Lauren P., In re

• Decision Date: 17 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. E015548,E015548
• Citation: 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 170,44 Cal.App.4th 763
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2709, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4466 In re LAUREN P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CORALEE T., Defendant and Appellant, Daniel P., Defendant and Respondent.

Page 170

52 Cal.Rptr.2d 170

44 Cal.App.4th 763, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2709,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4466

In re LAUREN P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CORALEE T., Defendant and Appellant, Daniel P., Defendant and Respondent.

No. E015548.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

April 17, 1996.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

[44 Cal.App.4th 765] Donna L. Groman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Los Angeles, and Rick M. Stein, Palm Springs, for Defendant and Appellant.

William C. Katzenstein, County Counsel, and Tanya E. Galvan, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Riverside, for Defendant and Respondent.

Mary Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

OPINION

RICHLI, Associate Justice.

In this juvenile dependency proceeding, the juvenile court dismissed two successive petitions alleging that Daniel P. (Dan) had sexually abused his daughter, Lauren P. Each time, the juvenile court found insufficient evidence of the alleged sexual abuse. Coralee T., Lauren's mother, appeals from the dismissal of the second petition. The Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), although it did not itself appeal, supports Coralee's position. Both Dan and Lauren do not; they urge us to affirm.

Initially, we questioned the appealability of the dismissal order. In the published portion of this opinion, however, we hold that the order was indeed appealable, and that Coralee is sufficiently aggrieved by it to have standing. In the unpublished portion, we hold that dismissal of the petition is supported by substantial evidence. Hence, we will affirm.

I PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 15, 1994, DPSS filed a juvenile dependency petition with respect to Lauren. As against Dan, it alleged sexual abuse (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 300, subd. (d)); as against Coralee, it alleged failure to supervise and protect (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 300, subd. (b))--specifically, that Coralee "may not be able to protect the minor due to attempts by father to gain custody through Family Law Court."

On February 16, 1994, at a detention hearing, Dan denied the allegations against him; Coralee admitted the allegations against her.

Beginning on March 23, 1994, the juvenile court, Commissioner Cornelia Hartman presiding, held a contested jurisdictional hearing. On March 28, 1994, it found insufficient evidence to sustain the petition, and it therefore granted Dan's motion to dismiss the entire petition.

On April 29, 1994, DPSS filed a subsequent petition. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 342.) ¹ Like the original petition, it alleged sexual abuse against Dan, and failure to supervise and protect against Coralee; however, the specific instances of sexual abuse it alleged all occurred in April 1994, immediately following the dismissal of the original petition.

At a jurisdictional hearing on July 27, 1994, the subsequent petition was amended by stipulation. As amended, the sole alleged basis for dependency jurisdiction was that "irreconcilable differences" between Dan and Coralee had "placed their daughter, Lauren, at risk for emotional or sexual abuse...." Both Dan and Coralee admitted this allegation.

At a dispositional hearing on September 26, 1994, Dan was allowed to withdraw his stipulation to amend the petition. A new jurisdictional hearing was set on the allegations of the subsequent petition as originally filed.

Beginning on October 31, 1994, the juvenile court, Thomas N. Douglass, Jr. presiding, ² held a contested jurisdictional hearing. On November 14, 1994, it found the allegations of the petition untrue, and it dismissed the entire petition "without prejudice."

On December 27, 1994, Coralee filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ^**

III APPEALABILITY AND STANDING

Shortly after this appeal was filed, we questioned whether the order dismissing the petition was appealable, and if so, whether Coralee was aggrieved by it so as to have standing to appeal. We asked Coralee to submit a letter brief addressing these issues; after we received it, we reserved the question for decision together with the merits of the appeal. We invited the parties to discuss appealability and standing in their briefs.

In her opening brief, Coralee contends that the order was appealable, and that she does have standing. Interestingly, the other parties do not disagree; indeed, Lauren specifically concedes that the order was appealable. Although we believe the issue is not frivolous and deserves discussion, in the end we conclude that respondents have "caved" for good reason.

A. Finality of the Dismissal Order.

A "judgment" in a juvenile dependency proceeding "may be appealed from in the same manner as any Pinal judgment...." (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 395.) If the juvenile court dimisses a dependency petition based on insufficiency of the evidence, the dismissal is a final judgment and hence appealable. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 195-198, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482.) "An order of dismissal constitutes a judgment for all purposes and, as such, is generally appealable." (Id., at p. 197, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482.) Also, such a dismissal is with prejudice, and a final judgment for res judicata purposes. (Ibid.) On the other hand, if the juvenile court dismisses a dependency petition without prejudice and without ruling on the merits, the dismissal is not an appealable order. (In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 697-698, 267 Cal.Rptr. 210.) These principles govern the appealability of dismissal orders in civil actions generally. (See generally 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 75, pp. 99-100.)

Here, there would be no question that the dismissal order was appealable, but for the fact that the juvenile court purported to dismiss "without prejudice." Its characterization of its own order, however, is not controlling. It could not preclude review of an otherwise appealable order by labeling it "without prejudice." (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 727-728, 160 P.2d 816 [order denying petition for writ of mandate "without prejudice" was appealable]; United Teachers-L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1514-1515, fn. 3, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 [same]; Guenter v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 460, 465, 189 Cal.Rptr. 470 [order denying class certification "without prejudice" was appealable].)

We hasten to add that we do not believe that was what the juvenile court was trying to do. Obviously it was concerned that, even though it found the proof at the hearing insufficient, Dan might actually have molested Lauren. Evidently it wanted to leave the door open to a new petition alleging similar sexual abuse. The fact remains that the dismissal followed a trial on an issue of fact; hence, it was on the merits and res judicata. (In re Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 197, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 482.)

B. Standing to Appeal from the Dismissal Order.

In juvenile dependency proceedings, as in civil actions generally (see Code Civ. Proc., § 902), only a party aggrieved by the judgment has standing to appeal. (In re Gary P. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 875, 877, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 929; In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1195-1196, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 878.) "One is considered 'aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment." (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.)

It could be argued that the only party aggrieved by dismissal of the petition was DPSS. A juvenile dependency petition can only be filed by a public agency. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 325; see also Welf. & Inst.Code, § 272.) A parent or other person who believes the agency should file a petition can apply to the agency, showing facts that would support dependency jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 329.) Then, if the agency fails or refuses to file a petition, the applicant can seek judicial review of its decision. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 331.)

Once a petition has been filed, however, both parents are entitled to notice of and an opportunity to be heard at all subsequent proceedings. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 302, subd. (b), 349.) At the jurisdictional hearing, the public agency has the burden of proof; if it fails to meet its burden of proof, the juvenile court is statutorily required to dismiss the petition. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 350, subd. (c); see also Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 355, 356.) However, it has been held that this statute cannot be applied literally so as to prevent other parties from presenting evidence in support of the petition. (Guadalupe A. v. Superior Court (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 100, 105-107, 285 Cal.Rptr. 570.) If the agency fails to meet its burden, the trial court must give the other parties an opportunity to supply the evidentiary deficiency. (Id., at p. 107, 285 Cal.Rptr. 570.) "When ruling in dependency proceedings, the welfare of the minor is the paramount concern of the court. [Citation.] ... Consequently, a trial court should not restrict or prevent testimony on formalistic grounds. On the contrary, the court should avail itself of all evidence which might bear on the child's best interest. [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 106, 285 Cal.Rptr. 570.)

We have found only two cases directly pertinent to the standing issue. In the first, In re Tomi C., 218 Cal.App.3d 694, 267 Cal.Rptr. 210, the department of social services filed a petition regarding three siblings which, as amended, alleged that they had been sexually abused by their father. Thereafter, however, the department moved to dismiss the petition. The juvenile court required the department to make a prima facie showing that dismissal was warranted, and hence that it was not exercising its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. The department introduced evidence...