Lastor v. City of Hearne, 10-90-032-CV

• Decision Date: 28 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 10-90-032-CV,10-90-032-CV
• Citation: 810 S.W.2d 742
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: Dorothy Jo LASTOR, Appellant, v. CITY OF HEARNE, et al., Appellees.

Page 742

810 S.W.2d 742

Dorothy Jo LASTOR, Appellant, v. CITY OF HEARNE, et al., Appellees.

No. 10-90-032-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Waco.

March 28, 1991.

Rehearing Overruled May 16, 1991.

Bryan F. Russ, Jr., Hearne, for appellant.

Arthur L. Walker, Austin, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and McDONALD and JAMES, JJ. (Ret.).

OPINION

THOMAS, Chief Justice.

The so-called "Texas Whistle Blower Act" prohibits a local government from terminating an employee for reporting "a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority if the employee report is made in good faith." TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp.1991) (emphasis added). The question is whether a city violates the Act by terminating an employee for reporting an incident which is not a violation of law but which the employee in good faith believes to be a violation of law. We hold that the legislature intended to protect an employee from termination if the report was based on a good-faith belief that the incident was a violation of law.

A jury found that the City of Hearne maliciously terminated Dorothy Lastor as its city manager for reporting "a violation of law" in "good faith," and awarded her actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Notwithstanding the verdict, the court entered a take-nothing judgment in the City's favor after concluding that Lastor was not protected by the Act because the reported incident was not, in fact, a violation of law. The judgment will be reversed and a judgment rendered in Lastor's favor.

Ordinarily, an unambiguous statute must be construed and enforced as written. Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985). The City argues for a literal interpretation of the explicit requirement that the reported incident be, in fact, a violation of law. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp.1991). Under the City's view, Lastor was not protected by the Act because the evidence conclusively established that the incident she reported in good faith was not a violation of law.

Departing from the strict letter of a statutory provision is necessary, however, when its literal enforcement would thwart the legislative purpose reflected by the statute as a whole. Crimmins v. Lowry, 691 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.1985). Unrestrained by the literal wording of its provisions, the Act as a whole clearly evidences an all-encompassing legislative intent to encourage government employees to "blow the whistle" on governmental wrongdoing by protecting from retaliation those who act in good faith. That the legislature would, on one hand, encourage employees to make good-faith reports of wrongdoing and, at the same time, jeopardize their livelihood if they happen to be wrong is incomprehensible. What could be more destructive of the legislature's purposes than to require that the employee be right on the pain of losing his job? Conscientious government employees could find scant encouragement in such an interpretation of legislative intent. An interpretation more in...