Latshaw v. Simpson, 6289.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1942
• Docket Number: No. 6289.,6289.
• Citation: 162 S.W.2d 635
• Parties: LATSHAW v. SIMPSON.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

162 S.W.2d 635

LATSHAW v. SIMPSON.

No. 6289.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 14, 1942.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pemiscot County; Louis H. Schult, Judge.

"Not to be published in State Reports."

Action by J. B. Latshaw against Lem Simpson to enjoin the defendant from interfering with plaintiff in the use and possession of certain farm tools and work animals and the farming of certain land. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Corbett & Peal, of Caruthersville, for appellant.

Von Mayes and Fred L. Henley, both of Caruthersville, for respondent.

FULBRIGHT, Judge.

This is an injunction suit filed by plaintiff, J. B. Latshaw, against defendant, Lem Simpson, in the Circuit Court of Pemiscot County, to enjoin and restrain defendant from interfering with plaintiff in the use and possession of certain farm tools and work animals and the farming of certain lands. The cause was tried before the court resulting in a verdict for plaintiff, from which verdict defendant duly appeals to this court.

The petition alleges in substance that on the 16th day of December, 1939, plaintiff hired the defendant to work for him on certain farm lands described therein; that plaintiff was the owner and in possession of said farm, certain work animals and farm tools; that said defendant, without just cause, has denied plaintiff the right to farm said land and to use said work animals and farm tools and threatens and asserts that he will continue to interfere with plaintiff should he undertake to farm said land or to use said work animals or tools thereon; that said defendant has no right to prevent plaintiff from farming said land and using said work animals and tools and is by reason of the premises trespassing upon said land. Plaintiff further states that defendant is insolvent and plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; that he has sustained irreparable injury by reason of said interference; that he fears that defendant will carry out the threats unless restrained therefrom and will put him to the necessity of bringing a multiplicity of actions to protect his rights and prays for equitable relief.

A temporary injunction was allowed on the 7th day of May, 1940, and afterwards, on the 27th day of July, 1940, defendant filed his answer and motion to dissolve said injunction.

The answer, in part, denies certain allegations of the petition, and alleges that the contract upon which plaintiff relies is a bogus one and, in fact, not the contract under which defendant was cultivating plaintiff's farm, but was drawn for an entirely different purpose. He alleges that he was to cultivate crops and raise live stock on the farm on a fifty-fifty basis and one half the government parities; that he had operated under such an agreement for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939 and had prepared the land in the Spring of 1940 for raising another crop; that there was harmony between plaintiff and defendant until the defendant wanted to investigate the amount of government money that had been paid to plaintiff during the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, on the land that defendant was cultivating. Defendant prays that the injunction be dissolved.

Plaintiff's reply to defendant's answer is a general denial of the new matter pleaded in said answer.

The evidence is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that an accurate statement of facts cannot be made. Plaintiff lived in Caruthersville and defendant and his family lived on plaintiff's farm. He had cultivated said farm for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939 under the same terms and agreement as he was to cultivate it for the year 1940. However, no written contract had been entered into until December 16, 1939. According to the plaintiff this contract contained the same agreement that defendant had been working under in prior years. About the only definite statement contained in the contract is the provision that it might be terminated by either party "by notice in writing". No notice in writing was ever given by either party. The essential parts of the contract, which was offered in evidence, are as follows:

"Witnesseth: That for and in consideration of the following, to-wit: that the second party agrees to work for and under the direction and instructions on the farm of the first party and in cooperation with the first party and the first party agrees to pay as good wages as is reasonable and possible under the circumstances which to some extent depends upon the degree of cooperation of the said second party with the first party in raising and growing crops and live stock on the farm of said first party, and which wages or salary are further dependent, more or less, in some measure upon the profit derived from growing of crops and live stock after all expenses in the form of rent, depreciation, labor bills, repairs, interest and all other expenses and losses are paid.

"It is further agreed and understood, between the parties hereto that there is and has been no agreement between the parties hereto for any division of the crops grown on said land of the first party and that there is no agreement for any division of the crops grown on said land to be executed in the future between said parties."

It should be borne in mind at all times that defendant was illiterate and could not read or write. Plaintiff testified that the net profits from raising live stock was to be divided fifty-fifty; that defendant was paid weekly for watering the live stock. It is a mere guess as to what defendant's interest was in the crops or what he was to be paid for his labor in producing same, although plaintiff and his wife testified he was working by the day. Plaintiff says that he had no settlement with defendant for the previous years of 1937, 1938 and 1939 until the written contract was entered into on December 16, 1939. Defendant was dissatisfied with the settlement at that time, and plaintiff afterwards, in March, 1940, paid him an...