LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass'n v. BULL VALLEY
| Decision Date | 03 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-03-1249.,2-03-1249. |
| Citation | 826 N.E.2d 449,355 Ill. App.3d 629,292 Ill.Dec. 308 |
| Parties | LaSALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Solely as Trustee under Land Trust No. 120800-08, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF BULL VALLEY, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William J. McKenna Jr., Melissa C. Brown, Eric M. Phillips, Foley & Lardner, Chicago, for LaSalle Bank National Association.
Michael J. Smoron, Zukowski, Rogers, Flood & McArdle, Crystal Lake, for The Village of Bull Valley.
On March 12, 2003, petitioner, LaSalle Bank National Association (LaSalle), as trustee for Inland Real Estate (Inland), filed a petition to disconnect approximately 78.7 acres of property under section 7-3-6 of the Illinois Municipal Code (disconnection statute) (65 ILCS 5/7-3-6 (West 2002)). Based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Village of Bull Valley (Village) moved to dismiss the disconnection petition under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2002)). The trial court granted the Village's motion to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice LaSalle's petition to disconnect. On appeal, LaSalle argues that its petition to disconnect is not barred by collateral estoppel. We reverse and remand.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On April 25, 1995, a group of property owners filed a petition to annex their land to the Village (see 65 ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 1994)). The Village was granted leave to intervene on May 1, 1995. Five principal objectors, who were owners of real estate or beneficial owners of trusts that own real estate, filed joint objections, seeking to have their land eliminated from the annexation. One of the objectors, Inland, with American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago (American) as trustee, sought to remove parcel four from the annexation. According to Inland, the exclusion of parcel four would not destroy the contiguity with the Village. The Village countered that parcel four was required because, without it, there would be no contiguity with Susan Powers' property (Powers' property) and the rest of the Village.
Parcel four, consisting of approximately 98 acres, is west of and adjacent to another parcel owned by Inland, parcel two. Parcel two is approximately 18 acres. Both parcel four and parcel two touch the southern boundary of Powers' property along Queen Anne Road. Parcel two is 297 feet wide at its northern border, which runs along Queen Anne Road at the southwest corner of Powers' property. The northern boundary line of parcel four is 1,320 feet, with approximately 41 feet running adjacent to the southwest corner of Powers' property (see map).
At the hearing on the petition for annexation, Inland argued that the bulk of parcel four was not necessary to establish contiguity with Powers' property and the rest of the Village. Rather than parcel four in its entirety, Inland proposed that only a small portion of the eastern perimeter be included in the annexation petition. Inland maintained that parcel two, which bordered 297 feet of Powers' property, combined with the easternmost 3 feet of parcel four, would establish the necessary contiguity. In a written opinion dated February 20, 1997, the trial court rejected Inland's argument, determining that parcel four was necessary for the required contiguity. Hence, all of parcel four was included in the annexation petition. Inland filed a motion for reconsideration, modification, and/or vacation of final judgment, which the trial court denied on April 8, 1997.
Inland, with American as trustee, subsequently appealed. On appeal, Inland claimed that the trial court's decision to include parcel four in the territory subject to annexation was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although Inland conceded that the shared boundary between parcel two and Powers' property was substantial, 297 feet, it argued that the shared boundary between parcel four and Powers' property was minimal. We affirmed the trial court's decision, stating as follows:
In re Petition for Annexation to the Village of Bull Valley, No. 2-97-0423 [293 Ill.App.3d 1142, 241 Ill.Dec. 238, 718 N.E.2d 1092] (1997) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
On March 12, 2003, Inland, with LaSalle as trustee (LaSalle is the successor trustee to American), petitioned to disconnect certain property. Inland described the parcel to be disconnected as "[t]he East Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 4, Township 44 North, Range 7 East of the Third Principal Meridian, in McHenry County, Illinois." The Village filed three requests to admit facts, asking Inland if the parcel legally described in the petition for disconnection was the same as parcel four. Inland responded that it lacked sufficient information to admit or deny the Village's request.
On April 11, 2003, the Village moved to dismiss Inland's disconnection petition under section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2002)). In its motion to dismiss, the Village asserted that (1) Inland must show that disconnection of its property from the Village will not isolate any part of the municipality from the remainder of the municipality; (2) the contiguity issue was litigated in the trial court and the appellate court from June 14, 1995, to December 23, 1997; (3) both courts held that the parcel described in Inland's disconnection petition was necessary to achieve contiguity with Powers' property and the Village; and (4) because the threshold issue of contiguity or "isolation" had already been adjudicated, Inland was collaterally estopped from litigating it again. On June 9, 2003, Inland requested leave to file a first amended petition for disconnection. In the amended petition, Inland revised the legal description of the parcel sought to be disconnected. Inland now sought to disconnect:
"The East Half of the Southeast Quarter (Excepting the East 42.00 feet thereof) of Section 4, Township 44 North, Range 7, East of the Third Principal Meridian lying North of the North right-of-way line of Country Club Road, in McHenry County, Illinois."
The Village moved to dismiss Inland's first amended petition for disconnection. According to the Village, Inland's revised legal description was not a changed circumstance precluding the application of collateral estoppel since both the trial court and the appellate court had previously determined that all of parcel four was necessary to establish contiguity with Powers' property. Specifically, the Village asserted that (1) the property described in the first amended petition was the same property as parcel four less the east 42 feet and right of way; (2) Inland's revised legal description was the legal equivalent of a cosmetic "nip and tuck" procedure; (3) Inland previously argued that all of parcel four, including the east 42 feet and right of way, should be excluded from the petition for annexation; (3) Inland alternatively argued that "a sliver of Inland parcel four" could be included in the annexation to establish the necessary contiguity; (4) the trial court and appellate court ruled that all of parcel four was necessary to establish contiguity; and (5) Inland was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether parcel four was necessary for contiguity with Powers' property. Attached to the Village's motion to dismiss was an affidavit of the Village clerk stating that (1) the Village's boundaries with respect to the area in question had not changed since the previous litigation and (2) no parcels had been annexed to parcel two, parcel four, or Powers' property.
In its memorandum in opposition to the Village's section 2-619 motion to dismiss, Inland argued that collateral estoppel did not apply because (1) the Village failed to show that the property to be disconnected was identical to parcel four; (2) the "isolation" requirement in the disconnection statute differs from the "contiguity" requirement in the annexation statute; (3) changed circumstances precluded the application of collateral estoppel; and (4) applying the doctrine would produce inequitable results. With respect to "changed circumstances," Inland asserted that (1) eight years had passed since the filing of the annexation petition; (2) the Village had failed to expand its municipal services since the property was annexed; and (3) a subsequent boundary agreement between the Village and the City of Woodstock prevented Inland from locating all of the property it seeks to develop in a single municipality.
On October 9, 2003, the trial court issued a written order granting the Village's motion to dismiss Inland's first amended petition for disconnection. According to the trial court, Inland's request was really an attempt to overrule the rulings made by the trial court and the appellate court in the prior proceedings. In finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Inland's attempt to disconnect parcel four, the court stated:
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