Lassiter v. Raper

• Decision Date: 20 February 1894
• Citation: 18 S.E. 946,114 N.C. 17
• Parties: LASSITER et al. v. RAPER et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

18 S.E. 946

114 N.C. 17

LASSITER et al. v. RAPER et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 20, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Pasquotank county; G. H. Brown, Judge.

Action by L. C. Lassiter and another against Caleb Raper and others on an administrator's bond. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

In an action on an administrator's bond, a plea "that since the final account and settlement of said estate, and the institution of this suit, the time elapsed is sufficient in law to bar a recovery against these defendants," and they plead "the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiffs' recovery," is bad, as containing but an allegation of law.

Grandy & Aydlett, for appellants.

SHEPHERD C.J.

In Bayard v. Malcolm, a case reported in 1 Johns. 453, Chief Justice Kent remarked: "I entertain a decided opinion that the established principles of pleading, which compose what is called its 'science,' are rational, concise luminous, and admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, and ought consequently to be very carefully touched by the hand of innovation." It was but in keeping with the spirit of these views that our present system of civil procedure was framed and enacted, and we find this court very shortly after its adoption, repudiating the idea that loose and uncertain pleading would be tolerated. In Crump v. Mims, 64 N.C. 767, the court said: "We take occasion here to suggest to pleaders that the rules of common law as to the pleading, which are only the rules of logic have not been abolished by the Code." In Parsley v Nicholson, 65 N.C. 210, it was said: "The rules of pleading at common law have not been abrogated. The essential principles still remain, and have only been modified as to technicalities and matters of form." In Oates v Gray, 66 N.C. 442, it was said that the object of the Code was "to abolish the different forms of action, and the technical and artificial modes of pleading, used at common law, but not to dispense with the certainty, regularity, and uniformity which are essential in every system adopted for the administration of justice." After other decisions to the same effect, it again became necessary, as it now is, to emphasize these early declarations of the court, and it was therefore remarked in Vass v. Association, 91 N.C. 55, that "it was a false notion, entertained by some of the legal profession, that the Code of Civil Procedure is without order or certainty, and that any pleading, however loose and irregular, may be upheld. On the contrary, while it is not perfect, it has both logical order, precision, and certainty when it is properly observed. Bad practice, too often tolerated and encouraged by the courts, brings about confusion and unjust complaints against it." It is hardly necessary to say that it was one of the elementary principles of the common law pleading that "facts, only, are to be stated, and not arguments or inferences or matters of law," (1 Chit. Pl. 214;) and that it is still essential to state the facts, which, indeed, is the chief office of pleading, is apparent from the explicit language of the Code, (sections 233-243,) which provides that there must be a "plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action;" and the same rule, of course, applies to a defense set up in the answer. Rountree v. Brinson, 98 N.C. 107, 3 S.E. 747. In accordance with the foregoing principles, the court held that a complaint "which merely states a conclusion of law,--that is, that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, and that the debt has not been paid,--is demurrable both at common law and under the Code." Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N.C. 535. So, in Rountree v. Brinson, supra, in which the defendant pleaded that "the bond was executed by this defendant to the said R. H....