Laurent v. City and County of San Francisco
| Decision Date | 28 September 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 14282,14282 |
| Citation | 222 P.2d 274,99 Cal.App.2d 707 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | LAURENT v. CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al. |
Walter H. Duane, Joseph P. Lacey, San Francisco, for appellant.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, A. Dal Thomson, Public Utilities Counsel, San Francisco, for respondents.
Appellant filed in the Superior Court his petition for a writ of mandate to compel respondents as members of the Public Utilities Commission and J. H. Turner as manager of Public Utilities and B. M. Doolin as manager and chief engineer of the Airport department 'to formally accept the bid of petitioner and to execute a lease with petitioner, * * *' covering a certain area at the San Francisco Airport near South San Francisco. Respondents' return raised issues of law and fact. The court's ruling denying the writ amounted to the sustaining of a demurrer to the petition.
The petition alleges that at the direction of the Commission a call for bids was issued by the Director of Property, reciting that sealed bids would be received up to October 21, 1948 at 10 a. m. for leasing for automobile parking and 'U' Drive purposes an area approximately 229 feet by 310 feet at the Airport, north of the Administration Building. The call recited that the lease would be for 3 years, subject to the covenants, terms and conditions set forth in the proposed lease on file in the office of the Director and that it would be 'awarded to the highest responsible bidder subject to confirmation by the Public Utilities Commission.' It concluded with the statement 'Right reserved to reject any and all bids' and was signed by Eugene J. Riordan, Director of Property.
The petitioner alleges that at the time and place mentioned he and others were present and 'bids were opened and examined and your petitioner was thereupon publicly declared by the respondent Turner to be the highest bidder and the winner of the lease.'
There are allegations that appellant thereupon made arrangements and purchases preparatory to entering into possession under the prospective lease, and disposed of other business interests.
It is then alleged that about November 22, 1948, the Commission adopted a resolution rejecting petitioner's bid and on the 24th notified him in writing of such resolution and rejection. It appears from the record that the Commission rejected not only appellant's bid but all bids.
Appellant argues that 'The mode provided for the leasing of lands devoted to airport purposes is clearly and intelligibly set forth in section 93 of the charter and no mode other than that provided by the statute may be followed.'
We agree with appellant that a charter provision is 'subject to the same rules of interpretation as a statute'. Braun et al. v. McGuire, 201 Cal. 134, 143, 255 P. 808, 811. We agree, also, that the rule that the mode constitutes the measure of the power is one of long standing. Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96, 102, 81 Am.Dec. 96.
The sole inquiry on this appeal is, 'Where does the authority reside to accept or reject bids?'
Section 93 of the charter provides inter alia that 'the public utilities commission may provide, by resolution, that lands now devoted to airport purposes or lands that may hereafter be acquired and devoted to airport purposes may be leased or rented for a period not to exceed forty years, and the director of property shall arrange for such lease to the highest responsible bidder at the highest monthly or annual rent, and thereafter the administration of any and all such leases shall be by the public utilities commission; * * *.'
There is no express language in § 93 respecting the right to reject bids, but appellant concedes 'that the right to reject any and all bids may be reserved.' However, that concession is coupled with the claim that 'such right may be reserved only by the official authorized to call for and accept bids.'
The charter vests in the Director the authority to 'arrange' for the lease 'to the highest responsible bidder' and that is all the authority the Director is expressly given by the charter. Appellant in contending that the Director 'was the only person empowered to accept or reject the bid' does not point to any charter language or any other authority supporting his contention. His petition, however, is inconsistent with that contention since it alleges that the ...
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