Larson v. Williams

• Decision Date: 10 December 1896
• Citation: 69 N.W. 441,100 Iowa 110
• Parties: LARSON v. WILLIAMS ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

69 N.W. 441

100 Iowa 110

LARSON v. WILLIAMS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa

December 10, 1896

Appeal from district court, Calhoun county; Charles D. Goldsmith Judge.

This is an action in equity to cancel a certain judgment rendered in the district court of Calhoun county, Iowa, on December 17, 1890, in which action these defendants were plaintiffs and Peter Larson and his wife, this plaintiff, were defendants. Plaintiffs, in that action, sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien against the defendants therein. They averred that they had entered into an oral contract with the "defendant" to build a dwelling house; that the house was built for the "defendant"; that "defendant" was the owner of the land and building situated thereon. They set out the filing of their statement for a lien, and asked judgment "against defendants," and the enforcement of their lien against the land and building. The statement shows that the contract was made with Peter Larson, and that he owned the land on which the house was erected. The account was against Peter Larson alone. The original notice ran against "Peter Larson and wife, Celia Larson, defendants," and notified them that a petition would be filed "claiming of you the sum of $86," with interest. It claimed the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien against the real estate described, and that "unless you appear thereto and defend * * * a default will be entered against you, and judgment entered thereon." Both parties defendant having made default, a judgment was rendered against them as prayed, and a decree entered establishing and foreclosing the lien. July 7, 1893 the defendants herein caused an execution to issue on said judgment against Peter Larson and this plaintiff, and caused a debtor of this plaintiff to be garnished. February 9, 1893 this action was commenced by plaintiff. The grounds alleged for canceling the judgment, as against this plaintiff are--First, that the court had no jurisdiction to enter said judgment, there being no allegation in the petition showing any personal liability on part of Celia Larson; and, second, that fraud was practiced by the successful parties and their attorney in obtaining the judgment. Facts are set forth in plaintiff’s petition, which, if true, would constitute a complete defense to said action as against her. On the hearing the court found that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction as against said Celia Larson; that, at the time the labor was performed for which a lien was established, she was not the wife of Peter Larson, and not a party to said contract; that said judgment, in so far as it was personal against this plaintiff, was obtained by fraud practiced by the defendants and their attorney; and that plaintiff did not discover that a personal judgment had been rendered against her until more than a year after its rendition, by reason of the representations of defendants and their attorney. The personal judgment against plaintiff was set aside. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

M. R. & J. B. McCrary, for appellants.

M. W. Beach, for appellee.

OPINION

KINNE, J.

1. This cause was heard in this court, and an opinion filed affirming the judgment of the lower court. See 63 N.W. 464. A rehearing has been granted, and the cause is again before us for determination. Without entering into a lengthy discussion of the facts, it may be said that there was nothing in the petition in the case of Williams & Betenbender v. Peter and Celia Larson, or in the issues involved in that case, to warrant a personal judgment as against Celia Larson. She was not a party to the contract out of which the lien arose. She was not the wife of Peter Larson when the contract was made, or when the labor was done for which a lien was thereafter established. The only reason for making her a party was that, at the time the foreclosure suit was instituted, she was the wife of Peter Larson. No one, on reading the petition, would understand that any facts were pleaded which tended to show a personal liability on the part of Celia Larson.

2. The claim is that the original notice claimed a personal judgment against the plaintiff, and, as she made default in the action, she is now concluded by the judgment, whether it was procured by fraud practiced by the plaintiffs and their attorney or not. It is said that this action is not brought within the time limited by the statute. We have often held that, independently of the statute, a court of equity will grant new trials, in actions at law, after the time for applying for relief under section 3157 of the Code has elapsed, if proper reasons are shown for not making such application within the time. Bowen v. Mill Co., 31 Iowa, 464; Partidge v. Harrow, 27 Iowa, 97; Hoskins v Hattenback, 14 Iowa, 314; Young v. Tucker, 39 Iowa, 596; District Township of Newton v. White, 42 Iowa, 613; McConkey v. Lamb, 71 Iowa, 638, 33 N.W. 146; Lumpkin v. Snook, 63 Iowa, 515, 19 N.W. 333. This action is not predicated upon the statute. It is an attempt to invoke the equitable powers of the court as to vacating judgments, on a proper showing, after the time fixed in the statute for so doing has expired. In the two last cited cases it is held that the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such cases is limited to the granting of relief on the grounds enumerated in section 3154 of the Code. Do the facts alleged and proven on the trial bring this case within the provisions of that section? Among the grounds enumerated in said section are the following: "For mistake, neglect, or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order; * * * for fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining the judgment or order." We think the facts alleged and established make these grounds applicable in this case. Here was a petition which contained no allegations authorizing a personal judgment against Celia Larson. Counsel taking the decree of the court knew such to be the fact. As a lawyer he knew that Celia Larson might confidently rely upon the fact that nothing was sought, as against her, save the extinguishment of her dower right in the premises. Having no defense to make to that claim, she was not called upon to appear and to answer to the petition. It matters not that the notice said that...