Larson v. United States
Decision Date | 27 November 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 16660.,16660. |
Citation | 296 F.2d 167 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Parties | Owen L. LARSON, Local Agent of United Benefit Fire Insurance Company, Omaha, Nebraska, and United Benefit Fire Insurance Company, Omaha, Nebraska, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
James L. McMullin, Kansas City, Mo., and Austin F. Shute, Kansas City, Mo., were on the brief, for appellants.
F. Russell Millin, U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., and John S. Boyer, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before VOGEL, VAN OOSTERHOUT and BLACKMUN, Circuit Judges.
Owen L. Larson, Local Agent of United Benefit Fire Insurance Company, Omaha, Nebraska, and United Benefit Fire Insurance Company, Omaha, Nebraska, are appealing herein from an order of the District Court denying their motion for remission of bond forfeiture.
It is not denied that in addition thereto Fleming and his bondsman, Larson, were notified that the arraignment was set for Friday morning, September 2, 1960, by letters from the United States Attorney's office mailed August 30, 1960. No claim of lack of notice as to the time of appearance is made.
(District Court's unpublished Memorandum and Order, filed November 23, 1960.)
On September 2, 1960, upon Fleming's case being called for arraignment, he failed to appear. Larson did appear in court and explained that the night before he had received a telephone call from Fleming, who indicated that he was going to Savannah, Missouri, but that he would meet his bondsman at nine o'clock the next morning. The court thereupon directed that a warrant issue, that Fleming be taken and held without bond and be brought directly before the court. The same day the court entered an order of forfeiture.
By September 14, 1960, the forfeiture not having been paid, an order was filed directing that execution issue. The execution was returned unsatisfied. On September 20, 1960, the District Court entered an order suspending the authority of the United Benefit Fire Insurance Company to write bail bonds and surety bonds in the Western District of Missouri. On September 21, 1960, the forfeiture was paid, not by the surety, United Benefit Fire Insurance Company, but by the Central Casualty Company of Evanston, Illinois.
On September 29, 1960, during the time Fleming was a fugitive, the grand jury returned an indictment against him and Hardison. The indictment charged violations of the Dyer Act and conspiracy.
On the morning of October 16, 1960, Fleming returned to Kansas City with the intention of turning himself over to the authorities. He called his wife on the telephone just prior to reaching home, telling her of his intentions. She, in turn, immediately notified the bondsman, the local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the company of one Bradshaw (also in the bail bond business), Larson went to Fleming's home, took Fleming into custody while the place was surrounded by local police, and then turned him over to the authorities. On October 21, 1960, a motion for remission of bond forfeiture was filed, together with suggestions supportive thereof. Larson claimed to have spent considerable time, effort and money in attempting to apprehend Fleming, including the offering of a $500 reward for information leading to his apprehension, which Larson claimed would have to be paid. Counsel stated in his suggestions in support of the motion:
The government strongly resisted the motion for remission of bond forfeiture, pointing out that Fleming's failure to appear was willful, that he was gone from September 2nd to October 16th, that while he was apprehended at his residence by Larson, he had nevertheless returned of his own accord and had called his wife, intending to turn himself in, that at the time Larson apprehended Fleming the residence was surrounded by local police, that there was no evidence that any reward had been paid or that it would have to be paid, and that there was an inordinate delay in the payment of the forfeiture, such payment not being made until after execution on the judgment had been issued and returned unsatisfied.
On November 23, 1960, the District Court denied the motion for remission and in so doing stated:
Since March 2, 1946, the date the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective, the exercise of considerable latitude in the remission of bail forfeiture has rested with the District Courts. Rule 46(f) (2) and (4), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., provides:
Clearly, in the adoption of Rule 46 there is indicated the intention to substantially broaden the discretion of the District Courts from that which had theretofore existed. Smaldone v. United States, 10 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 161, 163; United States v. Davis, 7 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 621, 624, certiorari denied sub. nom. Ferguson v. United States, 345 U.S. 998, 73 S.Ct. 1141, 97 L.Ed. 1404. Cf., Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 1942, 314 U.S. 527, 62 S.Ct. 393, 86 L.Ed. 426, decided before the enactment of Rule 46, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. It is only where there has been an abuse of discretion that an appellate court may set aside the action of the District Court denying the remission of a forfeiture. We are in full accord with the statement and resolution of the issue by Judge Duffy, speaking for the court in United States v. Davis, supra, wherein he said:
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