Section 2. In all other counties the circuit court and the judge thereof shall have and possess all the powers and shall perform the duties by law conferred on the juvenile court and the judge thereof.'

'Section 3. The juvenile courts created by this Act shall have original exclusive jurisdiction except when specifically waived by the court in such cases as provided by law in all cases of delinquent, dependent and neglected children as defined by law and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the paternity of any child born out of wedlock and to provide for the support and disposition of such child and in all other cases that may hereafter be conferred by law.'

'Section 12. That in counties where superior courts are established by law and are located in cities other than the county seat, except counties in which the judge of a court having juvenile jurisdiction is authorized by this Act to appoint a juvenile referee, such superior court and the judge thereof shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court and the judge thereof as provided by Section 2 of this Act and shall appoint one (1) probation officer which probation officer shall be paid compensation as provided for in this Act.

'Any circuit or superior court when in session under the provisions of this Act, shall for convenience, be known as the 'Juvenile Court', and such court may hold sessions irrespective of the terms of the circuit court or such superior court.'

There is a separability section, § 25, directing the saving of the remainder of the act if part is declared unconstitutional. Section 26 expressly excepts from the provisions of the act Vanderburgh County with its Probate Court established by Chap. 99, Acts of 1919, under which that court has juvenile jurisdiction. Chap. 260, Acts of 1933, creating the State Probation Commission, is declared by § 27 to remain in full force. Other inconsistent laws are repealed. The last section contains an emergency clause making the act effective April 1, 1945.

The act does not violate Art. 4, § 19, Const., requiring that 'Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith.' This is settled by the able opinion of Gillett, J., in Board of Commissioners of Elkhart County et al. v. Albright et al. 1907, 168 Ind. 564, 81 N.E. 578, 579, where similar contention was made with respect to the statute creating the Superior Court district of the Counties of Elkhart and St. Joseph. As we read the present act 'there is no difficulty in 'spelling out' from the title, taken as a whole, a single general subject,' namely, juvenile courts or a juvenile court system. As said by Judge Gillett: 'This becomes still clearer when the title is read in the light of the act.' The purpose is accomplished by creating special courts in the two largest counties and conferring upon circuit courts of the other counties juvenile jurisdiction. When such a court is exercising such jurisdiction it is to be known as a 'Juvenile Court.' § 12

Respondents say that §§ 22 and 23 of Art. 4 Const. are violated in that the act is local and special and seeks to regulate 'practice in courts of justice' by singling out the Lake and Marion Circuit Courts and removing jurisdiction in juvenile, delinquency and paternity cases from them to a juvenile court while leaving such jurisdiction in all other circuit courts in the state.

They say 'the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts throughout the State must be uniform.'

Even were the act local and special the constitutional provisions would not apply. Woods v. McCay, Treasurer, 1895, 144 Ind. 316, 43 N.E. 269, 33 L.R.A. 97; Board, etc., v. Albright, supra. However, we regard the act as a general law. It is of uniform operation in the state and in the same category as many valid laws classifying cities or counties for purposes of local government. Until a county has a population of 250,000 juvenile jurisdiction is given to and remains in its circuit court, and in the superior court of certain counties. See § 12. When a county attains by the last preceding census a population of 250,000, it will have a special juvenile court on the same terms as those in Lake and Marion County. See Wayne Township v. Brown, 1933, 205 Ind. 437, 461, 186 N.E. 841, 850. There is nothing in the act that purports to prescribe one kind of practice for the special juvenile courts and another for the circuit courts exercising juvenile jurisdiction. While there are procedural provisions different from the code of civil practice yet they are applicable to all courts exercising juvenile jurisdiction, such as section 13, which permits all hearings to be held in chambers and empowers the court to exclude from hearings persons who in his opinion are not necessary for the hearing. By section 8 juvenile courts are given power to adopt rules but it is required that they shall be in conformity with those prescribed by the Supreme Court on the same subject. We understand that it is the prerogative of any court to promulgate reasonable rules, with safeguards as above, that will facilitate the business of the court.

Respondents rely upon Heckler v. Conter, 1933, 206 Ind. 376, 187 N.E. 878, and Ettinger v. Studevent, 1941, 219 Ind 406, 38 N.E.2d 1000. The former held that the legislature had made an arbitrary and capricious classification in a statute 'abolishing the office of city treasurer in all second and fourth class cities located in a county having a population of not less than two hundred fifty...