Larson v. Solbakken

• Decision Date: 22 October 1963
• Citation: 221 Cal.App.2d 410,34 Cal.Rptr. 450
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ada Dorothy LARSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ray Vernon SOLBAKKEN, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 20588.

Page 450

34 Cal.Rptr. 450

221 Cal.App.2d 410

Ada Dorothy LARSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ray Vernon SOLBAKKEN, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 20588.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 22, 1963.

Dorsey Redland, D. E. Cavileer, San Francisco, for appellant.

Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, San Francisco, for respondent.

MOLINARI, Justice.

This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment after jury trial for defendant in an action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a collision between two automobiles under the following circumstances:

Defendant was driving his automobile going north on U. S. Highway No. 101, in the County of Sonoma, on June 3, 1959, at about 5:30 p. m. The said highway in the area of the collision, which is the subject of this action, is a two-lane highway 20 feet in width. As defendant rounded a curve in the highway he observed plaintiff's vehicle in front of him proceeding in the same direction he was travelling. ¹ The highway proceeds in a straight direction for approximately 1,500 feet after the curve. It was on this straight stretch of highway that the subject collision occurred. Defendant accelerated his automobile and turned from the right lane into the left lane, intending to pass plaintiff's vehicle. Approximately 100 feet from the point of ultimate impact between the vehicles, plaintiff turned into the left lane, intending to make a left turn into the driveway of her home on the west side of the highway. Defendant applied the brakes of his car, which skidded and struck plaintiff's vehicle. The point of impact was approximately 450 feet from the curve aforementioned, the collision occurring in the left lane, adjacent to the shoulder of the highway, and just south of plaintiff's driveway. The right front of defendant's automobile struck the left rear fender and taillight of plaintiff's car, which rolled approximately 150 feet after the impact because, as plaintiff testified, she 'couldn't find the brakes; * * *.' Defendant's vehicle moved from 10 to 15 feet straight forward after the impact.

Defendant testified that at no time did his speed exceed 55 miles per hour. Highway Patrol Officer Gottschalk testified that in his opinion the maximum safe speed at the general location of the accident was 55 miles per hour. The officer testified further that defendant told him at the scene of the accident that he had been travelling at a speed of 70 miles per hour prior to the accident. Plaintiff also testified that defendant had stated to her at the scene that he had been driving his vehicle at 70 miles per hour. Pearl Dukes, a friend of defendant and a passenger sitting in the front seat of the car, testified that, because she was nervous at high speeds, she had been watching the speedometer of defendant's car just before the accident and that defendant had not exceeded 55 miles per hour. With regard to the speed of plaintiff's automobile, there was evidence that as she turned from the north-bound lane into the south-bound lane she was travelling about 25-30 miles per hour, and that thereafter she slowed to about 15 miles per hour.

Officer Gottschalk testified that defendant's car laid down 114 feet of skid marks which started in the north-bound lane. These marks were identified by the officer on photographs of the locale taken 15 days after the accident. Defendant denied that these were his skid marks, and testified that the skid marks made by his car were all in the left lane and that they measured from 82 to 86 feet. Defendant testified that he and another officer had paced off the skid marks at the scene of the accident. It was also his testimony that after his vehicle started to skid he kept it in a straight course because he had no indication as to what plaintiff was going to do.

Defendant also testified that he had turned from the right lane into the left lane at a point some 200 feet before he applied his brakes and started skidding. In this regard, Mrs. Dukes testified that defendant had turned into the left lane a considerable distance before plaintiff made her turn from the right lane to the left lane. There was also testimony by defendant and Mrs. Dukes that they saw no light at all on the rear of plaintiff's vehicle prior to the collision, and that plaintiff gave no signal of any kind. Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that she had actuated her left turn blinker before starting to turn. Another witness, a neighbor of plaintiff, testified that she had observed that the turn signal was working as plaintiff was turning into her driveway.

It is apparent from the foregoing narrative that there were substantial conflicts in the evidence, the resolution of which was for the trier of fact. It is an elementary rule that, where opposing factual inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the inference drawn by the jury may not be disturbed by an appellate tribunal. (Thayer v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 55 Cal.2d 430, 438, 11 Cal.Rptr. 560, 360 P.2d 56.) Plaintiff does not take umbrage at this rule and its applicability in the present case, but claims that the trial court committed several instances of error, the cumulative effect of which seriously prejudiced the presentation of her case so as to warrant a reversal. These assignments of alleged error we shall now proceed to discuss.

Defendant's Knowledge and Intent at Time of Accident

After the jury was impaneled in the present case, counsel for both parties repaired to the trial judge's chambers where the following proceedings and colloquy between the court and counsel took place: 'THE COURT: Do you want to make a statement, then, for the record? MR. HAWKINSON: Yes. May the record show that in a conference in chambers, the defendant requested a ruling that the defendant's references to insurance following the accident are irrelevant and improper evidence; and that was overruled? THE COURT: Yes. MR. HAWKINSON: And may the second request, that the defendant's statement to the plaintiff after the accident about a 'near miss' previously is at this junction ruled irrelevant? THE COURT: Yes; and that the plaintiff will be instructed--The plaintiff's attorney is instructed to instruct the plaintiff not to volunteer it. MR. CAVILEER: Yes, Judge, I certainly shall do so. However, while we are talking on the subject: I didn't know this was going to come up; counsel didn't mention it before. He has a copy of Mr. Solbakken's deposition, and I would like to read, just for the record, Your Honor, and Your Honor may reconsider the most recent ruling in the light of this. This is my deposing Mr. Solbakken: 'Q. You remember that at the scene of the collision and in Mrs. Larson's presence mentioning a previous situation where you had almost had an accident under similar circumstances? A. Yes. I mentioned that to somebody. I don't remember mentioning it to Mrs. Larson. Q. Did that take place near Cloverdale? A. No. Near Hopland. Q. It was the same general type of situation? A. Almost. There was two cars, a pickup and a big truck ahead of it, and I had a clear road ahead, and I started to pass. Just when I got opposite the pickup, this fellow here decided--there was a kind of a roadhouse or something to the left, a big should, so he gave about a 50-foot signal to turn left when I was already opposite this pickup, right behind, which was right behind him. So I blew the horn then, and--I blew the horn, and I kept moving over to my left. So he seen me quick enough, so he hesitated enough so I got around him to the left and got back on the right-hand side of the road. That was just the time before, about nine or ten days.' That is page 60 of Mr. Solbakken's deposition. THE COURT: That wouldn't change my ruling, Mr. Cavileer. MR. CAVILEER: All right. THE COURT: That wouldn't change my thinking on it.'

Plaintiff claims that the exclusion of defendant's statement made at the scene of the collision constitutes prejudicial error. ² It is plaintiff's contention that this statement was relevant to demonstrate defendant's knowledge of a dangerous situation. The gist of her argument is that defendant's comment concerning a prior similar experience amounts to an acknowledgment of his awareness and intention immediately preceding the collision. Plaintiff argues that the said awareness consisted of defendant's knowledge of the danger involved in passing a vehicle known to be making a turning maneuver, and his condition of mind was manifested in the attempt to pass with knowledge of plaintiff's intention to turn. ³ Plaintiff therefore maintains that if the jury had been afforded the benefit of the statement in question it could properly draw an inference that defendant intended to pass plaintiff's automobile knowing that she was about to make a left turn. This inference, says plaintiff, could then have been considered and weighed by the jury as against defendant's testimony that he was surprised by plaintiff's left turn.

The state of mind of a person is a fact to be proved like any other fact when it is relevant to an issue in the case; and when knowledge of a fact has important bearing upon the issues, evidence is admissible which relates to the question of the existence or nonexistence of such knowledge. (Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal.2d 193, 200, 180 P.2d 873, 171 A.L.R. 667; Oil Workers International Union, C. I. O. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 532-533, 230 P.2d 71; Roberts v. Patterson, 170 Cal.App.2d 661, 665, 339 P.2d 236.) Accordingly, whenever the motive or intent with which an act was done is relevant, or whenever the knowledge a person may have had is material to an issue, a wide range of proof is allowed. (Cope v. Davison, supra, 30 Cal.2d p. 200, 180 P.2d pp. 877-878, 171 A.L.R. 667; Oil Werkers International Union, C. I. O. v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d p. 533, 230 P.2d pp. 83-84.) Such state of mind or knowledge may, therefore, be evidenced by the affirmative...