Laughner v. United States
| Citation | 373 F.2d 326 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 23854.,23854. |
| Parties | Arthur U. LAUGHNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Arthur C. Laughner, Pro Se.
Thomas M. Baumer, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., Edward F. Boardman, U. S. Atty., for appellee.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, BELL and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.
The district court has twice denied the motion made by appellant pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 to vacate his conviction for knowingly transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce. The first, denial was made without benefit of a hearing on the motion. On appeal therefrom this court concluded that the allegations respecting the inadequacy of the representation afforded appellant by his court-appointed counsel made necessary a factual judicial inquiry, and remanded the case for that purpose. Laughner v. United States, 360 F.2d 159 (5 Cir. 1966).
On remand, the district court heard testimony from appellant, and from the attorney who represented him at the time of his conviction. On the basis of that testimony, the court again denied appellant's Section 2255 motion. This appeal followed.
We are met first with the remarkable contention that appellant's rights were infringed upon by reason of the fact that the attorney he charged with failure to represent him adequately at his arraignment and sentencing was called as a witness by the government and permitted by the court to testify in this post-conviction proceeding with respect to the factual issues raised by appellant's motion. Having demanded and obtained a factual judicial inquiry into his claim that the attorney appointed to render him the assistance of counsel for his defense failed to discharge his responsibilities properly, appellant now proposes to invoke the privilege accorded confidential communications between an attorney and his client to eliminate the one source of evidence likely to contradict his allegations. We are unable to subscribe to this proposition. The privilege is not an inviolable seal upon the attorney's lips. It may be waived by the client; and where, as here, the client alleges a breach of duty to him by the attorney, we have not the slightest scruple about deciding that he thereby waives the privilege as to all communications relevant to that issue.1
There is no contention nor any indication in the record that the testimony elicited from the attorney in this case exceeded the scope of that waiver. Consequently, appellant's claim that his privilege was violated is baseless.
In his motion, appellant asserted that though he explained to counsel that he had rented the automobile which he was charged with transporting, and though counsel informed him that he had thus committed no crime, counsel advised him that the best thing to do was to enter a plea of guilty and allow the judge to dispose of the matter in his discretion. After hearing evidence on the matter, the district court determined that these allegations have no basis in fact. Instead, it found that appellant explained that he had rented the car in Pennsylvania for a limited period of time, that he had driven it to Savannah where he worked for a short time, and that later he had been picked up in Florida for speeding. Appellant insisted that since he had rented the car, it could not be stolen. His attorney, however, explained that keeping the car beyond the rental period could amount to theft, given the requisite intent, and that a...
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Patrick v. City of Chi., 14 C 3658
...the scope of the waiver beyond what was needed to litigate the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967). In this case, there are federal interests involved in Mr. Patrick's case, namely how a case based on a federal civil right......
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Bittaker v. Woodford
...Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir.1997); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1974); Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967). The question to us is the scope of the habeas petitioner's waiver: Does it extend only to litigation of the federal......
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Johnson v. Nagle, CV-93-N-1121-S.
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Davis v. Singletary
...grounds and by calling Tassone as a witness on those claims, Petitioner chose to and did waive the privilege. See Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967) (where client, in a collateral proceeding, alleges breach of a duty owed him by attorney, "we have not the slightest ......
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Dead men's lawyers tell no tales: the attorney-client privilege survives death.
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