Lauramore v. State
| Decision Date | 25 August 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. AF-442,AF-442 |
| Citation | 422 So.2d 896 |
| Parties | Carroll LAURAMORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Originally we affirmed the judgment and sentence in this case without opinion, 421 So.2d 520 (Fla.App.1982). Appellant has petitioned this court for rehearing or certification, alleging that without a written opinion it is impossible to determine the reason for affirmance and whether a conflict has been created with decisions of another district court, specifically M.J.S. v. State, 386 So.2d 323 (Fla.2d DCA 1980), and State v. Sepulvado, 362 So.2d 324 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). Under the circumstances, it is appropriate to explicate the reasons for affirming the judgment and sentence.
The first issue presented was whether the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, the identification testimony of Kenneth Prate since that testimony was allegedly the result of a pre-trial identification procedure which, it is asserted, violated appellant's right to due process of law. Mr. Prate had been the victim of the robbery, and his home had been burglarized.
Several weeks after the robbery and burglary, Prate was taken to the county jail and was present when appellant appeared for a parole revocation hearing. On entering the room, Prate was introduced to the people in the room; the only person not identified by name was appellant. Prate was asked whether the person who robbed him was present in the room, and he replied affirmatively. Appellant's counsel, who was representing him in the parole revocation proceeding, was present and objected. Because of this incident, the defense filed a motion to suppress the out-of-court identification and any subsequent in-court identification by Mr. Prate. This motion was presented prior to trial and denied.
In evaluating the correctness of this ruling, we consider only the testimony presented during the suppression hearing and on which the trial court based its ruling; additional information brought up during testimony at trial could not have affected that ruling.
During the suppression hearing, Mr. Prate testified that he had not based his identification on the fact that appellant was in the room, but that he had recognized appellant when he first saw him, and when he first walked into the room he immediately knew who appellant was before any statement of any kind was made to him. In addition he said that the criminal incident had lasted about fifteen minutes, the lights were on in the house, the burglar was not masked, Prate had no trouble seeing him, he was doing things in the house that drew Prate's attention to him, and although the thought of later having to identify appellant never entered his mind, he made an effort to remember what appellant looked like. Before the close of the suppression hearing Mr. Prate was questioned with regard to his assessment of appellant's height as being slightly under six feet. Counsel asserted that appellant had been seated at the parole revocation hearing.
The pre-trial procedure used in this case in which Mr. Prate was brought to the parole hearing, introduced to everyone except appellant, and asked if the robber was present in the room was unnecessarily suggestive. To that extent we agree with appellant's argument. This answers only one of several questions as to the alleged due process violation, however.
Our reading of the pertinent cases indicates that even if an out-of-court identification is determined to have been unnecessarily suggestive, eyewitness identification testimony will...
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State v. Guerra
...and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was made independent of the improper photographic lineup); Lauramore v. State, 422 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 426 So.2d 27 (Fla.1983); State v. Cromartie, 419 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. dismissed......
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State v. Walker, 82-1601
...under the Biggers standard, 5 the in-court identification was so unreliable that it should have been suppressed. Cf. Lauramore v. State, 422 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (in-court identification allowed because suggestive pretrial parole revocation hearing was not so suggestive as to creat......
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State v. Green
...before the trial court. Similar identifications have been approved. See State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426 (Fla.1978); Lauramore v. State, 422 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State v. Cromartie, 419 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State v. Ciongoli, 313 So.2d 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). The fact that......
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J.L.K. v. State
...to Florida judicial interpretation of Biggers; and that there never was a formal confrontation after the incident. Lauramore v. State, 422 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), points out that the criteria listed in Biggers are offered as measurements of the totality of the circumstances wher......