Larkin v. State of Mich. Dept. of Social Services
| Decision Date | 16 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1138,95-1138 |
| Citation | 89 F.3d 285 |
| Parties | Geraldine LARKIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Intervenor-Appellee, v. STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant, State of Michigan; City of Westland, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Gregory J. Bator (argued and briefed), Bator & Zartarian, Birmingham, MI, for plaintiff-appellee Geraldine Larkin.
Stewart R. Hakola (briefed), Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Marquette, MI, Gayle C. Rosen (argued and briefed), Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Livonia, MI, Beth Pepper (briefed), Stein & Schonfeld, Baltimore, MD, for intervenor Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service.
Stephen H. Garrard, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued and briefed), Dept. of Atty. Gen., Social Services Div., Lansing, MI, for defendant-appellant Michigan Dept. of Social Services.
William D. Winters, Angela B. King (briefed), McLain & Winters, Ypsilanti, MI, for amicus curiae Ypsilanti Tp.
Roy W. Froemming, Wisc. Coalition for Advocacy, Madison, WI, for amicus curiae Nat. Ass'n of Protection & Advocacy Systems.
Kathy L. Peterson (briefed), Ypsilanti, MI, for amici curiae ARC of Michigan, Autism Society of Michigan, United Cerebral Palsy of Michigan, Ass'n for Community Advocacy, Disability Network, American Disabled for Asst. Programs Today (ADAPT), of Michigan.
Kenneth C. Sparks, Bauckham, Reed, Lang, Schaefer & Travis, Kalamazoo, MI, for amicus curiae Michigan Tps. Ass'n.
Rebecca K. Troth (argued and briefed), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae U.S.
Before: SUHRHEINRICH and SILER, Circuit Judges; ANN ALDRICH, * District Judge.
Defendant-Appellant State of Michigan Department of Social Services appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Geraldine Larkin and intervenor-appellee Michigan Protection and Advocacy Services. The district court held that the spacing and notice requirements of the Michigan Adult Foster Care Licensing Act are preempted by the federal Fair Housing Act and violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Because we agree that the Fair Housing Act preempts the spacing and notice requirements of the Michigan Adult Foster Care Licensing Act, we affirm without reaching the equal protection issue.
Geraldine Larkin sought a license to operate an adult foster care (AFC) facility which would provide care for up to four handicapped adults in Westland, Michigan. The Michigan Adult Foster Care Licensing Act (MAFCLA), M.C.L. §§ 400.701 et seq., governs the issuance of such licenses. It prevents the issuance of a temporary license if the proposed AFC facility would "substantially contribute to an excessive concentration" of community residential facilities within a municipality. M.C.L. § 400.716(1). Moreover, it requires compliance with section 3b of the state's zoning enabling act, codified as M.C.L. § 125.583b. M.C.L. § 400.716(3). Section 3b of the zoning act provides in part:
At least 45 days before licensing a residential facility [which provides resident services or care for six or fewer persons under 24-hour supervision], the state licensing agency shall notify the council ... or the designated agency of the city or village where the proposed facility is to be located to review the number of existing or proposed similar state licensed residential facilities whose property lines are within a 1,500-foot radius of the property lines of the proposed facility. The council of a city or village or an agency of the city or village to which the authority is delegated, when a proposed facility is to be located within the city or village, shall give appropriate notification ... to those residents whose property lines are within a 1,500-foot radius of the property lines of the proposed facility. A state licensing agency shall not license a proposed residential facility if another state licensed residential facility exists within the 1,500-foot radius of the proposed location, unless permitted by local zoning ordinances or if the issuance of the license would substantially contribute to an excessive concentration of state licensed residential facilities within the city or village.
M.C.L. § 125.583b(4). MAFCLA also requires notice to the municipality in which the proposed AFC facility will be located. M.C.L. § 400.732(1).
Michigan Department of Social Services (MDSS) notified Westland of Larkin's application in accordance with MAFCLA. Westland determined that there was an existing AFC facility within 1,500 feet of the proposed facility and so notified MDSS. It also notified MDSS that it was not waiving the spacing requirement, so that MDSS could not issue a license to Larkin. When MDSS informed Larkin of Westland's action, Larkin withdrew her application.
Larkin filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that Michigan's statutory scheme violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA) as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). Larkin also alleged that MAFCLA violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution. In addition, Larkin named Westland as a defendant, alleging that it had violated the FHAA by not waiving the 1500-foot requirement. Michigan Protective and Advocacy Services (MPAS) moved to intervene as of right on the ground that it had a federal mandate to protect the rights of the handicapped. The district court granted that motion. 1
The parties agreed that there were no disputed issues of material fact and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After oral argument, the district court ruled that the 1500-foot spacing requirement and the notice requirements of M.C.L. § 125.583b(4), as incorporated into MAFCLA by M.C.L. § 400.716(3), were preempted by the FHAA because they were in conflict with it. The court also ruled that these statutes violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, the court enjoined the defendants from enforcing §§ 125.583b(4) & 400.716(3). 2 MDSS appeals this decision.
However, the court ruled that Westland did not violate the FHAA because it lacked the authority to waive the 1500-foot requirement under Michigan law. The court also rejected Larkin's claim for damages as barred under the eleventh amendment. The plaintiffs do not appeal these rulings.
Larkin filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification of the court's order, as the court did not discuss M.C.L. § 400.732(1), which requires MDSS to notify the municipality of the proposed facility. The defendants concurred with the plaintiff's motion in so far as it sought clarification. The court, noting the similarity in the notice provisions of M.C.L. §§ 125.583b(4) & 400.732(1), held that § 400.732(1) also violated the FHAA and the equal protection clause, and enjoined its enforcement. The defendants also appeal from this order.
The defendants appeal from a grant of summary judgment. We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Winningham v. North American Resources Corp., 42 F.3d 981, 984 (6th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Here, the parties agree that there are no disputes as to any material facts. Therefore, the only question is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment based on the agreed upon facts.
Congress passed the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, gender, and national origin. In 1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), which expanded the coverage of the FHA to include people with disabilities. The FHA, as amended by the FHAA, makes it unlawful to:
discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of--
* * * * * *
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (emphasis added). It is well-settled that the FHAA applies to the regulation of group homes. See Smith & Lee Assoc. v. City of Taylor, Mich., 13 F.3d 920, 924 (6th Cir.1993); Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir.1992). Moreover, Congress explicitly intended for the FHAA to apply to zoning ordinances and other laws which would restrict the placement of group homes. See H. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185.
The plaintiffs argue, and the district court found, that the MAFCLA provisions at issue discriminate in violation of the FHAA, and are therefore preempted by it. Congress may preempt state law in one of three ways. Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn., Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2522-23, 81 L.Ed.2d 399 (1984). First, Congress may explicitly preempt state laws. Id. Second, it may preempt by "occupying the field." Id. Finally, federal law preempts state law when they actually conflict, i.e., it is not possible to comply with both the state and the federal laws. Id. In this case, the FHAA expressly provides that any state law "that purports to require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid." 42 U.S.C. § 3615. Thus, the FHAA expressly preempts those state laws with which it conflicts, and the first and third types of preemption merge in this case.
This brings us to the crux of the case: whether the statutes at issue discriminate against the disabled in...
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