Laufer v. Alamac Inc.
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-02206 (TNM) |
| Decision Date | 17 May 2021 |
| Citation | 621 F.Supp.3d 1 |
| Parties | Deborah LAUFER, Plaintiff, v. ALAMAC INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Tristan Wade Gillespie, Johns Creek, GA, for Plaintiff.
Deborah Laufer sued Alamac Inc., owner of the River Inn in Washington, D.C. She alleges violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Laufer asserts that the River Inn has discriminated against her by breaching a regulation that requires it to ensure third-party online reservation systems are accessible for disabled users. The River Inn did not appear, and the Clerk of the Court entered default. Laufer then filed a motion for a default judgment.
The Court ordered Laufer to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. With the benefit of her response, as well as her proposed amended complaint, the Court finds that Laufer lacks standing. Her motion for default judgment will be denied as moot, and the complaint will be dismissed. Because Laufer's proposed amended complaint does not cure the standing deficiencies, her pending motion for leave to amend will be denied as futile.
Laufer resides in Pasco County, Florida. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. She states that she "qualifies as an individual with disabilities as defined by the ADA." Id. Laufer "is an advocate of the rights of similarly situated disabled persons and is a 'tester' for the purpose of asserting her civil rights and monitoring, ensuring, and determining whether places of public accommodation and their websites are in compliance with the ADA." Id. ¶ 2.
Patrons can reserve rooms at the River Inn through various third-party websites, such as priceline.com or expedia.com. Id. ¶ 9. Laufer alleges that these websites "did not identify or allow for reservation of accessible guest rooms and did not provide sufficient information regarding accessibility at the hotel." Id. ¶ 10. She thus claims that the River Inn did not comply with a regulation which requires places of lodging to, among other things, "ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms" and "[i]dentify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms." 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(i)-(ii); see also id. § 36.302(e)(1) ().
Laufer states that she "visited the websites for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessible features at the Property and [to] ascertain whether they meet the requirements of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e) and her accessibility needs." Compl. ¶ 10. As a tester, Laufer "maintains a system to ensure that she revisits the online reservations system of every hotel she sues." Id. ¶ 11. "In the near future," Laufer "intends to revisit Defendant's online reservations system in order to test it for compliance with" the regulation. Id. Her complaint also alleges, though, that she "is continuously aware that the subject websites remain non-compliant and that it would be a futile gesture to revisit the websites as long as those violations exist unless she is willing to suffer additional discrimination." Id. ¶ 12.
Laufer contends that she "is suffering irreparable harm." Id. ¶ 19. Her complaint explains that she "has suffered, and continues to suffer, frustration and humiliation as the result of the discriminatory conditions present at Defendant's website"; and that "[b]y continuing to operate the websites with discriminatory conditions, Defendant contributes to Plaintiff's sense of isolation and segregation and deprives Plaintiff the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges and/or accommodations available to the general public." Id. ¶ 13.
Laufer seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. See id. at 9-10.1 This action is one of "hundreds of identical lawsuits in federal district courts around the country." Laufer v. Mann Hosp., LLC, 996 F.3d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Laufer v. Dove Hess Holdings, LLC, No. 5:20-cv-379-BKS-ML, 2020 WL 7974268, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2020) (); Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC, No. 20-cv-1974-SAG, 2020 WL 7384726, at *8 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2020) ().
When the River Inn failed to appear, the Clerk entered default. Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 11. Laufer then moved for default judgment. Pl.'s Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 12. The Court questioned whether it had jurisdiction over Laufer's motion and ordered Laufer to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Order to Show Cause (Dec. 8, 2020), ECF No. 13. Laufer responded to the order, see Pl.'s Resp. to Order to Show Cause ("Pl.'s Resp."), ECF No. 15, and she later moved for leave to amend her complaint, see Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl., ECF No. 17.2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs default judgment procedures. A plaintiff may "apply to the court for a default judgment" after the opposing party "has failed to plead or otherwise defend." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)-(b). "[T]he entry of a default judgment is not automatic." Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). The appropriateness of a default judgment "is committed to the sound discretion of this Court." Boland v. Yoccabel Constr. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013).
As relevant here, "the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a federal court of its affirmative obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Herbin v. Seau, 317 F. Supp. 3d 568, 571 (D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up). "The Court cannot enter a default judgment when it lacks jurisdiction." Terry v. Dewine, 75 F. Supp. 3d 512, 530 (D.D.C. 2014). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish jurisdiction. See Herbin, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 571.
"Leave to amend a complaint under Rule 15(a) 'shall be freely given when justice so requires.' " Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). But "[c]ourts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss." Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). When a plaintiff's proposed complaint "fails to establish subject-matter jurisdiction . . . granting the plaintiff's motion to amend would be futile." Miller v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D.D.C. 2007). "[T]he grant or denial of leave to amend is committed to a district court's discretion." Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208.
The Court determines (A) that Laufer has not shown that she has standing, and (B) that her proposed amended complaint would be futile.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Article III curtails the judicial power to deciding "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). It "limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong." Id.
Only plaintiffs who show "(1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief" have standing to sue. Thole v. U.S. Bank, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1618, 207 L.Ed.2d 85 (2020). The plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing these elements." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). "[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id.
Article III standing is jurisdictional. It "can be raised at any point in a case proceeding and, as a jurisdictional matter, may be raised, sua sponte, by the court." Bauer v. Marmara, 774 F.3d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)). "When there is doubt about a party's constitutional standing, the court must resolve the doubt, sua sponte if need be." Id. (cleaned up). "In determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may 'consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.' " Terry v. First Merit Nat'l Bank, 75 F. Supp. 3d 499, 506 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
Laufer's alleged injury is not concrete. "A 'concrete' injury must be 'de facto'; that is, it must actually exist." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009)). Laufer alleges dignitary and informational harms arising from the River Inn's regulatory violations. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 13 (); id. (); id. ().
"There is no doubt that dignitary harm is cognizable" because "stigmatic injury is one of the most serious consequences of discrimination." Carello v. Aurora Policemen...
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