Lataille v. District Court of Eastern Hampden

• Decision Date: 16 December 1974
• Citation: 320 N.E.2d 877,366 Mass. 525
• Parties: . Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 877

320 N.E.2d 877

366 Mass. 525

Roger E. LATAILLE v. DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN HAMPDEN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 9, 1974.

Decided Dec. 16, 1974.

Richard A. Morocco, Jr., Holden, for petitioner.

Robert H. Quinn, Atty. Gen. (Dennis J. Lacroix, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for District Court of Eastern Hampden and others.

William W. Teahan, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Matthew J. Ryan, Jr., Dist. Atty., with him), for Dist. Atty. for Western District of Massachusetts.

Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, HENNESSEY and KAPLAN, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Justice.

The petitioner (hereafter referred to as the defendant) in this case asks that we rule that a person accused of a crime has a right to a probable cause hearing in all cases, irrespective of a supervening indictment, unless the Commonwealth is able to advance a substantial and paramount interest overriding the asserted right to a probable cause hearing.

The defendant seeks relief in this court after unsuccessful recourse to a judge of the Superior Court. The petition comes before us on appeal from an order of a single justice of this court sustaining the respondents' demurrers. ¹ The demurrers alleged that the petition was vague, improperly sought two types of writs and was insufficient in law. This proceeding is interlocutory and the ruling is sought, not under the Superior Court judge's privilege to report such matters under the provisions of G.L. c. 278, § 30A, but under our general supervisory powers pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3. We allow interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, under our supervisory powers, only in exceptional circumstances. Gilday v. Commonwealth,--- Mass. ---, ---, ^a 274 N.E.2d 589 (1971). However, that requirement can be said to be met where, as in this case, a substantial claim alleges violation of the defendant's substantive rights. Barber v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 236, 239, 230 N.E.2d 817 (1967). Myers v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^b 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). Corey v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^c 301 N.E.2d 450 (1973). Moreover, for all that appears in the record the single justice may well have sustained the demurrers on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause for relief. That is a further reason for us to examine the legal merits of the petition. ² We therefore turn to a consideration of whether the defendant's substantive rights were violated by the denial of a probable cause hearing following indictment by the grand jury.

The facts pertinent to the question at issue are briefly stated. On August 13, 1973, the defendant was arrested on complaints charging him with murder and rape. He was arraigned in the District Court of Eastern Hampden the following day. He was then transferred to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater for twenty days' observation. A probable cause hearing was set for September 4. In the interim, the defendant's counsel filed several discovery motions which also were scheduled to be heard September 4. On that date the discovery motions were heard, but a hearing on other defense motions was delayed. At the conclusion of the motion session, the probable cause hearing, by consent of counsel, was continued until September 13. The grand jury on September 12 returned indictments for murder and rape against the defendant. Defense counsel moved unsuccessfully in the Superior Court to quash the indictments and also moved for an order that a probable cause hearing be conducted. The Superior Court judge apparently denied the former motion and declined to act on the latter motion. The defendant was arraigned on the indictments and entered pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, the defendant initiated his petition in this court.

General Laws c. 263, § 4, provides in pertinent part that '(n)o person shall be held to answer in any court for an alleged crime, except upon an indictment by a grand jury or upon a complaint before a district court.' Where the original charge is in the form of a complaint and the defendant is under arrest not having been indicted by a grand jury, he is entitled 'as soon as may be' to a determination whether there is probable cause to hold him for trial. G.L. c. 276, § 38. The issue in this case is whether he is entitled to a probable cause hearing where there has been presentment of an indictment.

If the crime complained of is within the jurisdiction of a District Court, that court may exercise final jurisdiction. In cases not within the jurisdiction of a District Court, and in cases where a judge of that court declines to exercise final jurisdiction, a determination must be made whether the person complained of 'appear(s) to be guilty of crimes' and shall be bound over for trial in Superior Court on an indictment. ³ G.L. c. 218, § 30.

In two recent cases, MYERS V. COMMONWEALTH, --- MASS. ---, 298 N.E.2D 819^D (1973), and COREY V. COMMONWEALTH, --- MASS. ---, 301 N.E.2D 450 (1973)^E, we held that both in a preliminary hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 276, § 38, and in a bind-over hearinb pursuant to G.L. c. 218, § 30, the accused must be given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence on his own behalf. Such a process is required by the respective statutes and is necessary to an accurate appraisal of probable cause. We held that defendants are to be held for trial only if the examining magistrate finds (1) that a crime has been committed and (2) that there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty. G.L. c. 276, § 42. We expressed the view that cross-examination and the right to make an effective presentation of a defense are crucial in order to effectuate this probable cause standard.

The defendant relies on our decisions in the Myers and Corey cases as well as the decision in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1969), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the criminal process at which the accused is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. The petitioner argues that these cases establish that he is entitled as matter of right to a probable cause hearing for the purpose of utilizing the discovery and impeachment devices appurtenant thereto even though he has been indicted by the grand jury. We disagree.

In following the Supreme Court decision in Coleman v. Alabama, supra, we held in Commonwealth v. Britt, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^f 285 N.E.2d 780 (1972), that a probable cause hearing was a critical stage in criminal proceedings. However, the fact that the preliminary hearing is deemed a critical element when it is held does not mean that a preliminary hearing is necessary as matter of right in the criminal process. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in the Coleman case that '(t)he preliminary hearing is not a required step in an Alabama prosecution. The prosecutor may seek an indictment directly from the grand jury without a preliminary hearing.' 399 U.S. at 8, 90 S.Ct. at 2002 (opinion of Brennan, J.).

It is, of course, true as the petitioner points out that our holdings in the Corey and Myers cases result in certain collateral benefits with respect to impeachment, discovery, ⁴ and possible dismissal of charges without a trial ⁵ where a preliminary hearing is held. These effects are, however, indirect. Impeachment, discovery and the presentation of affirmative defenses are guaranteed by our decisions in the Myers and Corey cases because these procedures seek to further the primary function of the preliminary hearing, the screening out of 'an erroneous or improper prosecution.' Coleman v. Alabama, supra, at 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999.

Thus, the discovery and impeachment functions of the preliminary hearing preserved in the Myers and Corey cases are not independent rights to be asserted apart from their function of ensuring that the accused is held only when a crime has been committed and there is probable cause to believe the accused to be guilty. Our decisions in those two cases were directed toward establishing a probable cause standard that effectively distinguished between groundless or unsupported charges and meritorious prosecutions. Myers v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^g 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). We held that complete cross-examination and the opportunity to present affirmative defenses were crucial and necessary to effectuate a true probable cause standard. We did not hold then, nor do we hold now, that the discovery and impeachment functions are ends in themselves to be asserted apart from their evidentiary role in ascertaining probable cause where a preliminary hearing is held.

The question we now turn to is whether a preliminary hearing is necessary under the Constitution or statutes of the Commonwealth where there has been a supervening indictment. General Laws c. 263, § 4, provides in part that '(n)o person shall be held to answer in any court for an alleged crime, except upon an indictment by a grand jury or upon a complaint' (emphasis added). We agree with the Commonwealth that these two processes are alternative means for establishing probable cause to hold a defendant for trial.

Where probable cause is to be determined by a preliminary hearing on a complaint in the District Court the panoply of defensive procedures announced in the Corey and Myers cases applies. However, in the context of grand jury proceedings, the return of an indictment is itself a determination of probable cause and renders unnecessary a preliminary hearing. ⁶

To hold otherwise would be to undermine the function traditionally performed by the grand jury, for the defendant's argument rests ultimately on the premise that a determination of probable cause reached by the grand jury is insufficient in law. The defendant would have us hold that despite the grand jury's finding of probable cause to indict, the accused is entitled to a separate and additional proceeding to duplicate the finding of...