Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 30 November 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-3830,16-3830
• Parties: Marybeth LAUDERDALE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

876 F.3d 904

Marybeth LAUDERDALE, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 16-3830

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 20, 2017
Decided November 30, 2017

Donald Orzeske, Attorney, Goodin, Orzeske & Blackwell, P.C., Beth L. Riga, Attorney, Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Aaron Talen Dozeman, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before Manion and Kanne, Circuit Judges, and Miller, District Judge.^*

Kanne, Circuit Judge.

Marybeth Lauderdale alleges she was paid substantially less than her male colleague despite taking on twice the responsibility. The Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit state employers from paying an employee less based on her sex. However, the record indicates that the pay discrepancy in this case was not based on sex. Therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants-appellees is affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

Marybeth Lauderdale served as acting superintendent for the Illinois School for the Deaf ("ISD") from 2006 to 2007 and as superintendent from 2007 to 2010. During her last year as superintendent, she was paid a base salary of $83,856 plus a 5% bilingual pay bonus, for a total of $88,048. Reggie Clinton was superintendent for the School for the Visually Impaired ("ISVI") from 1998 to 2003 and again from 2008 to 2010. When Clinton returned to ISVI in 2008, he received a 1.9% salary increase from his most recent salary at the Arcola School District. He was paid, at the end of his tenure at ISVI, $121,116 per year.

In 2010, Clinton resigned. The Illinois Department of Human Services, which oversees ISD and ISVI, decided to create one combined superintendent role to cover both schools. The Department offered Lauderdale the role. Lauderdale wanted to be paid as much or more than Clinton had been paid; the Department counteroffered. Communications indicate that some Department employees believed Lauderdale was entitled to a large pay raise because she was taking on two roles. However, the same communications reveal budget constraints and a concern that the Department of Central Management Services would not authorize a 30% pay increase for a public employee. Eventually, Lauderdale

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accepted a salary of $106,500, which was less than what Clinton was paid as superintendent of ISVI, but a 21% increase from Lauderdale's salary as superintendent of ISD.

Lauderdale filed a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination based on the difference between what she was paid and what Clinton had been paid. Specifically, she alleged a violation of the Equal Pay Act by the Department, and she alleged claims of sex discrimination by the Department and several individuals under Title VII and § 1983. Upon a review of the evidence, the district court concluded no reasonable juror could find the pay discrepancy was a product of sex discrimination. The court found that the discrepancy instead resulted from budget concerns and from the application of the Illinois Pay Plan. Furthermore, Lauderdale did not provide sufficient evidence for a jury to find these explanations were pretextual. Thus, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and in doing so construe all facts in the light most favorable to Marybeth Lauderdale, the non-moving party. Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc. , 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he ultimate question ... is ‘whether a reasonable jury could find prohibited discrimination.’ " Hooper , 804 F.3d at 853 (quoting Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86 , 746 F.3d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 2014) ).

Because a plaintiff's burden of proof is different for Equal Pay Act claims than it is for Title VII and § 1983 claims, we review Lauderdale's Equal Pay Act claim first, then address her claims brought under Title VII and § 1983.

A. Equal Pay Act

Lauderdale claims that the Department violated the Equal Pay Act when it paid her less than it paid Reggie Clinton. The Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To establish a prima facie cause of action under the Act, an employee must demonstrate "a difference in pay for ‘equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’ " King v. Acosta Sales & Mktg., Inc. , 678 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) ). If this requirement is satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove some neutral factor that explains the discrepancy in salary. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan , 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). The Act provides four affirmative defenses by which the employer can claim the discrepancy is not discriminatory: "where ... payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

Lauderdale compares her role as dual superintendent with that of Clinton as superintendent of ISVI. Lauderdale took over all of Clinton's responsibilities in addition to those she had as a superintendent of ISD, so it is clear that she sufficiently alleged that she was paid less for work that was equal to, if not more demanding than, the work performed by Clinton. "[D]ifferences in skill, effort, or responsibility" do not justify a finding that two

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jobs are not equal "where the greater skill, effort, or responsibility is required of the lower paid sex." 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a).

The Department concedes that Lauderdale has sufficiently established a prima facie case under the Act, but argues the pay discrepancy was based on non-discriminatory bases: Illinois's CMS Pay Plan, Lauderdale's and Clinton's prior salaries, and budget concerns.

1. Illinois's CMS Pay Plan

The Illinois Administrative Code sets forth a detailed pay plan for state employees. Ill. Admin. Code 80, § 310. Positions are assigned established salary ranges, and raises and bonuses are based on the established applicable range. Pay increases are based primarily on the employee's prior salary. Upon promotion, an employee's increase in pay is generally limited to 5% of the employee's current base salary. Id. § 310.460. The increase can be greater if necessary to meet the minimum rate of the salary range for a new position, but the increase cannot exceed the maximum rate of the salary range. Id. Any other increase greater than 5% is considered a "special salary adjustment," which must be approved by the Director of Central Management Services. Id.

Lauderdale claims there is no evidence in the record that the Department believed the pay plan applied when someone is hired for a newly created position. An employer's given explanation for a pay discrepancy must be supported by evidence that the employer actually relied on that reason. King , 678 F.3d at 474. Contrary to Lauderdale's assertion, the record contains compelling evidence that the Department believed the pay plan was applicable. The documents submitted by the Department include forms establishing the new position, classifying the new position within the pay plan, and setting the salary range for the new position. (R. 58–13, at 1–4; R. 61–5, at 8–11.) Additionally, the record includes an email sent to Department officials regarding the creation of the dual superintendent position. (R. 61–7, at 6–7.) The email explains that Department employees were working with "Classification and CMS" and had submitted the job duties to CMS for classification. (Id .)

Lauderdale further argues that the Department did not adhere to the pay plan when determining her...