Larson v. Amundson, C0-87-250

• Decision Date: 13 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. C0-87-250,C0-87-250
• Parties: Donna Lee LARSON, Appellant, v. Duane S. AMUNDSON, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 413

414 N.W.2d 413

Donna Lee LARSON, Appellant, v. Duane S. AMUNDSON, et al., Respondents.

No. C0-87-250.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Oct. 13, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court did not err in finding the original roadway was not a fixed easement.

2. Appellant did not obtain the right to use the driveway through easement by prescription.

3. Appellant did not obtain the right to use the driveway through an irrevocable license.

4. The evidence supports the trial court's findings.

Patrick J. Neaton, Muenzer & Neaton, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Charles R. Kennedy, Kennedy & Nervig, Wadena, for respondents.

Heard, considered and decided by POPOVICH, C.J., and WOZNIAK and NIERENGARTEN, JJ.

OPINION

WOZNIAK, Judge.

This is an appeal from an action commenced by appellant Donna Larson seeking a declaration that she is entitled to a permanent access easement in the form of a driveway across property owned by respondents Duane and Estelle Amundson. The trial court found appellant had no easement, and she appeals the judgment dismissing her claim. We affirm.

FACTS

In 1955, Melvin and Rosalie Nyhus began selling lakeshore lots on a large wooded area of property located between the southern shore of West Leaf Lake and Trunk Highway 108 in Otter Tail County, Minnesota [see diagram]. Appellant and her husband purchased one of the first lots on the eastern side of the property. The Nyhuses eventually sold additional lots along the lakeshore located west of the Larson's lot and reserved the eastern-most section of the property for themselves. An old dirt trail ran across the property from the highway to the eastern edge of the lakeshore lots. The trail was located on the undeveloped portion of the property the Nyhuses had reserved for themselves.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

Between 1955 and 1961, Nyhuses conveyed seven lakeshore lots by warranty deeds which contained a provision granting the buyers ingress and egress to their lots "on a road to be laid out" by the Nyhuses. However, the Nyhuses did not immediately lay out the new road and continued to permit the lot owners to use the original trail for access. The Nyhuses gave appellant permission to clear a 50-70 foot road from their property over the Nyhus property to reach the original trail and Highway 108. To gain access to the lots from 1958 to 1966, all the lot owners continued to use the original trail, as well as an old logging trail which ran along the back of each lot. During this period, Nyhus was never asked by the lot owners to "lay out" the access road as covenanted in the deeds.

In 1961, appellant's husband purchased two more lots from the Nyhuses, with both warranty deeds granting the right of access to the lots on "a road to be laid out" by the Nyhuses. In 1965, appellant's husband resold the lots, with the deeds also containing language granting access on a road to be laid out in the future.

In 1966, respondent and his brother purchased the eastern portion of the property originally reserved by the Nyhuses. The deed respondent accepted from the Nyhuses did not reserve any access easement on their behalf or burden the land with any easement or servitude. Apparently because they no longer owned the property in which the original trail was located, shortly after the sale to respondent, Nyhus constructed a new gravel access road as required in the deeds. This new road was located on property the Nyhuses still owned, and ran from the highway to the lakeshore lots on the western side of the property. Appellant retained access to the new roadway by following the road located behind the lakeshore lots. In 1977, the Nyhuses sold the remaining portions of their property, including the portion over which the new road was constructed. In this deed, a specific exception was made for the lakeshore lots previously conveyed.

The new road was used by all the lot owners except appellant, respondents and one additional lot owner. The same year the Nyhuses constructed the new road, respondents constructed, at their own expense, a driveway located entirely on their property. This new driveway followed a significant portion of the original trail, but branched off the original trail westerly until it entered Highway 108.

Respondents contend they granted appellant and her husband permission to use the new driveway and permission to continue using the road the appellants cleared over respondents' property to reach the new driveway. They testified that appellant's husband regularly would request permission to use the driveway. Appellant, on the other hand, claims respondents obtained their permission to construct the new driveway and that they continued to use it without any express permission from respondents. Further, appellant claims that respondents never objected to her continuous use of the driveway, while respondents stress that appellant never claimed a right to access over their land. Nonetheless, both parties continued to openly use the driveway.

In 1973, the parties split the cost of paving the driveway to the points where the driveway turned off to the individual residences. Appellant's cost totaled $1,800, with another $515 in 1980 for maintenance. The third landowner using the driveway also contributed to the 1980 maintenance costs, and respondents denied his request to purchase an easement to use the driveway.

Respondents later installed a locked gate at the driveway's entrance to Highway 108 and furnished appellant with a key. Respondents next installed a gate across the roadway appellant's husband had cleared at the point where the roadway crossed respondents' property. Appellant also was given a key to the lock on this gate.

Finally, in 1983 respondents replaced the second gate with a fence. The fence was constructed after respondents returned from vacation and found the gates unlocked and left open. They also found some of their property had been damaged and stolen. Because appellant and her husband possessed the only other key, respondents held them responsible and revoked their permission to use the driveway. Appellant was then forced to use the less-convenient new roadway.

Appellant initiated this action seeking a declaration she was entitled to a permanent access easement across respondents' property. She claimed the existence of an express grant with a fixed location defined by their constant use of the driveway, that a prescriptive easement was created, and that respondents were estopped from denying existence of the easement.

The trial court found that appellant held no easement to cross respondents' property and use the driveway. The court found that the Nyhuses and all subsequent grantees, including appellant, had intended that Nyhus would lay out the access road at a later date as reserved in the deeds. The court found that Nyhus permitted use of the old roadway until the right reserved in the deed to designate the right of access was exercised in 1966. Further, the court determined appellant's use of respondents' new driveway was permissive and that appellant had never designated the easement's location. The court thus dismissed appellant's claim after concluding that no easement existed, and she appeals.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in finding the original roadway was not a fixed easement and that the right to designate the new roadway was retained?

2. Did appellant establish the right to use the new driveway through easement by prescription?

3. Did appellant establish the right to use the new driveway through an irrevocable license?

4. Are the trial court's findings supported by the evidence?

ANALYSIS

The record indicates that appellant did not make a motion for a new trial and that this appeal is from the judgment entered pursuant to the trial court's findings and conclusions. When there has been no motion for a new trial, the scope of review is limited to determining whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and judgment. Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (1976).

1. The language of the deed expresses the final, binding agreement between the grantor and grantee. Hubachek v. Brown, 126 Minn. 359, 362-63, 148 N.W. 121, 122 (1914). Here, the language in the deed created an easement granting appellant "a right of ingress to and egress from the lands herein described on a road to be laid out by [Nyhuses]." The scope of an easement created by express grant depends entirely upon the construction of the terms of the grant. Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Northwestern National Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Minn.1977). The extent of an easement should not be enlarged by legal construction beyond the objects originally contemplated or expressly agreed upon by the parties. Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 258, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789-90 (1970). The court has the equitable power to determine the fair extent of an easement when the parties are unable to agree. Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 429, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937).

The crux of appellant's contention is the indefinite location of the easement caused by the Nyhuses' delay in exercising their reserved right to locate the new road. She relies upon Ingelson, which determined the rules governing the location of easements where the description is indefinite as follows:

[T]he grantor has the right in the first instance to designate and locate the roadway, and, if reasonably suitable for the purpose, a selection of a place cannot be questioned.

If the grantor omits to exercise this right, the grantee may make the selection and his selection will be upheld unless he has abused the right.

Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 428, 272 N.W.2d at 274 (citations omitted). Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held:

Where a way is granted without fixing its location, but there is a way already located at the time of the grant, such way...