Laundry, Dry Cleaning, Dye House Workers Union, Local 3008, AFL-CIO v. Laundry Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO

• Citation: 4 Wis.2d 542,91 N.W.2d 320
• Decision Date: 26 June 1958
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Parties: , 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2546, 73 A.L.R.2d 843, 35 Lab.Cas. P 71,635 LAUNDRY, DRY CLEANING, DYE HOUSE WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 3008,, etc., Respondent, v. LAUNDRY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, Defendant, Joseph F. Williams, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Page 320

91 N.W.2d 320

4 Wis.2d 542, 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2546,

73 A.L.R.2d 843,

35 Lab.Cas. P 71,635

LAUNDRY, DRY CLEANING, DYE HOUSE WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 3008 AFL-CIO, etc., Respondent, v. LAUNDRY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, Defendant Joseph F. Williams, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 26, 1958.

Hayes & Hayes, Snyder & Greco, Milwaukee, for appellant in error.

Robert E. Gratz and Joseph J. Shutkin Milwaukee, for respondent in error.

CURRIE, Justice.

The following two issues are before us on this appeal.

(1) Was the trial court confronted with a labor dispute as defined by sec. 103.62, Stats., so as to require compliance with the provisions of sec. 103.56 in the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the temporary injunction?

(2) Was it error for the trial court to issue both the temporary restraining order and the temporary injunction without requiring bond?

In resolving the first issue we deem it would be helpful to review the statutory history of secs. 103.56 and 103.62. The legislature, by ch. 376, Laws of 1931, enacted the 'Little Norris-La Guardia Act' comprising secs. 103.51-103.62, Stats., as they stood prior to the amendments made thereto by ch. 25, Laws of 1939. Such act was originally numbered secs. 268.18-268.29, but later was transferred to ch. 103 and renumbered secs. 103.51-103.62. Sec. 103.62, as it stood prior to the 1939 amendment, read as follows:

'When used in sections 103.51 to 103.63, and for the purpose of these sections:

'(1) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in a single industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or who are employes of one employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employes; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employes or associations of employes; (2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employes or associations of employes and one or more employes or associations of employes; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as defined in subsection (3) of 'persons participating or interested' therein (as defined in subsection (2)).

'(2) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it and if he or it is engaged in the industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association of employers or employes engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.

'(3) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employe, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employe.' (Italics supplied.)

The amendments effected to such Little Norris-La Guardia Act by ch. 25, Laws of 1939, were, first, to add thereto a new section numbered 103.535; and, secondly, to repeal subd. (3) of sec. 103.62 and simultaneously reenact a new subsection bearing the same number reading as follows:

'The term 'labor dispute' means any controversy between an employer and the majority of his employes in a collective bargaining unit concerning the right or process or details of collective bargaining or the designation of representatives. Any organization with which either the employer or such majority is affiliated may be considered a party to the labor dispute. The provisions of this subsection shall supersede any provision of the statutes in conflict therewith.'

Counsel for the defendant Williams contend that the present case involves the type of dispute between two unions which is embraced within the definition of a labor dispute set forth in subd. (1) of sec. 103.62. From this premise it is urged that the temporary restraining order violated the provision of subd. (4) of sec. 103.56 because issued for a longer period than the permissible five days. The temporary injunction is attacked because not issued upon the testimony of witnesses taken in open court, and because the trial court did not make the specific enumerated findings of fact, all as required by subd. (1) of sec. 103.56. There can be no question but that the requirements of subds. (1) and (4) of sec. 103.56 were not complied with by the trial court, but these are only applicable in the event the instant action involves a labor dispute as defined by sec. 103.62.

We doubt that subd. (3) of sec. 103.62 as amended by ch. 25, Laws of 1939, completely renders nugatory subd. (1) of such section. However, subd. (1) does not state that every action between two associations of employees constitutes a labor dispute. As sec. 103.62 was originally enacted in 1931, the definition of a labor dispute for the purposes of Wisconsin's Little Norris-La Guardia Act was not to be found in subd. (1) but rather in subd. (3). When carefully read it will be found that subd. (1) attempts to enumerate the different classes of litigants between whom a labor dispute may be found to exist. The effect of the 1939 amendment in repealing and recreating subd. (3) was to substitute a new definition of labor dispute for the prior one.

The controversy involved in the instant action with respect to the assets and property of the plaintiff local does not constitute a labor dispute within the definition of such term set forth in subd. (3) of sec. 103.62 as such subsection stood either before or after the 1939 amendment. Such a controversy is not one involving terms or conditions of employment or representation of employees for collective bargaining purposes.

Subds. (1) and (3) of sec. 103.62 as orginally enacted, while not entirely identical in wording to the corresponding provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113(a) and (c), are very similar thereto. The federal courts have held in cases where the parties fall within the enumerated categories of sec. 113(a) that no labor dispute exists because the controversy does not meet the statutory definition of sec. 113(c). Columbia River Packers Association, Inc., v. Hinton, 1942, 315 U.S. 143, 62 S.Ct. 520, 86 L.Ed. 750; United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 7 Cir., 1935, 80 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 297 U.S. 714, 56 S.Ct. 590, 80 L.Ed. 1000; and Tisa v. Potofsky, D.C.N.Y.1950, 90 F.Supp. 175. See also annotation entitled, 'Applicability of Norris-La Guardia Act and similar state statutes to injunction action by private complainant,' 29 A.L.R.2d 323, at page 385, and Sutton v. Marvidikis, 1957, 6 Utah 2d 238, 310 P.2d 735.

Pennsylvania has a Labor Anti-Injunction Act, 43 P.S. § 206a et seq., with provisions corresponding to subds. (1) and (3) of sec. 103.62, Wis.Stats., as they stood prior to the 1939 amendment. The Pennsylvania supreme court was called upon to construe these two subsections of such Pennsylvania Act in Bright v. Pittsburgh Musical Society, 1954, 379 Pa. 335, 108 A.2d 810. The plaintiff therein was a professional entertainer who obtained a preliminary injunction which restrained the defendant musicians' union and its officers from directing its members not to play live music at the public performance of the plaintiff's comedy act, and from maintaining his name on the union's unfair list. The issue was whether the action involved a controversy which was a labor dispute. The court in its opinion stated (108 A.2d at page 814):

'Further, the definition of a case arising out of a labor dispute in Section 3(a) of the Anti-Injunction Act must be construed reasonably to apply only where a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment or representation of employes is an issue in the proceeding. The identity of the persons involved in a controversy is insufficient of itself to oust a court of equity of jurisdiction in a case which was otherwise properly brought before it. * * * We, therefore, conclude that this case does not involve or grow out of a 'labor dispute' as that term is defined in the Pennsylvania statutes.'

However, the allegations of the complaint in the instant action spell out more than a mere controversy over property rights. This is because it is alleged that the defendant Williams attempted to represent the members of the plaintiff local in collective bargaining with their employers. Furthermore, the temporary restraining order enjoined the defendants 'from in any manner interfering with the duly elected officers and employees of said plaintiff union in their capacities as such officers, agents, and employees.' This is broad enough to include collective bargaining activities of the plaintiff local's officers and employees. A similar restraint was not imposed by the temporary injunction which later replaced the temporary restraining order.

The answer of the defendant Williams denied the allegations of the complaint that he attempted to represent the membership of the plaintiff local in collective bargaining activities with employers. The affidavit of Williams filed in opposition to the application for a temporary injunction did not raise the issue of whether a labor dispute was involved making necessary the compliance with sec. 103.56, Stats., and there is nothing in the record to indicate that such issue was raised before the trial court.

Under the definition of labor dispute contained by subd. (3) of sec. 103.62, as it now stands after the 1939 amendment, it is essential that there be a controversy between an employer and a majority of his employees relating to collective bargaining or...