Lathrop v. Brewer

Decision Date03 April 1972
Docket NumberCiv. No. 11-377-C-2.
PartiesHarold A. LATHROP, Plaintiff, v. Lou V. BREWER, Individually and in his capacity as Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Robert Bartels, Iowa City, Iowa, for plaintiff.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Larry S. Seuferer, and Richard N. Winders, Asst. Attys. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HANSON, Chief Judge.

This is an action for injunctive and other relief, brought pursuant to 42 U. S.C., Section 1983 and 28 U.S.C., Section 1343(3) to redress certain alleged deprivations of procedural due process in the administration of discipline at the Iowa State Penitentiary, Fort Madison, Iowa ("Fort Madison"). Plaintiff herein is an inmate of that institution. Defendants are each in some way responsible for administration at Fort Madison, including the administration of discipline.

Trial in this cause was had on January 21, 1972, and the action has thereupon been submitted for decision on the merits.

FACTS

Plaintiff has had at least three significant encounters with the disciplinary system at the Iowa State Penitentiary, but only two of these encounters are relevant here. The first took place on February 9, 1971, when plaintiff was accused by defendant Haas, a correctional officer, of "loitering on the range".1 The first plaintiff heard of the charge against him, however, was on February 11, 1971, when Captain Parrot came to his cell, indicated he had a report of plaintiff's misconduct from Officer Haas, read it, cited the rule allegedly violated and asked if it was true. Lathrop did not know what "loitering on the range" was, but after Capt. Parrot explained, he admitted the violation. Parrot then departed, without indicating that Lathrop could call witnesses to rebut the charge.

Approximately two hours later, Lathrop was brought before an Adjustment (Disciplinary) Committee consisting of Capt. Parrot (the investigating officer), and defendants Menke and Sanders.2 He was not told of any right to counsel or right to call witnesses to testify, nor was he given the opportunity to confront his accuser, Officer Haas, who was not present. Lathrop was again informed of the charge, and, without admitting any violation of the rules, admitted the offending act. Acting on the basis of Lathrop's admission and the reports of Capt. Parrot and Officer Haas, the Committee sentenced plaintiff to three days in solitary confinement and 30 days "on grade" (loss of privileges), as well as the forfeiture of two days of good time and ten days of honor time.

Plaintiff's second material encounter with the disciplinary process at Fort Madison began on November 5, 1971, when he was accused by Robin Nicol, an off-duty correctional officer, of leaving his place of assignment, while at the University Hospital in Iowa City, despite the asserted fact that he did not do so. To conform to Officer Nicol's report, Officer Harris, who had custody of Lathrop, likewise reported him for being absent for 35 minutes, although there is testimony that Officer Harris never independently noted Lathrop's absence.

Upon return to Fort Madison, plaintiff was brought to the office of Capt. Maynard and informed that he was on report for leaving his place of assignment. It is undisputed that Lathrop became incensed and verbally, although not physically, abusive. He was thereupon placed in administrative segregation, and additional reports of misconduct were lodged as a result of this behavior.

On November 8, 1971, Lt. Eschman was assigned to be investigating officer of the misconduct reports against Lathrop, as part of a group of 7 or 8 other reports to be investigated that day. He went to Lathrop's cell, read the misconduct reports to Lathrop, and the charges lodged against him. Plaintiff denied these charges and indicated that he had witnesses who could testify that he had never left the hospital, although Eschman and Lathrop differ as to who these witnesses were said to be, three inmates, (Lathrop's version) or nine nurses (Eschman's version). At any rate, Eschman never made any attempt to confirm or refute Lathrop's denial by independent investigation of any witness, despite the ready availability of such witnesses within the prison; his sole further "investigation" was to go to each of the charging officers and ask if their report was true, and then submit a written report to the Adjustment Committee.

About an hour after Eschman visited Lathrop, Lathrop was brought before an Adjustment Committee consisting of James Helling and Capts. Gregory and Susich. He was informed of the offense and given a chance to explain.

Lathrop readily admitted the threat charges, but denied leaving the hospital, indicating that witnesses, including Russell Mills, another inmate, could testify to this. He was not given counsel, nor allowed to present witnesses in his own behalf. None of the accusing officers were present, so plaintiff was not given the opportunity to confront them. Lathrop was then excused while the Adjustment Committee deliberated. Relying on the misconduct reports filed by the accusing officers, the report of the investigating officer, and Lathrop's protestations, Lathrop was given 5 days in solitary confinement, 30 days "on grade" (no privileges) and a forfeiture of 5 days good time and 10 days honor time.

Lathrop's encounters with the disciplinary system at the Iowa State Penitentiary appear to be typical of disciplinary practice there and indeed at most other penal institutions in the State of Iowa.3 Upon the commission of an infraction a formal report is filed by the accusing officer. This goes to the Chief of Correctional Services, who determines that it is actionable and then assigns it to an investigating officer. This individual confronts the inmate charged with the report, indicates the rule violated,4 and asks the inmate if the report is true. If an inmate admits an act constituting an offense, the investigation is over. If he denies the veracity of the report, the investigating officer only takes the report to the accusing officer and asks if it is true; he makes no, or very little, attempt at independent investigation. In either event, the investigating officer's report is brought to an adjustment or disciplinary committee consisting of supervisory prison personnel. This committee calls the inmate before it, but neither affords him counsel or counsel-substitute, the opportunity to confront or cross-examine the accusing officers (who are not summoned), nor the right to present witnesses in his own behalf. Furthermore, a prisoner is only given about an hour between the time he is formally notified of the pendency of charges and his hearing, although he often knows a misconduct report is being filed. Then, upon consideration solely of the reports of the accusing and investigating officers, and the statement of the inmate himself, punishment is imposed, or the inmate is acquitted. Punishment may range from a warning to loss of good and honor time, solitary confinement or loss of privileges, and is reviewed by the Warden and by the Iowa State Bureau of Corrections.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Court at the outset recognizes that it should not be an unduly hospitable forum, for it is well recognized that it is not the function of the Court to run the prisons, to supervise day to day treatment and discipline. Much must be left to the good faith discretion of prison officials, Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971), which discretion includes the disciplining of prisoners, Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 404 U.S. 1062, 92 S.Ct. 743, 30 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). However, contrary to earlier thinking on this subject, such as Stiltner v. Rhay, 258 F.Supp. 487 (W.D.Wash.1965), aff'd 367 F.2d 148, cert. den. 385 U.S. 941, 87 S.Ct. 310, 17 L.Ed.2d 220, and Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1964), which held such discretion to be beyond review, it is now well recognized that prison officials' discretion is not unfettered, but must be scrutinized for interference with paramount constitutional rights. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Cf., also, Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971) cert. granted 404 U.S. 999, 92 S.Ct. 568, 30 L.Ed.2d 552 (1971); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971). These rights are not lost upon the closing of the prison gates, but are only constricted by the necessary accoutrements of incarceration, Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 235, 24 L.Ed.2d 192. However, this is the outer limit of judicial scrutiny as well as the minim. Only where constitutional rights are infringed is the Court empowered to act, McMichaels v. Hancock, 428 F.2d 1222 (1st Cir. 1970), Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1001, 89 S.Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed. 2d 466, and not where there is only a maladministration of state law or question of administrative judgment that does not rise to constitutional dimension, Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. California, 336 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 11 S.Ct. 191, 34 L.Ed. 796 (1891).

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The question at bar is thus whether the punishment practices at the Iowa State Penitentiary are violative of Lathrop's constitutional rights, or of the rights of inmates generally, and, more particularly, whether precepts of due process have been violated in the following particulars alleged:5

1. Failure to give adequate notice of violations of prison rules.
2. Failure to provide prisoners with the rule allegedly breached.
3. Failure to provide an independent tribunal for the administration of discipline.
4. Failure to allow prisoners to confront their accusers, and to cross-examine them.
5. Failure to allow a prisoner the
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