Lauria v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. 97-1306,No. 97-1306,97-1363,97-1361,97-1362,Nos. 97-1361,97-1306,s. 97-1361,s. 97-1306
• Citation: 145 F.3d 593
• Parties: 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 660 Frank LAURIA, Appellant in Appeal, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Appellant in Appeal/62/63.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 593

145 F.3d 593

49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 660

Frank LAURIA, Appellant in Appeal No. 97-1306, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Appellant in Appeal Nos. 97-1361/62/63.

Nos. 97-1306, 97-1361, 97-1362, 97-1363.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued March 17, 1998.

Decided May 22, 1998.

Marvin I. Barish, Stacey E. Barish (Argued), Marvin I. Barish Law Offices, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

David E. Faust, Andrew J. Connolly (Argued), Sheila A. Haren, Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and SEITZ, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Frank Lauria and two railyard co-workers were traversing the railroad tracks near Philadelphia's 30th Street Station late one evening when Lauria slipped and injured himself. He sued his employer, Appellee National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq., ("FELA"), claiming a workplace injury caused by Amtrak's failure to provide a reasonably safe work environment. At trial, the district court refused to permit the admission of expert and lay opinion testimony, and at the close of Lauria's case it entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Amtrak. We have jurisdiction over the district court's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we will reverse and remand for a new trial.

I.

On November 8, 1993, Lauria slipped while crossing the tracks at Amtrak's Penn Coach Yard in Philadelphia with two co-workers, Campbell Smith, an engineer, and Carl Boselli, a conductor. Lauria testified that because they were crossing a "dark" railyard with "poor" lighting conditions, he was trying to step on the ballast, the coarse gravel that is used to form the bed of the railroad, rather than on the rail ties themselves, because it provides stable footing and support between the tracks. However, Lauria lost his balance and fell on Track 26 while trying to step over the ties. He stated under oath that he raised his left foot, lifted it over the rail, and set it firmly on the ballast. He then lifted his right foot, but he slipped when trying to place that foot down on the ballast, and he fell to the ground, developing sharp pains in his right leg and lower back before losing consciousness. Lauria admitted that he never saw what caused the fall, but he testified that he had stepped on "something slippery," rather than on the ballast that is usually found between the two rail ties on the tracks.

Boselli testified that he was standing an "arm's length" from Lauria when the accident occurred. Boselli saw Lauria fall, heard him "smack" onto the ground, and felt "baffled" because Lauria "fell violently." Immediately after the accident, Boselli looked down and saw a "fresh" skid mark on the surface of a piece of wood that was lying inside the gauge of the track where the ballast providing stable footing would normally be found. The wood was in the exact area where Lauria had slipped, and the skid mark was at the precise spot where the fall had occurred. Boselli also noticed that the lighting conditions were "poor," because the overhead lights did not sufficiently illuminate the area where Lauria fell, and because the trains "were blocking the passage of what lights did exist."

Lauria attempted to offer Robert T. Slavin, a track foreman and maintenance engineer, to support his case as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Slavin was prepared to testify that Amtrak's negligence in failing to remove a piece of wood from the tracks had contributed to and caused Lauria's injuries. However, the district court found that Slavin was not sufficiently qualified as an expert on track maintenance operations, and it refused to allow him to render an opinion. The court also rejected Lauria's effort to introduce Slavin as a lay witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701. As a result, Lauria sought to recall Boselli as a lay opinion witness to testify about the condition of the tracks on the morning after the accident. Once again, though, the district court denied Lauria's request under Rule 701 and precluded the witness from testifying. Amtrak then moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), arguing that without the testimony of Slavin and Boselli, Lauria had presented no evidence that Amtrak's negligence had contributed to his injuries. The district court agreed, and on March 27, 1997, it dismissed Lauria's claims and entered judgment in favor of Amtrak at the close of Lauria's case.

Lauria contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Slavin and Boselli and erred in entering a judgment in Amtrak's favor. ¹ We need not reach the issue of the correctness of the district court's ruling on the motion for judgment as a matter of law, because we conclude that Lauria's failure to produce evidence of negligence resulted from the improper exclusion of testimony from Slavin and Boselli that was clearly admissible. ² Therefore, we will reverse and remand for a new trial at which Slavin and Boselli may testify on Lauria's behalf.

II.

The district court incorrectly prohibited Slavin from testifying as an expert witness. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The Rule therefore has three fundamental requirements: (1) the proffered witness must qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the expert must testify to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact. United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 849 (3d Cir.1995). Here, the district court appears to have excluded Slavin's testimony based on the first two elements of the test, evincing skepticism as to both the extent of Slavin's qualifications and as to whether he possessed specialized knowledge. ³

Lauria offered Slavin as an expert in track maintenance based on his experience and education in "Maintenance of Way" and related train procedures. Slavin's expert report contained his opinion that, from an examination of photos and the site, the piece of wood in question was a "base tie" over which a walkway platform once existed; that it should have been discovered by Amtrak during a regular inspection and removed; and that it "contributed to and caused" Lauria's injuries. ⁴

Lauria proffered evidence as to the extent of Slavin's experience in railroad track operations. Slavin had worked for Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") from 1976 to 1993, where he was hired as a trackman and then promoted to machine operator, assistant supervisor, and, in 1981, to supervisor of railroad tracks. As a supervisor, Slavin assumed ultimate responsibility for conditions on a 200-300 mile stretch of track located in Indiana. Among other things, he oversaw maintenance of the track structure, installation of the rail ties, and rehabilitation of all switches, and he was responsible for records, chargeouts, and safe maintenance of the area. Slavin also successfully completed training programs for track foremen, maintenance and way engineers, equipment operators, and supervisors during his seventeen-year tenure at Conrail. In addition, he had been self-employed as a railroad track safety consultant since 1993.

In pretrial proceedings, the district court had denied Amtrak's motion in limine to exclude Slavin's testimony. See Lauria v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-1561, 1997 WL 138906, at * 6-7 (E.D.Pa. March 24, 1997). However, after listening to the voir dire, and asking its own questions, the district court rejected Lauria's request to introduce Slavin at trial as a qualified expert on track maintenance. ⁵ The court's examination of Slavin proceeded in relevant part as follows:

The Court: Now the first question, do you consider yourself qualified by reason of your scientific education? Do you feel yourself qualified to testify as an expert based on your technical knowledge by reason of education or experience and if so would you be specific as to what you think that is? Technical knowledge.

Slavin: I believe so with the hands-on experience that I've had over the years working with track and track equipment and maintenance and production, yes, I--

The Court: You consider that to be your specialized knowledge?

Slavin: Yes.

The Court: And what separates you from other persons who have worked for twenty years on the railroad? Would all of those ... ladies or gentlemen who have had the same experience--work experience as you, in your mind, sir, do you consider them to be persons who have the type of technical or specialized knowledge who can come into a court of law and give answers to hypothetical questions like a doctor does?

Slavin: I believe so.

The Court: And why is that? What is so unusual about working the rails as you have over the years which gives persons who had that experience specialized knowledge of the type that would enable them to offer an opinion, to hypothecate?

Slavin: I don't have an answer for that.

The Court: And that's my dilemma.... I'm not qualifying him as an expert.... I don't see any basis to qualify him as an expert.

We must exercise restraint in examining the district court's decision on appeal, because a "trial court's determination whether to admit or exclude expert testimony will be upheld unless manifestly erroneous." Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 627 (3d Cir.1998) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, we find that in light of Slavin's qualifications and the liberal standard for determining whether...