Laundry Public Health Committee of Fla. v. Board of Business Regulation, N--26

• Citation: 235 So.2d 346
• Decision Date: 19 May 1970
• Docket Number: No. N--26,N--26
• Parties: The LAUNDRY PUBLIC HEALTH COMMITTEE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF BUSINESS REGULATION of the State of Florida, and J. H. Louchheim, III, Director of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 346

235 So.2d 346

The LAUNDRY PUBLIC HEALTH COMMITTEE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF BUSINESS REGULATION of the State of Florida, and J. H. Louchheim, III, Director of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Respondents.

No. N--26.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 19, 1970.

Paul A. Saad, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, and W. R. Phillips, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Wilbur E. Brewton and Riley Davis, Tallahassee, for respondents.

B. Kenneth Gatlin, of Parker, Foster & Madigan, Tallahassee, amicus curiae.

SPECTOR, Judge.

Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, has filed a motion to dismiss this proceeding and asserts multiple grounds in support thereof. The proceeding sought to be dismissed is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review an 'order' of the respondent board in accordance with Section 120.31(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and in the alternative a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to expunge its 'order' aforesaid and to enforce the provisions of Section 509.221(5) according to the clear wording of the said statute.

The principal ground for dismissing the certiorari proceeding to review the respondents' 'order' is that said 'order' is not an 'order' within the purview of Section 120.31(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides for certiorari review of '* * * the final orders of an agency entered in any agency proceeding, or in the exercise of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority, * * *.' We agree. In Bay National Bank and Trust Company v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 302 (Fla.App.1969), this court rendered its opinion distinguishing various 'orders,' rules, and rulings entered by administrative agencies and held that only those 'orders' which were quasi-judicial in nature were susceptible of review by certiorari under the intendment of Section 120.31(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

We have examined the 'order' sought to be reviewed by petitioners, and it is clear that the same falls within the statutory definition of the word 'rule' found in Section 120.021(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., under Part I of the Administrative Procedure Act expressly relating to the rulemaking power of administrative agencies. The last cited statutory provision reads in material part:

'(2) Rule means rule, order, regulation, standard, statement of policy, requirement, procedure, Or interpretation of general application, including the amendment or repeal thereof, Adopted by an agency to implement, interpret or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 509.221(5), Florida Statutes, 1969, F.S.A., reads in part as follows:

'* * * Sheets and pillow slips after being used by one guest, must be washed and ironed before they are used by another guest, a clean set being furnished each succeeding guest.'

The petition alleges that on November 4, 1969, one of the respondents, J. H. Louchheim, III, as Director of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants of the respondent regulatory board issued an 'administrative construction' of Section 509.221(5), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which stated after preliminary matter that the said Louchheim '* * * do(es) hereby rule that the word 'ironed' as set forth in Chapter 509.221(5) shall include linens conventionally ironed through normal laundry processes, pre-ironed linens and no-iron linens.' Thereafter, petitioner alleges, the respondent board on December 16, 1969, '* * * considered, affirmed and approved the 'administrative construction' of Section 509.221(5), Florida Statutes, adopted by the Division of Hotels and Restaurants * * *' referring to the ruling of Mr. Louchheim quoted above.

It appears that the action taken on December 16, 1969, constitutes the 'order' that petitioner seeks to have reviewed by certiorari. The latter action is no more than an administrative construction of the subject statute. It, along with the earlier action of Mr. Louchheim dated November 4, 1969, constitutes a 'rule' within the meaning of Section 120.021(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Neither Mr. Louchheim's administrative construction of November 4, 1969, nor the board's action of December 16, 1969, affirming and approving the subject administrative construction of the statute is an 'order' which is...