Laughlin v. Stuart

• Decision Date: 21 January 2022
• Docket Number: 19-cv-2547 (ECT/TNL)
• Parties: Malik Laughlin, et al., Plaintiffs, v. James Stuart, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Malik Laughlin, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
James Stuart, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-2547 (ECT/TNL)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

January 21, 2022

Malik Laughlin, OID #259995, MCF-Rush City, and Emily Claire Hari, Livingston County Jail, (pro se Plaintiffs);

Robert I. Yount, Assistant Anoka County Attorney, (for Defendants James Stuart, Jonathon Evans, Lt. Sheila Larson, Sgt. Carrie Wood, and Jesse Rasmussen).

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Tony N. Leung, United States Magistrate Judge District of Minnesota.

This matter is before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, on County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 357). This motion has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and recommendation to the Honorable Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1. (ECF No. 98.) Based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that County Defendants' motion be GRANTED and that this matter be dismissed with prejudice.

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Malik Laughlin, Kenneth Lewis, and Emily Hari^[1] brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 22, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Their original complaint arose from events that occurred while all three were inmates at the Anoka County Jail (“ACJ”). (Id.) This included allegations that jail employees (1) provided inadequate dietary nutrition in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) inhibited each Plaintiffs' ability to communicate with their attorneys and review legal materials, and that jail employees reviewed materials subject to attorney-client privilege in violation of their Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) performed “sexually abusive patdowns” in violation of their Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights; (4) failed to provide adequate access to discovery in their criminal cases in violation of their Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (5) failed to provide adequate access to the jail's law library in violation of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (6) violated their Fifth and Fourteenth amendment rights through disciplinary segregation. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed their first motion to amend their complaint in May of 2020. (ECF No. 64.) Plaintiffs proposed adding extensive claims specific to Hari. (Id.) These claims related to allegations that employees of multiple law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities collected and reviewed Hari's privileged telephone calls; correctional officers at the Sherburne County Jail monitored Hari's use of a computer to view discovery and correspond with her attorney; unidentified Marshals in Illinois seized

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Hari's legal mail and disclosed information in it; mail that Hari sent from the Sherburne County Jail was opened, disclosed, and, in some cases, altered and delayed in delivery; and certain correctional officers searched Hari's cell and read her legal materials. (ECF No. 64-1 at 17-26.)

The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended complaint adding certain claims and supporting allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: namely, violations of Laughlin's rights under the First Amendment as to Sergeant Carrie Wood and Deputy Jonathan Evans; and violations of Lewis's rights under the First and Sixth Amendments as to Sheriff James Stuart and Detective Tessa Villegas. (ECF No. 81.) The order denied the motion to amend with regard to Hari's newly outlined claims.^[2] (Id.) Plaintiffs filed their Amended Civil Rights Complaint on June 23, 2020. (ECF No. 85.) Plaintiffs again moved to amend their complaint in September of 2020. (ECF No. 176.) Citing knowledge gained through the discovery process, Plaintiffs sought to amend the First Amended Complaint by: (1) removing Plaintiffs' claims based on sexually abusive pat-down searches, punitive diet in segregation, and punitive disciplinary segregation; (2) adding various pieces of factual evidence obtained in discovery in support of their claims, “primarily for the lawyer client violations of mail and telephone privilege and privacy” claims; and (3) Hari sought to add a claim against Deputy Jesse

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Rasmussen for seizing a piece of her legal mail in June of 2019. (Id. at 2; see also ECF No. 178.)

The Court again granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion. (ECF No. 303.) Plaintiffs were allowed to file a Second Amended Complaint to add Hari's claim as to Deputy Rasmussen, remove claims, and organize the complaint. (Id. at 13.) The order denied Plaintiffs' requests for amendment in all other respects. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in March of 2021. (ECF No. 311.) Defendant Tessa Villegas filed a motion to dismiss on April 5, 2021. (ECF No. 321.) The remaining Defendants (hereinafter collectively “County Defendants”), all employees of Anoka County during the relevant time period, filed a motion for summary judgment on June 14, 2021. (ECF No. 357.) Lewis has since settled his claims with County Defendants (ECF No. 411) and Tessa Villegas (ECF No. 413). Lewis's claims have been dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 418.)

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56(a), courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine' dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

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The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, ” and must identify “those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); accord Gannon Int'l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2012). “If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Gannon Int'l, 684 F.3d at 792.

This is true of pro se litigants as well. Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Like any other civil litigant, [the pro se plaintiff] was required to respond to defendants' motions with specific factual support for his claims to avoid summary judgment.”); see also, e.g., Quam v. Minnehaha Cty. Jail, 821 F.2d 522, 522 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“Although Quam is entitled to the benefit of a liberal construction of his pleadings because of his pro se status, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 remains applicable to Quam's lawsuit”); Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”). “To establish a genuine issue of material fact, . . . [the non-moving party] may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but must substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor.” Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011).

B. Section 1983

Plaintiffs' claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” Thus, “Section 1983 creates a species of tort liability for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911, 916 (2017) (quotations and citations omitted). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).

C. Facts

1. Plaintiffs' Presence at the ACJ

a. Bookings

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint details claims made while both were inmates at the ACJ in 2019. (See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 5.)

Hari was arrested in March 2018 after the filing of a complaint in this district related to the bombing of the Dar al-Farooq Islamic Center and Mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota. See United States v. Hari et al., 18-cr-150 (DWF/HB) (D. Minn.) [hereinafter United States v. Hari], ECF No. 1; see also Hari v. Stuart, No. 19-cv-1330 (ECT/TNL),

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2020 WL 7249816, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Hari I], report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6391305 (D. Minn. Nov. 2, 2020). Hari was later indicted on several charges related to that bombing. Hari I, 2020 WL 7249816, at *2. She was transported from Illinois to the Sherburne County Jail in February 2019 by the United States Marshals Service. Id. During this transport, she attempted to escape. Id. She was transported to the ACJ in April 2019. Id.

Laughlin was booked into the ACJ in June 2019 pending state charges in multiple cases filed in the District Court for Anoka County. See State of Minnesota v. Malik Laughlin, case No. 02-CR-18-2752; State of...