Larson v. Wasemiller
| Decision Date | 16 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A05-1698.,No. A05-1701.,A05-1698.,A05-1701. |
| Parties | Mary LARSON, et al., Appellants, v. James Preston WASEMILLER, M.D., Respondent (A05-1698), Paul Scot Wasemiller, M.D., et al., Defendants, St. Francis Medical Center, Respondent (A05-1701). |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Diane B. Bratvold, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for MN Defense Lawyers Association.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
Appellants Mary and Michael Larson commenced this medical malpractice claim against respondent Dr. James Wasemiller, Dr. Paul Wasemiller and the Dakota Clinic for negligence in connection with the performance of gastric bypass surgery on Mary Larson. The Larsons also joined respondent St. Francis Medical Center as a defendant, claiming, among other things, that St. Francis was negligent in granting surgery privileges to Dr. James Wasemiller. St. Francis then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Minnesota does recognize a claim for negligent credentialing, but certified two questions to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that Minnesota does not recognize a commonlaw cause of action for negligent credentialing. Larson v. Wasemiller, 718 N.W.2d 461, 467-68 (Minn.App.2006). We reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
In April 2002, Dr. James Wasemiller, with the assistance of his brother, Dr. Paul Wasemiller, performed gastric bypass surgery on Mary Larson at St. Francis Medical Center in Breckenridge, Minnesota. Larson experienced complications following the surgery, and Dr. Paul Wasemiller performed a second surgery on April 12, 2002 to address the complications. On April 22, 2002, after being moved to a long-term care facility, Larson was transferred to MeritCare Hospital for emergency surgery. Larson remained hospitalized until June 28, 2002.
The Larsons claim that St. Francis was negligent in credentialing Dr. James P. Wasemiller. Credentialing decisions determine which physicians are granted hospital privileges and what specific procedures they can perform in the hospital. See Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals' Physician Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 Temp. L.Rev. 597, 598 (2000). The granting of hospital privileges normally does not create an employment relationship with the hospital, but it allows physicians access to the hospital's facilities and imposes certain professional standards. Id. at 605. The decision to grant hospital privileges to a physician is made by the hospital's governing body based on the recommendations of the credentials committee. A credentials committee is a type of peer review committee. Minnesota, like most other states, has a peer review statute that provides for the confidentiality of peer review proceedings and grants some immunity to those involved in the credentialing process. Minn.Stat. §§ 145.61-.67 (2006).
The district court noted that the majority of courts in other jurisdictions have recognized a duty on the part of hospitals to exercise reasonable care in granting privileges to physicians to practice medicine at the hospital. The court also noted that the existence of such a duty is objectively reasonable and consistent with public policy. The court therefore held that Minnesota "will and does recognize, at common law, a professional tort against hospitals and review organizations for negligent credentialing/privileging."
After denying St. Francis' motion to dismiss, the district court certified the following two questions to the court of appeals:
A. Does the state of Minnesota recognize a common law cause of action of privileging of a physician against a hospital or other review organization?
B. Does Minn.Stat. §§ 145.63-145.64 grant immunity from or otherwise limit liability of a hospital or other review organization for a claim of negligent credentialing/privileging of a physician?
The court of appeals held that Minnesota does not recognize a common law cause of action for negligent credentialing of a physician against a hospital, and noted that the confidentiality mandate of Minn. Stat. § 145.64 "limits the evidence that could be used to support or defend against such a claim in a manner that appears to affect the fundamental fairness of recognizing such a claim * * *." Wasemiller, 718 N.W.2d at 470. The court appropriately deferred to this court or to the legislature to address the complex policy concerns involved. Id. at 468.
In response to the second certified question, the court of appeals held that the plain language of Minn.Stat. §§ 145.63-.64 does not grant immunity to a hospital or other review organization from liability for a claim of negligent credentialing of a physician, but that the statute does limit the liability of hospitals or other review organizations "to actions or recommendations not made in the reasonable belief that the action or recommendation is warranted by facts known to it after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts on which its action or recommendation is made." Wasemiller, 718 N.W.2d at 469-70. Neither party challenges the court of appeals' answer to the second certified question.
The Larsons sought review of the court of appeals holding that Minnesota does not recognize a claim for negligent credentialing. This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Minn.2004). Certified questions are questions of law that this court also reviews de novo. Fedziuk v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 696 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn.2005).
We turn to the first certified question—whether Minnesota recognizes a cause of action for negligent credentialing. In determining whether Minnesota recognizes a particular cause of action this court must look to the common law and any statutes that might expand or restrict the common law. This court has the power to recognize and abolish common law doctrines, Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn.1998), as well as to define common law torts and their defenses, Schumann v. McGinn, 307 Minn. 446, 467, 240 N.W.2d 525, 537 (1976). It is also the province of the legislature to modify the common law, Jung v. St. Paul Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 223 Minn. 402, 405, 27 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1947), but statutes are presumed not to alter or modify the common law unless they expressly so provide, Agassiz & Odessa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Magnusson, 272 Minn. 156, 166, 136 N.W.2d 861, 868 (1965).
We consider, first, whether the language of the peer review statute actually creates a cause of action for negligent credentialing. Section 145.63, subd. 1, provides that
No review organization and no person shall be liable for damages or other relief in any action by reason of the performance of the review organization or person of any duty, function, or activity as a review organization or a member of a review committee or by reason of any recommendation or action of the review committee when the person acts in the reasonable belief that the action or recommendation is warranted by facts known to the person or the review organization after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts upon which the review organization's action or recommendation is made * * *.
(emphasis added.) The legislature has the authority to create a cause of action for negligent credentialing. The question is whether section 145.63, subdivision 1, expresses an intent to do so.
Although stated in the negative, the language of this statute implies that a review organization shall be liable for granting privileges where the grant is not reasonably based on the facts that were known or that could have been known by reasonable efforts. This language could be read as evidencing the legislative intent to establish such a cause of action, whether or not one existed at common law.
We agree with the Larsons that the immunity provision of the peer review statute contemplates the existence of a cause of action for negligent credentialing—otherwise there would be no need for the legislature to address the standard of care applicable to such an action. But we are reluctant to conclude that the statute affirmatively creates such a cause of action because the standard of care is stated in the negative.1
Ultimately, we need not determine whether the statute creates a cause of action because, at the very least, the statute does not negate or abrogate such a cause of action and this leaves us free to consider whether the cause of action exists at common law.
In deciding whether to recognize a common law tort, this court looks to (1) whether the tort is inherent in, or the natural extension of, a well-established common law right, (2) whether the tort has been recognized in other common law states, (3) whether recognition of a cause of action will create tension with other applicable laws, and (4) whether such tension is...
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