Larsen, Matter of

• Decision Date: 17 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-27,88-27
• Citation: 770 P.2d 1089
• Parties: In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Fred LARSEN, Fred LARSEN, Appellant (Employee/Claimant), v. HALL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee (Employer/Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1089

770 P.2d 1089

In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Fred LARSEN,

Fred LARSEN, Appellant (Employee/Claimant), v. HALL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee (Employer/Respondent).

No. 88-27.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 17, 1989.

David A. Drell, Casper, for appellant.

Tim I. Munson, Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., retired.

THOMAS, Justice.

The critical question in this appeal is whether an employer, Hall Construction Company (Hall), met its burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of any material fact in order to justify a summary judgment in its favor with respect to the claim of an employee, Fred Larsen (Larsen), for temporary total disability benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. There is a threshold question with respect to whether the District Court for the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County had jurisdiction in the case because, if it did not, the judgment would be void. We conclude that the District Court for the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County did have jurisdiction over the worker's compensation claim, but we agree with Larsen that Hall failed to sustain its burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of any material fact. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Hall must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Larsen, in his Brief of Appellant, simply asserts a broad allegation of error in this way:

"I. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the employer and precluding the employee from being awarded benefits for temporary total disability from and after March 25, 1987."

Hall, as appellee, divides Larsen's claim of error into separate questions which it iterates in this way:

"1. Whether Appellant (Employee) waived any impropriety of venue in Campbell County, Wyoming, and whether venue of this contested worker's compensation case in Campbell County materially prejudiced Appellant (Employee)?

"2. Whether the district court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of Appellee (Employer) and against Appellant (Employee)?"

Prior to December 14, 1986, Larsen appeared to be a robust man in excellent health. On that day, he was injured in a truck rollover while performing work within the scope of his employment for Hall. Ever since the accident, Larsen has complained of disabling pain preventing his return to work. The record does indicate, however, that he still is capable of performing heavy ranch labor and strenuous rodeo activities.

Following the accident, Larsen filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits including a request for monthly temporary total disability payments. In accordance with the statutory requirement, the original claim was filed in the court in the county where the injury occurred, the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County. Hall objected to Larsen's claim for temporary total disability, running from the date of the accident through January 23, 1987, but payment was ordered despite the objection because the district court found that the objection was not timely filed. Hall previously had approved Larsen's initial bills for medications, so payment also was ordered for these bills.

On February 12, 1987, Hall filed a petition protesting the award of all further benefits contending that Larsen had suffered no compensable injury. This petition was dismissed based upon a finding that Hall was estopped from asserting this argument because of its earlier approval of the medical bills. Then, on March 25, 1987, Hall filed its second "Objection of Employer Disputing the Right of Employee to Receive Compensation." This time, the filing was determined to be timely.

The next day, March 26, 1987, Larsen filed a Request for Transfer of Case to which Hall amicably consented. Because of the "Application of the Employee * * * and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised," the case was transferred, pursuant to an appropriate order, from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County to the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District in and for Converse County. The case did not stay in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, however, because, before that court resolved any matters other than procedural determinations, the court sent the case back to Campbell County with the statement, "I am going to return the file to Campbell County and allow Judge O'Brien to set any hearings necessary to resolve the matter." Neither party had requested that the case be returned to Campbell County, and no order for the return of the case was ever entered. Neither party objected to this reassignment, however, and both appeared in the subsequent proceedings which were conducted in Campbell County.

A series of motions and continuances followed, and a hearing ultimately was held on October 7, 1987. The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County, although noting that medical expenses and prescription bills should be paid pursuant to an agreement by both parties, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Hall which barred any award for temporary total disability subsequent to March 20, 1987. The court then ordered the case transferred again to Converse County. Larsen, still insisting that his debilitating injury prevents his return to work, has appealed from that decision.

We turn first to Larsen's claim of lack of jurisdiction. He contends that the District Court for the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County was without subject matter jurisdiction over Hall's Motion for Summary Judgment because the case had been sent back to that court without properly following the procedures outlined in § 27-12-601, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.). Larsen asserts correctly that the summary judgment is void and of no effect if jurisdiction is absent. See Matter of Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933 (Wyo.1988). The statute upon which Larsen relies, however, while pertinent to venue, does not determine subject matter jurisdiction, and a failure to comply with the statute does not require a conclusion of a jurisdictional defect. Further, this case, contrary to the urgings of appellant, is not controlled by the dictum of R.L. Manning Company v. Millsap, 687 P.2d 252 (Wyo.1984). That case is readily distinguished in that, unlike this case, the original transferring court had never acquired jurisdiction to act in any capacity and, also unlike this case, the parties did not accept the transferee court as a convenient forum.

Section 27-12-601, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), in effect at the time of Larsen's injury, provided, in pertinent part:

"(a) If an injury or death resulting from injury is reported to the clerk of the district court of the county in which the injury occurred, * * * the clerk or his designee shall review the reports of the injury to ascertain whether the case should be docketed. * * *

"(b) At any time after the employee files his claim, he may request that the case and entire file be transferred to the district court of the county in which he resides. At any time after the employee has filed the employer's report of injury, he may request that the case and entire file be transferred to the district court of the county in which his main office in Wyoming is located. * * * If no objection is filed within ten (10) days after notice has been mailed, or if both parties request transfer of the case to the same district court, the clerk shall make proper notation in the docket and forward the entire file to the district court requested."

The mechanism found in this statute permits an employee or an employer to request a transfer of a worker's compensation claim once it has been properly filed in the county in which the injury occurred. The transfer is usually accomplished as a matter of course if neither party protests, or if both parties request it. This is the procedure which Larsen invoked when he requested the case be transferred from Campbell County to Converse County. Despite Larsen's interpretation to the contrary, this statute neither creates nor rejects subject matter jurisdiction in any certain district court; it relates only to venue. See Myuskovich v. State ex rel. Osborn, 59 Wyo. 406, 141 P.2d 540 (1943).

The district courts in this state are courts of general jurisdiction. Murrell v. Stock Growers' National Bank of Cheyenne, 74 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir.1934). See Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953 (...