Latite Roofing Co., Inc. v. Urbanek

• Citation: 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1876,528 So.2d 1381
• Decision Date: 10 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-0244,87-0244
• Parties: 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1876 LATITE ROOFING COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. August URBANEK and Sidney Kohl, Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

Page 1381

528 So.2d 1381

13 Fla. L. Weekly 1876

LATITE ROOFING COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. August URBANEK and Sidney Kohl, Appellees.

No. 87-0244.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Aug. 10, 1988.

William H. Benson of Benson, Stallons & Moyle, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Amy S. Rubin of Shutts & Bowen, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

DOWNEY, Judge.

Appellant, Latite Roofing Company, Inc. (Latite), appeals from a final judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of appellees, August Urbanek and Sidney Kohl (Urbanek).

This litigation arose out of the construction of a shopping center in Lake Worth, Florida, which began in 1978. Latite was the roofing contractor and constructed most of the roof area on the shopping center before being compelled to stop work on the job. Urbanek and Kohl purchased the center after work had been stopped and before recommencement and completion of the project. In 1983 Urbanek filed a complaint against Latite seeking damages for the negligent construction and installation of the roof on the center. After a jury trial in which the jury found Urbanek suffered damages in the amount of $100,000, but was 20% negligent, judgment was entered for Urbanek for $80,000 and Latite filed this appeal.

Six points are presented for our consideration, none of which demonstrate reversible error; thus we affirm the judgment appealed from.

Latite's first appellate point is that its motion for directed verdict should have been granted because Urbanek could not prevail on the legal theory chosen. Latite argues that, since no personal injury or property damage was sustained, a cause of action in negligence does not lie to recover only economic losses when no privity of contract exists between the parties. While there are ostensibly cases that support Latite's contentions under this point, we do not believe they are apposite in the present case.

Florida has long since joined the majority view in the United States in holding that recovery for purely economic losses under a negligent tort theory is normally not allowed absent a claim for personal injuries or property damage. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 515 So.2d 180 (Fla.1987). See also East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17 (1965); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So.2d 899 (Fla.1987); Affiliates For Evaluation And Therapy, Inc. v. Viasyn Corp, 500 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So.2d 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). This majority view is set forth in Prosser, The Law of Torts § 101 (4th ed. 1971), as follows:

There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any kind of physical harm, including not only personal injuries, but also property damage to the defective chattel itself, as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes, as well as damage to any other property in the vicinity. But where there is no accident, and no physical damage, and the only loss is a pecuniary one, through loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the cost of repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule to be encountered later, that purely economic interests are not entitled to protection against mere negligence, and so have denied the recovery.

The rationale of this rule is described by Justice Traynor in Seely as follows:

The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's...