Davis v. Singletary

Decision Date25 May 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-251-Civ-J-20.,92-251-Civ-J-20.
Citation853 F. Supp. 1492
PartiesAllen Lee DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

M. Elizabeth Wells, Steven M. Kissinger, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, FL, for petitioner.

Jon Robert Phillips, State Attorney's Office, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Jacksonville, FL, and Mark Christopher Menser, Atty. General's Office, Tallahassee, FL, for respondent.

OPINION

SCHLESINGER, District Judge.

Before the Court is Petitioner Allen Lee Davis' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in State Custody (Doc. No. 1, filed March 9, 1992).

Respondent filed an anticipatory response on March 9, 1992 (Doc. No. 10). On March 16, 1992, the Court ordered Petitioner to submit a supplemental memorandum detailing the procedural history of each of his twenty-five claims and, where appropriate, addressing his right to bring those claims in light of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). The Court also ordered Respondent to file an additional response to the Petition and supplemental memorandum. Petitioner complied by filing a supplemental memorandum on March 26, 1992 (Doc. No. 16) and Respondent complied by filing an amended response on April 6, 1992 (Doc. No. 17). The Court heard oral argument on the Petition on April 27, 1992.

Subsequently, the Court found that Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the following issues: (1) whether Petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in his investigation of Petitioner's family and social history; (2) whether Petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the hypnotically induced testimony of a prosecution witness; and (3) whether Petitioner was competent to stand trial. The evidentiary hearing was conducted January 25 through January 27, 1993.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 11, 1982, Nancy Weiler and her two young daughters, Katherine and Kristina, aged five and ten, respectively, were brutally murdered in their home near San Pablo Boulevard, in Jacksonville, Florida. Nancy Weiler was beaten over the head with a pistol, "almost beyond recognition." Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 67, 72 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 913, 105 S.Ct. 3540, 87 L.Ed.2d 663 (1985). One daughter was tied up and shot twice, and the other was shot in the back once, then beaten. Id. All the acts occurred in the mother's bedroom and the short hallway to that bedroom. Id.

On March 2, 1983, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death on each of three counts of first degree murder. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences of death directly to the Florida Supreme Court. On October 4, 1984, the court rejected Petitioner's five claims of error.1 Davis, 461 So.2d at 68-72.

Petitioner then sought clemency before the Florida Board of Executive Clemency. The board held a hearing on June 26, 1986, and on August 20, 1986, the Governor denied Petitioner's request for clemency. On that date the Governor also signed a death warrant for the week of September 17-23, 1986.

On September 20, 1986, Petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relief and an application for a stay in the Florida Supreme Court.2 The court denied the petition on September 22, 1986, and entered an opinion on October 30, 1986. Davis v. Wainwright, 498 So.2d 857 (Fla.1986). On September 22, 1986, Petitioner applied for a stay of his execution with the United States Supreme Court. At 11:30 p.m. on September 22, 1986, Justice Powell granted a stay until 3:00 p.m. on September 23, 1986, pending consideration of the stay issue by the entire Court. On September 23, 1986, the United States Supreme Court granted the stay pending the resolution of an application by Petitioner for a writ of certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court's denial of the petition for extraordinary relief. The Court denied certiorari on October 5, 1987. Davis v. Dugger, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 208, 98 L.Ed.2d 159 (1987).

On September 22, 1986, after the denial of the petition for extraordinary relief by the Florida Supreme Court, but before the stay of the execution by the United States Supreme Court, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 and a motion for a stay of execution in the state trial court.3 The trial judge denied both motions on September 22, 1986. Transcript of Record of First 3.850 Motion hereinafter "PC" at R5-827-28. Petitioner appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which on September 23, 1986, summarily affirmed the trial court's denial of both motions. Davis v. State, 496 So.2d 142 (Fla.1986).

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody on September 22, 1986, at 10:30 p.m., in this Court, during the pendency of the appeal to the Florida Supreme Court of the denial of the 3.850 Motion, but before the stay by the United States Supreme Court.4 On September 23, 1986 at 9:30 a.m., this Court denied the petition because it contained unexhausted claims and because the Court found that it constituted an abuse of the writ. Davis v. Wainwright, 644 F.Supp. 269 (M.D.Fla.1986). The court of appeals reversed, and remanded the matter for consideration of the petition on its merits. Davis v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1987).

On December 23, 1988, this Court dismissed the prior petition without prejudice so that Petitioner could exhaust his fourteenth claim, the one unexhausted claim, or file an amended petition without the unexhausted claim. Davis v. Dugger, 703 F.Supp. 916 (M.D.Fla.1988). The fourteenth claim originally was Claim 13 in Petitioner's first 3.850 motion. That claim was considered by the state courts prior to the decision of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). The Court, therefore, found that Petitioner's Hitchcock claim had not been fairly presented to the state courts. 703 F.Supp. at 920.

On July 31, 1989, Petitioner filed another motion pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, in which he presented the Hitchcock claim, as well as nine other claims.5 The state trial court held that all of Petitioner's claims except the Hitchcock claim were procedurally barred. Transcript of Record of Second 3.850 Motion hereinafter "PC2" at R1-141-42. That court also held that the Hitchcock claim had no merit. Id. at 141. On October 31, 1991, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings. Davis v. State, 589 So.2d 896 (Fla.1991).6

The Governor signed a Death Warrant on February 12, 1992 for the week beginning Tuesday, March 10, 1992 at 12:00 p.m. and ending Tuesday, March 17, 1992 at 12:00 p.m. On March 9, 1992, the instant petition was filed, raising 25 claims.7 By an Order dated that same date (Doc. No. 11), this Court stayed the execution then scheduled for March 11, 1992.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The current version of the habeas corpus statute states that a determination on the merits of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant for the writ can establish one of the enumerated causes for exception. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (listing enumerated causes); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). In the Eleventh Circuit, a district court entertaining a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must resolve all claims for relief raised therein, regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied. Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992). A claim for relief is deemed to be any allegation of a constitutional violation. Id.

CLAIM I—CHANGE OF VENUE

In Claim I Petitioner alleges that in light of the extensive and highly prejudicial pretrial media coverage of his case, the trial court's failure to grant his motion for a change of venue deprived Petitioner of his right to a fair and impartial jury at the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of his trial, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments. Petitioner asserts that this error, and the alleged resulting prejudice to Petitioner's rights, was compounded by the court's additional failure to grant Petitioner's motion for individual and sequestered voir dire. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) "Pet." at 8.8

This claim originally was raised in Petitioner's direct appeal. The Florida Supreme Court denied the claim, on its merits, on October 4, 1984.9 Davis, 461 So.2d at 70. Therefore, the Court finds that Claim I has been exhausted and is properly before the Court.

With respect to the change of venue issue, Petitioner contends that the greater Jacksonville, Florida, community was exposed to extensive and highly prejudicial pretrial publicity, by both the print and electronic media. Petitioner further contends that this pretrial publicity met both the inherent and actual prejudice standards outlined by the Eleventh Circuit. The examples of pretrial publicity to which Petitioner alludes include: (1) inadmissible evidence of Petitioner's prior criminal record, which contained convictions for manslaughter, two armed robberies, and attempted robbery; (2) inadmissible evidence that Petitioner was on parole at the time of the murders; (3) inadmissible evidence that Petitioner failed a polygraph test; (4) Petitioner's statements to police (the admissibility of which had yet to be determined) placing him in the victims' home at the time the medical examiner believed the murders occurred, and statements claiming that he...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Parker v. Turpin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • August 13, 1999
    ...With the second prong, the Court must determine whether the prosecutor's comments rendered the entire trial unfair. Davis v. Singletary, 853 F.Supp. 1492, 1569 (M.D.Fla.1994). When determining whether the prosecutor's argument affected the outcome of the trial, the "relevant criteria includ......
  • Duckett v. Mcdonough
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • March 25, 2010
    ...is more exculpatory in its impact than inculpatory, and it was made clear to the jury that no test ever occurred. Davis v. Singletary, 853 F.Supp. 1492, 1569 (M.D.Fla.1994). Duckett's guilt was established by a wealth of circumstantial evidence-whether or not he was willing to take a polygr......
  • Holland v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 11, 1997
    ...to neurological examinations, as such examinations are medical and not psychological in nature. Page 334 Davis v. Singletary, 853 F.Supp. 1492, 1540 n. 39 (M.D.Fla.1994). ¶83 It appears that a neurological examination would have been helpful in determining the existence of brain damage and ......
  • Farina v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • March 26, 2012
    ...life histories and personal accomplishments, and innocence and unconditional love manifested by child victims); Davis v. Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492, 1541-42 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (finding victim impact evidence from eight family members and one close friend was not unconstitutional). Petition......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT