Laughlin v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 09 May 1899
• Citation: 52 S.W. 816,102 Tenn. 455
• Parties: LAUGHLIN v. JOHNSON et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

52 S.W. 816

102 Tenn. 455

LAUGHLIN v. JOHNSON et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 9, 1899

Appeal from chancery court, Shelby county; John L. T. Sneed Chancellor.

Action by Norman Laughlin against Amanda Johnson and others to share in the estate of Louisa J. Hardwicke, deceased. From a decree in favor of defendants, complainant appeals. Reversed.

Young & Young and Jas. M. Greer, for appellant.

Randolph & Randolph and D. M. Scales, for appellees.

BEARD J.

The complainant, Laughlin, is the illegitimate son, and the defendants Amanda F. Johnson and Josaphine P. Clifton are the legitimate daughters, of one Eveline Chunn, who departed this life many years ago. Louisa J. Hardwicke, who was also a legitimate daughter of the same mother, died intestate some time before the institution of this suit, leaving neither husband nor lineal descendants. At the time of her death she was the owner of realty in the city of Memphis acquired by her by deed from a former husband, and the question in this record is, does complainant share with the legitimate sisters of the deceased in this property? At common law, a bastard had no inheritable blood, so that, if complainant is to be let in to an interest in this property as an heir, it must be by virtue of some statute. It is conceded that Acts 1851-52 c. 39, and Acts 1885, c. 34, § 1, carried into the Codes of Tennessee (Shannon's Code, §§ 4166, 4167; Mill. & V Code, §§ 3273, 3274), give no support to this claim; but it is insisted that it is provided for in the last clause of section 10, c. 36, Acts 1866-67, found in Shannon's Code at section 4169. That section, as a whole, is as follows "Where any woman shall die intestate, having a natural born child or children, whether she also have a legitimate child or children, or otherwise, such natural born child or children shall take, by the general rules of descent and distribution, equally with the other child or children, the estate real or personal of his or her and their mother; and should either of such children die intestate, without child his or her brothers and sisters shall, in like manner, take his or her estate." No doubt is entertained that the first clause of this section removes the taint of illegitimacy, so far as to confer inheritable blood on the natural born child, and thus enable him or her, as the case may be, to share equally with the legitimate child or children in the estate of their mother who dies intestate. It is the last clause in the section which raises the present controversy, the complainant insisting that, upon a natural and necessary interpretation of its terms, he is entitled to a share in the estate of Mrs. Hardwicke, although it did not come from the mother common to himself and the defendants; while, on the other hand, these defendants insist it is to be construed with regard to the first clause of the section, and that, taken altogether, to use the words of the solicitors of the defendants in their brief, "the statute applies only to the estate of the mother, real or personal, of the illegitimate, or, in other words, its language confines such illegitimate person to the estate, real and personal, of his, her, or their mother." We have had occasion, in two other cases involving a construction of this statute, upon facts similar to those found in this record, and with like arguments pressed with so much earnestness and ability in this case, to carefully examine this statute, and in each of these cases we have announced a conclusion adverse to the contention of the defendants. We find nothing new either in this record or in the argument presented. A re-examination of the question satisfies us that the one heretofore announced is sound. To hold otherwise we think would be to do violence both to the literalism of the statute, as well as the purpose of the legislature in enacting it. It is but a culmination of legislation begun in this state in 1819, the design and effect of which has been to change radically the status of illegitimates before the law. Acts 1851-52 (Shannon's Code, § 4166), heretofore referred to, provided for the disposition of the estates of illegitimates who died intestate without child or children, or husband or wife; while section 10, c. 36, Acts 1866-67, was a more advancced step in effectuating the general design to give ample relief to this unfortunate class of persons. The first part of the section places legitimate and illegitimate children upon a common ground of inheritance as to the mother's estate, where she dies intestate; while the last clause, in distinct terms, does the same thing for these two classes, as to the estate of any one of...