Larson v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 13 June 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 31560,31560 |
| Citation | 142 So.2d 727 |
| Parties | J. Edwin LARSON, State Treasurer and ex officio Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. Glen HARRISON, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Kelly and Gerald Mager, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
Fletcher Fleming of Shell, fleming & Davis, Pensacola, for respondent.
Writ of certiorari discharged and the cause dismissed.
DREW, Justice .
I would like very much to be able to agree with the dissenting opinion of my esteemed associate, Mr. Justice TERRELL, in this case but I cannot ascribe to the quoted language of the Constitution the meaning which he gives to the words 'a class of constitutional or state officers.' I think, in the light of events which have transpired since the effective date of Amended Article V, that it would have been wise had the amendment given this Court the power to review by direct appeal or certiorari any decision of a trial court which affected any cabinet officer of this state but I am unable to find any way to interpret the present amendment to give it that effect. I, therefore, must conclude that the state treasurer does not fall within the classification set forth and I am, therefore, compelled to cast my vote in favor of discharging the writ.
I agree to discharge writ because of the facts of this case.
July 10, 1956, a motor vehicle owned by and registered in the name of respondent, Glen Harrison, a Florida citizen, was involved in an accident in the State of Michigan. At the time of the accident, the motor vehicle was operated by J. C. Lackey. December 27, 1957, suit was brought against respondent and Lackey in the Circuit Court of Ingraham County, Lansing, Michigan. A copy of the complaint was served upon respondent December 30, 1957, as required by § 257.403, Comp.Laws Mich.1948, Pub.Acts 1949, No. 300.
August 10, 1959, a default judgment was entered against respondent and J. C. Lackey in the amount of $5,528.85, copy of which was personally served upon respondent August 15, 1959, in Pensacola, Florida. November 16, 1959, the Motor Vehicle Department of Michigan entered an order suspending the license and driving privileges of respondent in Michigan for failure to satisfy said judgment, copy of which was received by the Financial Responsibility Division of the State Treasurer's office November 23, 1959. November 19, 1959, the Financial Responsibility Division received an abstract of the court record in the said cause certifying the unsatisfied judgment in the amount stated herein.
December 15, 1959, the insurance commissioner, petitioner, issued an order suspending the driver's license, registration and license plates of the respondent because of failure to satisfy the judgment rendered in the State of Michigan. The said order of suspension inadvertently referred to § 324.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., instead of § 324.121, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. August 31, 1960, as authorized by § 324.121, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., petitioner issued a nunc pro tune order of suspension which was transmitted to respondent by certified mail.
August 10, 1960, or thereabout, respondent filed his complaint in Court of Record, Escambia County, praying for a temporary restraning order enjoining petitioner from enforcing the order suspending his driver's license, registration and license plates. August 10, 1960, the court granted the temporary restraining order. August 31, 1960, petitioner filed his answer and counterclaim. September 23, 1960, the court entered final decree dissolving the temporary restraining order and directed respondent to surrender his driver's license, registration and license plates to the insurance commissioner. February 9, 1961, the court of record denied the petition for rehearing.
February 20, 1961, respondent entered his appeal to the District Court of Appeal, First District. Motion to dismiss the appeal was seasonably overruled and on September 21, 1961, the district court of appeal reversed the judgment of the Court of Record of Escambia County. Petition for rehearing was denied and petitioner moved the district court to certify the question presented in the cause to the Supreme Court as being one of great public interest, which motion was denied.
We are confronted with an appeal by certiorari from the order of the district court wherein the order of the Court of Record of Escambia County was reversed.
We first determine whether or not this court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the questions presented in this cause. The petitioner contends that the question of jurisdiction is concluded in the affirmative by that part of Section 4(2), Article V of the Constitution, which provides that the Supreme Court 'may review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional or state officers.'
A state officer, said this court, is 'a person in the service of the government, whose field for the exercise of his jurisdiction, duties and powers is coextensive with [the territoria] limits of the state * * * and whose authority involves an exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, either in making, executing, or administering the laws.' Glendinning v. Curry, 153 Fla. 398, 14 So.2d 794; Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 146 Fla. 622, 1 So.2d 636. It does not appear that this court has heretofore determined what is comprehended in the phrase 'a class of constitutional or state officers.' In this I do not overlook what we said in Hakam v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.1959, 108 So.2d 608; State v. Robinson, Fla.1961, 132 So.2d 156, and Lake v. Lake, Fla.1958, 103 So.2d 639, 642. Nothing said as to law or fact in any of these cases has the slightest influence on the case at bar. It is admitted that the petitioner, state treasurer, is a constitutional officer, but it is contended that he is a single officer and does not constitute a 'class' because it requires several of a kind to do so.
I think 'a class of constitutional or state officers' lends itself to such analysis as gives it a reasonable field of operation. The word 'class' may be said to limit 'constitutional' officers, but it does not limit 'state officers.' The two phrases are connected by the disjunctive 'or' which in one aspect connotes difference or separation. As used here it places constitutional officers and state officers in two separate categories so that 'class' modifies nothing but constitutional officers. Many officers in Florida, besides state officers, are recognized by the Constitution and may be classified as constitutional officers. They include county officers, district officers and others created by statute. Then there is a larger class of state officers including the members of the cabinet, railroad commission, state board of health, citrus commission, presidential electors, members of the legislature and others. Some of these lend themselves to classification but certainly members of the cabinet would not. They are not limited by the word 'class' as...
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Florida State Bd. of Health v. Lewis
...cannot be a class in the sense used in the Constitution. There is only one State Treasurer, not a class of State Treaurers. Larson v. Harrison, Fla., 142 So.2d 727. There is only one Secretary of State, not a class of Secretaries of State. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Standard Oil Co. e......
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Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Standard Oil Co.
...here present the petition is denied. TERRELL, Justice (dissenting). I dissent for reasons stated in my dissent in Larson et al. v. Harrison et al., Fla., 142 So.2d 727. ...
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