Larson v. Cox

• Decision Date: 04 March 1903
• Docket Number: 12,684
• Citation: 93 N.W. 1011,68 Neb. 44
• Parties: LAWRENCE E. LARSON v. FRANCIS M. COX
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

93 N.W. 1011

68 Neb. 44

LAWRENCE E. LARSON v. FRANCIS M. COX

No. 12,684

Supreme Court of Nebraska

March 4, 1903

ERROR to the district court for Dawes county: WILLIAM H. WESTOVER DISTRICT JUDGE. Affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Albert W. Crites, for plaintiff in error.

Ernest M. Slattery and C. Dana Sayrs, contra.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This was an action by Larson against Cox to recover damages for slander. The defamatory words set out in the petition amount to a charge of larceny. The defendant in his answer alleged that the charge was true, and that it was made with good motives and for justifiable ends. The jury found against the plaintiff and judgment followed the verdict.

The assignments of error discussed by counsel relate for the most part to the plea of justification, and raise the question whether the truth of slanderous matter is per se a complete defense. The contention of counsel for plaintiff is that the truth is unavailing unless it was uttered with a good motive and for a proper purpose. His argument is grounded altogether upon the provision of the constitution which declares that "in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense." Constitution, art. 1, sec. 5. The provision here quoted is a substitute for section 3, article 1, of the constitution of 1866, which was an almost literal copy of a New York statute adopted soon after the trial of the celebrated case in which Croswell was convicted of publishing a libel on Thomas Jefferson. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337. This statute was intended to secure and safeguard the freedom of the press, and is now fundamental law in many of the states. It was a modification of the doctrine of the common law that, in public prosecutions for libel, the truth of the libel is no excuse for its publication. When considered in the light of history, there is much reason to suppose that the constitutional provision upon which plaintiff relies was designed as a sure and permanent protection, both in civil and criminal actions, to persons who have occasion, in the discharge of some legal, social or moral duty, to write and publish criticisms on the character and conduct of others and that it was not any part of its purpose to take away from the defendant in a libel case any right given him either by the statutory law or the common law. The truth of a defamatory publication is still a complete and perfect defense in a criminal case, irrespective of the...