Latoya R. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:19-cv-03938-AJB |
| Parties | LATOYA R., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff Latoya R. brought this action pursuant to §§ 205(g) and 1631(c) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner") denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income benefits("SSI") under the Social Security Act.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff filed applications for SSI and DIB in or around February 2017, alleging disability commencing on August 9, 2016.3 [Record (hereinafter "R") 201-12]. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. [R56-57, 82-83]. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). [R138-39]. An evidentiary hearing was held on September 11, 2018. [R33-50]. The ALJ issued a decision on November 5, 2018,denying Plaintiff's application on the ground that she had not been under a "disability" at any time through the date of the decision. [R17-28]. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on July 12, 2019, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [R1-6].
Plaintiff then initiated this action on September 3, 2019, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. [Doc. 1]. The answer, [Doc. 6], and transcript, [Doc. 8], were filed on December 20, 2019. On January 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of her petition for review of the Commissioner's decision, [Doc. 10]; on February 26, 2020, the Commissioner filed a response in support of the decision, [Doc. 11]; and on March 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of her petition for review of the Commissioner's decision, [Doc. 12]. The matter is now before the Court upon the administrative record, the parties' pleadings, and the parties' briefs, and it is accordingly ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).4
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment or impairments must result from anatomical, psychological, or physiological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).
The burden of proof in a Social Security disability case is divided between the claimant and the Commissioner. The claimant bears the primary burden of establishing the existence of a "disability" and therefore entitlement to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a). The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether the claimant has met the burden of proving disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228(11th Cir. 1999), superseded by Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000),5 on other grounds as stated in Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2018). The claimant must prove at step one that he is not undertaking substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the claimant must prove that he is suffering from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his ability to perform basic work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, if the impairment meets one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 (Listing of Impairments), the claimant will be considered disabled without consideration ofage, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is unable to prove the existence of a listed impairment, he must prove that his impairment prevents performance of past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, the regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform other work besides past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The Commissioner must produce evidence that there is other work available in the national economy that the claimant has the capacity to perform. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2. To be considered disabled, the claimant must prove an inability to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists. Id.
If at any step in the sequence a claimant can be found disabled or not disabled, the sequential evaluation ceases and further inquiry ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Despite the shifting of burdens at step five, the overall burden rests on the claimant to prove that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2; Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983),superseded by statute on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), as recognized in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991).
A limited scope of judicial review applies to a denial of Social Security benefits by the Commissioner. Judicial review of the administrative decision addresses three questions: (1) whether the proper legal standards were applied; (2) whether there was substantial evidence to support the findings of fact; and (3) whether the findings of fact resolved the crucial issues. Washington v. Astrue, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Fields v. Harris, 498 F. Supp. 478, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1980). This Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and the Commissioner applies the proper legal standards, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
"Substantial evidence" means "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must be enough to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hillsman, 804 F.2d at 1180; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the Court] must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Even where there is substantial evidence to the contrary of the ALJ's findings, the ALJ decision will not be overturned where "there is substantially supportive evidence" of the ALJ's decision. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). In contrast, review of the ALJ's application of legal principles is plenary. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Walker, 826 F.2d at 999.
Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled at age thirty-four due to epilepsy, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, headaches, back problems, high blood pressure, and panic disorder. [R201, 212, 235]. She has a high-school education, two years of college, and past work as a customer-service clerk. [R47, 236]. Plaintiff alleges in her appeal of the denial of benefits that the ALJ erred in her consideration of Plaintiff's noncompliance with medication, which led her to further err in her consideration of whether Plaintiff's condition met or was equal to the Listing of Impairments for epilepsy. [Doc. 10 at 9-14].
In a function report dated October 3, 2017, Plaintiff reported that epilepsy and the frequency of her seizures limited her ability to work. [R253]. She indicated that bright lights, stress, and repeated use of computers were triggers. [R253]. She reported that she was tired most of the time, took several one-to-two-hour naps throughout the day, and had "extremely little energy." [R254]. She stated that herseizures were sporadic, that the exact cause was unknown, and that they could be triggered by even small amounts of stress. [R256-57]. She also indicated that effects of her repeated and frequent seizures included a loss of memory and difficulty staying on track. [R258].
At the hearing taking place before the ALJ on September 11, 2018, Plaintiff testified that she had been asked to resign from her last job due to too many days off. [R38-39]. She also indicated that there was a...
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