Larson v. Lowden
| Citation | 282 N.W. 669,204 Minn. 80 |
| Decision Date | 09 December 1938 |
| Docket Number | 31,796,31,797 |
| Parties | JESSIE J. AND ALFRED LARSON v. FRANK O. LOWDEN AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county by husband and wife against defendants as trustees of the property of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company to recover for injuries sustained by the wife, for damage to the husband's auto, and consequential damages suffered by him because of his wife's injuries arising out of a collision between his car and one of defendants' trains at a crossing. The cases were tried together before Carlton McNally, Judge, and a jury, and verdicts were returned in each case in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appealed from the judgments and from orders denying their motions for a new trial. Affirmed.
Municipal corporation -- ordinance -- validity -- regulation of train signals at crossings.
1. An ordinance prohibiting the unnecessary ringing of bells and blowing of whistles on locomotives within the corporate limits of a city is reasonable and valid.
Evidence -- ordinance -- admissibility in negligence case.
2. An ordinance, being an evidentiary fact in a negligence case may be proved without having been pleaded, like any other fact tending to prove or disprove the ultimate fact of negligence.
Railroad -- duty to give signals -- action against railroad -- instructions.
3. An instruction that under a city ordinance which provides that a railroad shall not ring a bell or blow a whistle except against immediate threatened danger a railroad is not negligent because of the failure alone to blow a whistle or ring a bell, but that it is a question of fact whether, in the exercise of due care in the operation of a train, it is the duty of the railroad to give such a warning against such danger, correctly applies the ordinance.
Railroad -- crossing -- "obstruction" -- statute.
4. An obstruction of the driver's view, which by 1 Mason Minn St. 1927, § 2720-4(b), is deemed to exist when he does not have a clear and uninterrupted view of an intersection, includes all obstructions without qualification as to kind, source, or permanency, and may include temporary accumulations of snow and other materials upon the windshield as well permanent structures such as buildings and embankments by the roadside which cut off the view.
Samuel A. Anderson and Russell M. Carlson, for appellants.
O'Brien, Horn & Stringer, for respondents.
These actions arise out of a crossing collision between one of defendants' trains and plaintiff Alfred Larson's automobile, a Chevrolet coach, at about eight p.m. on the evening of February 19, 1937. Alfred Larson sues to recover damages to his automobile, loss of its use, and damage sustained because of injuries to his wife, Jessie Larson. She sues to recover for personal injuries. Alfred Larson was driving and his wife was a passenger. She sat in the front seat on the driver's right. The train was backing south on a switch track, and plaintiffs were going east on Bayfield street in St. Paul, en route to an airport. Plaintiffs claim that defendants were negligent in failing to have a headlight on the end of the tank heading the train with the front of the engine coupled to a string of boxcars, and failing to warn by sounding a bell or whistle before crossing the street. Defendants claim that they had a light on the tank and that they blew the whistle and rang the bell before crossing. It was dark and a wet snow was falling. About one-half to one inch of snow fell during the six hours preceding the collision. The windows of the car were closed, and the snow had "plastered" the windows and windshield. Alfred Larson testified that the snow-covering on the windshield and windows was not "solid." He had a clear lookout only through a space on the windshield kept clean by a windshield wiper which cleaned a space about one foot wide at the bottom of the swing. The Larsons could not see beyond the edge of the pavement through the other portions of the windshield and the side windows. Just before the collision the car was going 15 to 20 miles per hour. Alfred Larson had driven this route a number of times, knew that the switch track ran north and south across the street a short distance west of the airport, and he knew at the time that they were nearing the crossing but could not see the tracks or warning posts. He saw the airport lights in the near distance and must have known where he was. Larson saw the lights of an automobile approaching from the east, and his wife saw the lights when the automobile was at least 25 feet away. The driver of the approaching car saw the train when it was about 75 feet north of the crossing, but neither he nor the Larsons heard the engine, which was then on the left of the Larsons, backing onto the crossing with a string of boxcars at about ten miles per hour. None of them saw any light on the tank. The tank of the engine collided with the front portion of Larson's car, which came to rest facing south, alongside the train. Alfred Larson testified that the leaned forward to watch through the clear space on the windshield and could have seen the light on the engine if there had been one. No buildings or other fixed obstructions affected the view of the track at the crossing. Members of the train crew testified that there was a light on the end of the tank at the head of the train, that the bell was ringing, and that a crossing whistle had been given. The verdict was for defendants.
Plaintiffs' assignments of error question the admissibility and validity of an ordinance of the city of St. Paul, and instructions based on the ordinance and the speed statute. The ordinance, which was not pleaded in the answer, provides that it shall be unlawful to ring the bell or blow the whistle of a railroad locomotive within the city "except as a warning against immediate threatened danger, and only upon starting an engine." Although not pleaded, the ordinance was received over plaintiffs' objection. In the instructions it was stated that defendants could not be held negligent for failing to perform what the ordinance prohibited, that the failure to blow the whistle and ring the bell alone was not negligence, that defendants were bound to exercise due care in the operation of their trains, and that it was a fact question whether, under the circumstances, it was the duty of defendants in the exercise of due care to give warning by ringing the bell or blowing the whistle against immediate threatened danger of injury, if any, to plaintiffs.
1 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 2720-4(b)(1), which was repealed after the accident by L. 1937, c. 464, § 144, provides that a speed in excess of 15 miles per hour is prima facie evidence that the operator of an automobile is driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and proper when approaching within 50 feet of a grade crossing of a steam railway when the driver's view is obstructed, and that a driver's view shall be deemed to be obstructed "when at any time during the last two hundred feet of his approach to such crossing he does not have a clear and uninterrupted view of such railway crossing and of any traffic on such railway for a distance of four hundred feet in each direction from such crossing." The instructions left it to the jury to find the fact whether the driver's view was obstructed by the snow on the windows and the windshield. The jury was instructed that it could find for defendants if they were not negligent, or, in Alfred Larson's case, if he were guilty of contributory negligence, and in the Jessie Larson case, if Alfred Larson's negligence, if any, were the sole cause of the accident.
1. Plaintiffs claim that the ordinance is invalid on the ground that it is unreasonable. It is urged in support of the claim that the ordinance is arbitrary and conflicts with well settled principles of law applicable to the subject matter. No claim is made that the city is not authorized by its charter to legislate upon the subject matter of the ordinance. Ordinances prohibiting the unnecessary ringing of bells and blowing of whistles on locomotives within the corporate limits of a city are reasonable and valid. C.R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Steckman, 224 Ill. 500, 79 N.E. 602; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hemmer, Admx, 206 Ind. 311, 186 N.E. 285, 189 N.E. 137; McAbee v. Southern Ry. Co. 166 S.C. 166, 164 S.E. 444; Langham v C.R.I. & P. Ry. Co. 197 Iowa 1118, 198 N.W. 525; 2 Dillon, Municipal Corp. (5 ed.) § 717, p. 1093; see Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569, 36 Am. R. 188; Katzenberger v. Lawo, 90 Tenn. 235, 16 S.W. 611, 13 L.R.A. 185, 25 A.S.R. 681. We assumed that such an ordinance was valid in Gendreau v. M. St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. 99 Minn. 38, 108 N.W. 814. No hard and fast test has ever been adopted by which to determine the reasonableness of ordinances. Regard is had to the purposes and powers of municipal corporations and whether the provisions of the ordinance are appropriate and in themselves reasonable, not simply expedient, under the circumstances, and not oppressive. Northwestern T.E. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 83 N.W. 527, 86 N.W. 69, 53 L.R.A. 175; Evison v. C. St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co. 45 Minn. 370, 48 N.W. 6, 11 L.R.A. 434. Municipal corporations have no inherent power...
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