Estate of Thomas v. Fayette Cnty.

Decision Date08 July 2016
Docket Number2:14-cv-00551
Citation194 F.Supp.3d 358
Parties ESTATE OF Derek A. THOMAS et al, Plaintiffs, v. FAYETTE COUNTY et al, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Herbert A. Terrell, McDonald, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Marie Milie Jones, Michael R. Lettrich, JonesPassodelis, PLLC, Pittsburgh, PA, John R. Ninosky, Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner, Lemoyne, PA, Matthew Ridley, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer LLP, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge

In late December, 2013, Derek A. Thomas was arrested and brought to Fayette County Prison ("Prison").1 Mr. Thomas was screened for suicide risk and other medical conditions by Correctional Officer Joseph Barnes and, later that evening, by Prison Nurse Shannon DeLorenzo. In response to inquiries from Prison personnel, Mr. Thomas self-reported a history of drug addiction, recent drug use, attempted suicide by family members, and a history of mental health treatment for depression, bi-polar disorder, sleep disorder, and anxiety. Prison medical personnel concluded that Mr. Thomas did not pose a suicide risk and did not need to be placed under suicide watch. At that time, Mr. Thomas was also tested for heroin and oxycodone ; urine drip tests indicated that neither substance was in Mr. Thomas's system. Mr. Thomas claimed that he had recently used cocaine and was undergoing cocaine withdrawal, but it was the practice of the Prison to not test for cocaine, and to not provide medication to alleviate the symptoms of cocaine withdrawal. Therefore, Mr. Thomas was cleared to be released into the general Prison population. During Mr. Thomas's time in jail—both before and after the examination by Nurse DeLorenzo—Mr. Thomas continually complained of drug withdrawal symptoms ("dope sickness") and requested medication from the Prison staff. Pursuant to Prison policy, no medication was provided.

The next day, Sunday, December 22, 2013, Correctional Officer Tammy Popiesh came on duty around 3:30 p.m. Officer Popiesh and Mr. Thomas recognized each other from a prior incarceration of his, so Mr. Thomas helped Officer Popiesh distribute and re-collect the trays for dinner. About two hours later, Officer Popiesh took her break and was relieved by another Officer. When Officer Popiesh returned from her break, she found a tragic scene: Mr. Thomas was hanging from a bedsheet in his cell. Mr. Thomas had committed suicide.

Plaintiff, Mr. Thomas's Estate, as administered by Mr. Thomas's mother, Tonya Leigh Thomas, now sues Nurse DeLorenzo, Officer Popiesh, Fayette County (the municipality governing the Prison), PrimeCare Medical, Inc., (the private healthcare corporation which contracted to provide medical care to inmates of Fayette County Prison), and Warden Brian Miller (the Warden of Fayette County Prison). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Act statutes. See ECF No. 33. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Mr. Thomas's constitutional rights by failing to provide medical treatment for Mr. Thomas's alleged medical conditions, and by failing to take sufficient precautions to prevent Mr. Thomas's suicide. Further, Thomas asserts various claims of municipal liability, failure to train, and failure to supervise against Fayette County, Warden Miller, and PrimeCare Medical.

I. MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT WITNESS

Before getting to those merits issues, the Court must consider Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses. ECF No. 67. Defendants introduced into the record the reports of three experts who, unsurprisingly, offered opinions supporting various Defendants' positions in this case.2 Though Plaintiff did not depose the Defendants' experts, Plaintiff contests the admissibility and evidentiary usefulness of these expert reports. Plaintiff's Motion puts forth three arguments why the Court should strike these experts reports from the record (or otherwise not consider the reports at this stage of the case).

First, Plaintiff alleges that the reports were improperly or insufficiently verified. Plaintiff may have been right initially, but, in the interests of justice, Defendants were provided an opportunity to correct any shortcomings in this regard. They have done so. See ECF No. 87; ECF No. 88; ECF No. 89.

Second, Plaintiff asserts that the statements of the experts should not be considered because they are contrary to Plaintiff's own assertions and, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff's assertions must be favored. But the statements made by Plaintiff in contradiction of the expert reports are not based upon facts in the evidentiary record. Instead, these conclusory factual assertions are found only in Plaintiff's pleadings and briefs. This is not enough to get past a summary judgment motion. Though factual disputes must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, a non-moving party is not automatically entitled to a presumption of correctness on a given factual issue "without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor and by merely asserting that the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the defendant's" evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ("[T]he issue of fact must be ‘genuine.’ When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.") (internal citations omitted); Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks , 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.2006) ("An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party."); Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp. , 613 F.2d 1240, 1244 (3d Cir.1980) ("[W]hen an issue of fact is supported by affidavits or other evidence which admit of only one conclusion, the court may not draw an opposite conclusion merely on the basis of unsupported allegations."). Defendants have provided properly supported expert evidence on various issues directly relevant to the case. Plaintiff cannot exclude this expert evidence simply by asserting that the opposite is true based on their own pleadings and briefs.

Finally, Plaintiff challenges the admissibility of the expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). As part of a court's essential "gatekeeping" function to ensure that expert testimony is not only relevant but also reliable, it must make sure that the proffered expert meets three requirements: "(1) the proffered witness must be an expert, i.e., must be qualified; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact." Pineda v. Ford Motor Co. , 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir.2008) ("We have interpreted the second requirement to mean that an expert's testimony is admissible so long as the process or technique the expert used in formulating the opinion is reliable." (internal quotations omitted)). See also Fed. R. Evid. 702.3 Despite Plaintiff's protestations, the experts here provide reliable, relevant, expert opinions that could assist the trier of fact.

Rightly, "Plaintiff does not challenge here the credentials of any Prime expert." ECF No. 68, at 20. The experts are surely "qualified." See Pineda , 520 F.3d at 244. Furthermore, the expert testimony here would assist the trier of fact by providing the fact-finder with information pertinent to observable drug-withdrawal symptoms, suicide correlates, treatment procedures, and the standards of care to be employed by medical professionals in a prison setting. The expert testimony is just as surely "relevant."4 SeeMeadows v. Anchor Longwall & Rebuild, Inc. , 306 Fed.Appx. 781, 790 (3d Cir.2009) ("The third element under Rule 702, namely, whether the expert testimony would assist the trier of fact, ‘goes primarily to relevance.’ ") (quoting Lauria v. Amtrak , 145 F.3d 593, 599 (3d Cir.1998) ).

Thus, Plaintiff primarily contests the second prong of the gatekeeping test: "Plaintiff urges [that] each of Prime's experts are not ‘reliable.’ " See ECF No. 68, at 20. An inquiry into the reliability of an expert should be "flexible," Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, but the focus should remain "on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions generated by the principles and methodology." In re TMI Litig. , 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3d Cir.1999)amended , 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.2000). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) ( "[The objective] is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.").

Though Plaintiff may not agree with the conclusions generated by these experts, each of the three experts considered the record facts of the case in light of their extensive education, training, and experience, in order to render their professional judgments. Nurse Fillman—a health care operations administrator and experienced Correctional Nurse who writes about, teaches, and implements Standardized Procedures for Registered Nurses—analyzed the documented actions of the Prison medical personnel to determine whether, given Fillman's training and experience, these actions were reasonable and comported with applicable standards of care. Dr. Guzzardi, M.D.—an expert in toxicology (the study of the adverse effect of chemicals on living organisms) and a long-time emergency medical physician—offered his...

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