State v. Hedrick
| Decision Date | 22 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 25360.,25360. |
| Citation | 204 W.Va. 547,514 S.E.2d 397 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Clyde J. HEDRICK, Defendant Below, Appellee, Raymond A. Young, Jr., d/b/a City Bonding Company, Appellant. |
William J. Ihlenfeld, Ihlenfeld Law Office, Wheeling, West Virginia, Attorney for the Appellant.
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Barbara H. Allen, Managing Deputy Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Appellee, State of West Virginia. DAVIS, Justice:
Appellant herein, Raymond A. Young, Jr., d/b/a City Bonding Company [hereinafter "City Bonding"], appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Pendleton County entered in connection with a criminal action against Clyde J. Hedrick [hereinafter "Hedrick"], an appellee herein, remitting only $355,000.00 of $455,000.00 in bail bonds City Bonding posted on behalf of Hedrick. The bonds were forfeited upon Hedrick's failure to appear at a hearing before the circuit court. On appeal to this Court, City Bonding argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to remit the entire $455,000.00 in forfeited bail bonds, because City Bonding endeavored to return Hedrick to the court's jurisdiction, and because Hedrick voluntarily turned himself in and was in custody after being absent for only thirty-seven days. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by remitting only $355,000.00 of the forfeited bail bonds.
The basic facts underlying this appeal are undisputed by the parties. Appellant City Bonding, acting as surety, posted bail bonds totaling $455,000.001 on behalf of Clyde J. Hedrick, an appellee herein and criminal defendant below,2 guaranteeing Hedrick's appearance before the Circuit Court of Pendleton County at a hearing that was subsequently scheduled for March 4, 1998. Hedrick failed to appear at the March 4 hearing. Consequently, the Pendleton County Prosecuting Attorney [hereinafter "the State"] moved the circuit court to declare that the bonds posted on behalf of Hedrick be forfeited. The court granted the State's motion. Thereafter, the State moved that it be awarded a $455,000.00 judgment against City Bonding in connection with the forfeited bonds.
A hearing on the State's motion for judgment was held on March 23, 1998. After considering arguments presented by the parties, the circuit court granted the State's motion and entered judgment against City Bonding as requested. During the course of the hearing, City Bonding did not object to a judgment against it but sought "some time before there be any execution on that bond" so that it might locate Hedrick and return him to the jurisdiction of the court. City Bonding also reported that it was attempting to locate Hedrick and, because the media was present at the hearing, offered to detail its efforts to the court in chambers.3 In response to City Bonding's request for additional time, the circuit court stated that it might consider a stay of execution only if City Bonding deposited $455,000.00 "in the breast of the Court and placed on an interest-bearing account, with the General Receiver or a good faith showing by the bonding company that that be done[.]" City Bonding responded that it was unable to make such a deposit that day. Consequently, on March 24, 1998, the State caused the circuit clerk to issue a writ of execution against the property of City Bonding in order to collect the judgment.
Due to City Bonding's failure to pay the judgment against it, a second hearing was held on April 7, 1998. At this hearing, counsel for the State explained that he had contacted counsel for City Bonding on an almost daily basis in an attempt to collect the judgment. The State asked that City Bonding be required to disclose certain financial information concerning its ability to satisfy the judgment so that the State could proceed with its collection efforts. Counsel for City Bonding explained that steps were being taken to procure a letter of credit in the amount of $455,000.00. City Bonding also requested ninety days, to begin on April 7, 1998, within which to produce Hedrick and offered to tender a check in the amount of the judgment on the ninety-first day if it was unsuccessful in this endeavor. The circuit court apparently declined to grant City Bonding's request for a ninety-day stay of execution, and ordered City Bonding to produce the financial documents requested by the State at a future hearing, which was subsequently scheduled for April 13,1998.
On April 10, 1998, prior to the next scheduled hearing in this matter, Hedrick voluntarily surrendered himself to officials in Miami, Florida.4
A third hearing was then held on April 13, 1998, whereat City Bonding disclosed numerous financial records, in partial compliance with the circuit court's previous order. During the hearing, City Bonding made an oral motion to exonerate the judgment against it based upon the fact that Hedrick was in custody in the State of Florida. City Bonding also moved, once again, for a stay of execution on the $455,000.00 in forfeited bonds. The circuit court again ruled that it would grant a stay of execution only if City Boding deposited the amount of the bonds, plus interest, with the circuit clerk or filed with the clerk an irrevocable unconditional letter of credit for that amount. During this hearing, counsel for City Bonding also described City Bonding's efforts to locate Hedrick and return him to court.5
Thereafter, on April 16, 1998, City Bonding obtained a letter of credit in the amount of $458,116.50;6 however, the letter was not received by the circuit clerk until April 23, 1998. The final hearing on this matter was held on May 7, 1998. The purpose of this hearing was to address City Bonding's motion to exonerate its obligation on the forfeited bail bonds. After hearing the arguments of the parties, the circuit court remitted and exonerated all but $100,000.00 of the forfeited bail bonds. The court explained:
The Court believes, as counsel has indicated, that it has the authority to exonerate the bond in full; Mr. Hedrick is here now; or to exonerate a portion of the bond. Everyone here knew, including the bonding company, that this term of court started with the Grand Jury action on March the 3rd; that arraignment date was the following day; and that trials would be this month, starting next Monday, the 11th of May, with jury selections scheduled for that day. It is fairly obvious at this time that there is a Motion to Continue filed by Mr. Hedrick, and it's fairly obvious that that motion probably should be granted at this late juncture, since this is his first appearance, and it's now the 7th of May and just four days hence his jury selection. So the Court will be considering that motion in that vein here in a few moments.
City Bonding moved for a thirty-day stay of execution pending appeal to this Court. The circuit court denied the motion until such time as City Bonding deposited $100,000.00 with the clerk of the circuit court. City Bonding states that, on May 8, 1998, it sent a check in the amount of $100,000.00 to the circuit court. On May 21, 1998, the circuit court entered an order reflecting its rulings of May 7, 1998. It is from that order that City Bonding now appeals.7
City Bonding raises the issue of whether the circuit court erred by failing to remit the entire amount of the forfeited bail bonds. We have not previously articulated a standard of review for this issue. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that our review of the circuit court's decision on this issue is for an abuse of discretion. Because a circuit court's actions with regard to forfeiture of bail and associated topics such as remission of forfeited bail and exoneration of the obligor of bail are governed by Rule 46 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, we begin our analysis of the appropriate standard of review by examining the relevant portions of that rule, which state:
(e) Forfeiture....
(2) Setting Aside.—The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it...
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...for guidance when applying or construing a rule of this Court that is patterned after a federal rule. See State v. Hedrick , 204 W. Va. 547, 554, 514 S.E.2d 397, 404 (1999) ("Consequently, because the relevant provisions of W. Va. R. Crim. P. 46 are substantially the same as Rule 46 of the ......
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