Nadeem v. Viscosity Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-08253 |
| Parties | KANWAL NADEEM, Plaintiff, v. VISCOSITY OIL COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Kanwal Nadeem sues her former employer, Defendant Viscosity Oil Company (“Viscosity”), alleging that Viscosity: (1) willfully violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (count I); (2) discriminated against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C 2000e-2000e-17 (count II); and (3) retaliated against her for complaining about the discrimination, also in violation of Title VII (count III). [29]. Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and alternatively moves to strike certain paragraphs of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)(2). [33]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion.
Viscosity Oil Company, located in Willowbrook, Illinois, is a subsidiary of Petronas Lubricants International, a corporation owned by the Malaysian government. [29] at ¶ 7. Viscosity hired Plaintiff-a female-to work as a financial analyst in January 2015. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8. From the outset, Plaintiff fulfilled the duties of her job title, but also performed the duties of the Senior Financial Analyst position because that position with Viscosity remained otherwise vacant. Id. at ¶ 10. In the first quarter of 2016, after roughly one year of working under the title of Financial Analyst at Viscosity, Plaintiff informed her supervisor, Luis Jimenez, that she was interested in assuming the vacant Senior Financial Analyst position. Id. Jimenez informed Plaintiff that he “was working on it” and promised her the promotion. Id. at ¶ 11. Meanwhile, Plaintiff continued to perform Senior Financial Analyst duties, in addition to her assigned duties as a Financial Analyst. Id. at ¶ 12.
In late 2016, after seeing a posting for the Senior Financial Analyst job on LinkedIn, Plaintiff reiterated to Jimenez that she wanted the job; Jimenez told her the LinkedIn post was a mistake, and Viscosity removed the posting after Plaintiff's conversation with Jimenez. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to fulfill the duties of both her position and of the Senior Financial Analyst position. Id. at ¶ 15.
In April of 2017, Viscosity hired Roman Duda, a male, for the Senior Financial Analyst job. Id. Viscosity hired Duda as a “Financial Analyst, ” though he was hired to perform Senior Financial Analyst functions. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 25. Viscosity did not consider Plaintiff for the role, even though Plaintiff expressed interest in the position and performed the duties of the position, and even though Jimenez previously promised her the position. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 17. Plaintiff trained Duda, and she also continued to perform many aspects of his job, as he frequently took personal time during critical periods in the billing cycle, leaving Plaintiff to manage her role, as well as his role, to meet looming budget deadlines. Id. at ¶¶ 18 19. Plaintiff's workload continued to increase throughout 2018, as she continued to do both jobs. Id. at ¶ 20. Viscosity granted Plaintiff a 1% raise in March 2018 for her efforts. Id. at ¶ 21. Jimenez told Plaintiff the 1% increase was “the best he could do.” Id.
In the summer of 2018, Plaintiff met with Tatiana Villefort, the Human Resources manager for Viscosity's parent company, Petronas. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff told Villefort that she believed Viscosity discriminated against women. Id. at ¶ 23. Specifically, Plaintiff told Villefort that she believed Viscosity had “strung her along” in her position with the promise of career advancement. Id. Plaintiff told Villefort that she performed many of Duda's job functions in addition to her own responsibilities at Viscosity, and the extra work led to long hours and caused significant stress. Id.
In early August 2018, Duda directly informed Plaintiff that he was resigning, effective the next month. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 30. During that conversation, Duda told Plaintiff his salary, told Plaintiff he believed Jimenez knew Plaintiff wanted his job, and indicated that Jimenez told Duda not to call himself a “Senior” Financial Analyst because it would rankle Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26, 27. Jimenez never mentioned Duda's resignation to Plaintiff, generally seemed secretive about Duda's departure, and never raised the possibility of promoting Plaintiff into Duda's position. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30. For her part, Plaintiff also failed to raise the issue with Jimenez, as she was concerned about creating unnecessary backlash for Duda. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff continued to perform the work of both her position and the Senior Financial Analyst position until August 28, 2018, when she notified Defendant she planned to resign effective September 7, 2018. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 31, 32; [29-1].
On December 17, 2018 Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). [29-1]. In her charge, she alleged that Viscosity discriminated against her on the basis of sex and paid her less in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Id. More specifically, she alleged that, during her employment from January 2015 to September 2018, she performed her job duties as well as a lot of the job duties for the Senior Financial Analyst position, that she expressed interest in the latter open position, that Viscosity hired a man to do the job instead, that she had to train that man and continue to perform a lot of his job duties, that Viscosity failed to promote her and paid her less because she is a woman, and that she was constructively discharged on September 7, 2018. Id. The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue on September 17, 2019. [29-2]. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on December 17, 2019, claiming violation of the Equal Pay Act (count I); sex discrimination in violation of Title VII (count II), and retaliation in violation of Title VII (count III). See [1]; [29]. Defendant moves to dismiss all three claims and also moves to strike certain allegations based upon timeliness and non-exhaustion. [33].
Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although Plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations, ” “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court need not accept statements of law as true, however. Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013).
In the alternative to dismissal, Defendant moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike certain allegations in Plaintiff's complaint. Rule 12(f) allows a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Courts generally disfavor motions to strike, however, and strike challenged allegations only if they are “so unrelated to the present claim as to be void of merit and unworthy of consideration.” Kies v. City of Aurora, 149 F.Supp.2d 421, 427 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see also Talbot v. Robert Mathews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) ().
Defendant moves to dismiss all three of Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim; moves to strike certain aspects of Plaintiff's claims based upon the applicable statute of limitations; and moves to strike certain aspects of Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim for failure to exhaust. The Court considers the parties' arguments below.
Viscosity moves to dismiss count I, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state an Equal Pay Act claim. [34] at 11. The Equal Pay Act is broadly remedial and should be construed and applied to fulfill its underlying purposes: to remedy pay disparity arising from traditional concepts of gender. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 208 (1974). To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act Plaintiff must demonstrate that she received a lower wage than an employee of the...
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