Laughlin v. United States
| Decision Date | 25 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-CV-00085-JRG-CRW,2:17-CV-00085-JRG-CRW |
| Parties | ASHLEA M. LAUGHLIN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Her Sentence [Doc. 1], the United States' Response [Doc. 3], and Petitioner's Reply [Doc. 6]. For the reasons herein, the Court will deny Petitioner's motion.
In January 2011, Petitioner Ashlea M. Laughlin pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the kidnapping of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1201(a)(1), (g)(1)(A). [Superseding Indictment, Doc. 43, at 1-2, No. 2:10-CR-00074; Plea Agreement, Doc. 50, at 1, No. 2:10-CR-00074]. The Court sentenced her to a seventy-two-month term of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. [J., Doc., Doc. 110, at 2-3, No. 2:10-CR-00074]. The Court ordered her not to "commit another federal, state, or local crime" while on supervised release. [Id. at 3]. In addition, the Court imposed several conditions of supervised release—though none of them included the requirement that she register as a sex offender under either the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq., or the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act ("Tennessee Sex Offender Act"), Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-39-201 et seq.
According to Ms. Laughlin, however, the United States Probation Office informed her, upon her release into the community in 2016, that she had to register as a sex offender "with the state of Tennessee," in compliance with the Tennessee Sex Offender Act. [Pet'r's Mot. at 4]. Ms. Laughlin asserts that the Probation Office "ordered" her to register under this statute after it contacted the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") and obtained "an advisory opinion." [Id. at 5-6]. Although Ms. Laughlin did register under the Tennessee Sex Offender Act, she ultimately violated other conditions of her supervised release, on multiple occasions, [id. at 4], prompting the Court to hold two revocation hearings. At those hearings, Ms. Laughlin objected to the "addition of the supervised release condition" requiring sex offender registration. [Pet'r's Obj., Doc. 210, at 1, No. 2:10-CR-00074].
The events of those hearings are not within the four corners of Ms. Laughlin's pending petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but they remain a source of useful background information for it. At the hearings, the Court learned Ms. Laughlin's probation officer sought the TBI's opinion because she was concerned that Ms. Laughlin might be violating state law by not registering as a sex offender, in contravention of the Court's mandatory condition that she not commit a federal, state, or local crime. [Order, Doc. 238, at 2, No. 2:10-CR-00074]. The probation officer also requested the United States Attorney's Office's opinion on the same issue. [Id.]. In response, the United States Attorney's Office, in a written memorandum, informed the probation officer of its position that neither federal law nor state law required Ms. Laughlin to register as a sex offender. [USAO's Memo., Doc. 234-2, at 3]. The TBI, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion. [TBI E-mail, Doc. 234-1, at 1].
According to Greene County's Sex Offender Administrator, Angie Weems, from whom the Court received testimony, she "was informed by TBI that the defendant[] w[as] requiredto register under the TBI's interpretation of the law because [her] offense involved kidnapping." [Order at 2]. Although she recalled cases in which a state judge had not required a defendant to register as a sex offender even though the conviction was for a registerable offense, she could not guarantee that the TBI would follow a judicial order, whether state or federal, if it was inconsistent with its own opinion. [Id. at 2-3]. So based on the TBI's advisory opinion, the probation officer had told Ms. Laughlin that if she did not register as a sex offender, the TBI might charge her with failure to register, a state crime. [Id. at 2].
The Court ultimately denied Ms. Laughlin's objection to the TBI's requirement that she register as a sex offender. [Id. at 6]. Although the Court acknowledged that Ms. Laughlin was under no court-ordered mandate to register as a sex offender, it interpreted her objection as a request for a judicial advisory opinion, which the Court lacks authority to issue. [Id. at 5]. In potentially rendering an advisory opinion, the Court also expressed concerns about imposing on the State of Tennessee's sovereign right to interpret and enforce its own laws. [Id.]. And lastly, the Court viewed the probation officer's actions, in light of the TBI's advisory opinion, as a reasonable and legitimate attempt to ensure Ms. Laughlin's compliance with the Court's mandatory condition that she not commit a federal, state, or local crime. [Id.].1
As a registered sex offender, Ms. Laughlin now details the struggles she has experienced in trying to rebuild her life outside of prison. She states that she cannot return to a local halfway house for transitional living because it is located within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare, or park. [Pet'r's Letter, Doc. 263-2, at 1, No. 2:10-CR-00074]. She also claims that she cannot live withher family because they have minor children in their homes. [Id.]. She fears she will become homeless and relapse into drug use. [Id.]. Further complicating matters, she maintains that she has struggled to find employment. She says that even when she succeeds in locating employers not within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare, or park, "they no longer want anything to do with" her once they learn she is a registered sex offender. [Id.].
Relying on § 2255, Ms. Laughlin now moves the Court, through the Federal Defender Services of East Tennessee, to vacate, set aside, or correct "the addition of a supervised release condition that she be required to register as a sex offender for her federal conviction." [Pet'r's Mot. at 1]. She opposes this condition because it did not appear in her plea agreement, the presentence investigation report, the Court's criminal judgment, or in any modification of her conditions of supervised release. [Id. at 1, 3]. In response to her § 2255 petition, the Court held a hearing, at which it heard oral argument from both parties. The Court is now prepared to rule on Ms. Laughlin's petition.
Under § 2255, "[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a [federal] court . . . claiming the right to be released . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A court must vacate and set aside a sentence if it concludes that "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." Id. § 2255(b). To warrant relief for a denial or infringement of a constitutional right, a petitioner has to establish an "error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings." Watson v. United States,165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)). To warrant relief for a non-constitutional claim, a petitioner must establish that a fundamental defect in the proceeding resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error that deprived him of "the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994); see Grant v. United States, 72 F. 3d 503, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1996).
In sum, "[a] prisoner seeking relief under § 2255 'must allege as a basis for relief: (1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid." Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). In support of one of these three bases for relief, a petitioner's allegations must consist of sufficient facts showing she is entitled to relief. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972). "Generally, courts have held that 'conclusory allegations alone, without supporting factual averments, are insufficient to state a valid claim under § 2255.'" Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotation and citation omitted). And similarly, if "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief," she will not receive an evidentiary hearing. Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 (1973)).
A petitioner has the burden of proving that "an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental to come within" one of the three "narrow limits" for § 2255 relief. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979); see Pough, 442 F.3d at 964. The standard that governs collateral review under § 2255, as opposed to direct review on appeal, is significantly higher. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162-66 (1982); see Hampton v. United States, 191 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1999) . This is so because "[t]he reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system." Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 (footnote omitted); see Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) ...
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