Lauro v. Lauro
Decision Date | 05 June 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 2001-CA-00801-SCT.,2001-CA-00801-SCT. |
Parties | Francis Joseph LAURO v. Helen Rita LAURO. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Dennis Leon Sharp, Mark A. Chinn, Jackson, Karen H. Spencer, James Emory Price, III, Corinth, attorneys for appellant.
Terry L. Caves, Laurel, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
¶ 1. Francis Joseph Lauro (Frank) appeals from an adverse judgment of the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County which granted Helen Rita Lauro (Helen) a divorce on the ground of adultery. Helen was also granted primary physical and legal custody of their three minor children, permanent periodic alimony, child support and attorney's fees. In addition to Frank's appeal, Helen, on cross-appeal, also submits issues for this Court's review.
¶ 2. Frank and Helen were married on May 1, 1991, while Frank was still in medical school. During the early years of the marriage, Helen worked as a licensed practical nurse. During their marriage, three children were born: Christina born January 31, 1992; Phillip born November 15, 1994; and Isabella born October 3, 1998.
¶ 3. Helen filed for separate maintenance on April 23, 1999, after discovering Frank was romantically involved with another woman. In response to Helen's motion, Frank filed a counter-complaint for divorce on May 12, 1999. On June 2, 2000, the chancellor granted Helen's motion to file an amended complaint for divorce.
¶ 4. The matter was tried by the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County on June 14th and August 16th and 17th, 2000. The chancellor granted a divorce in favor of Helen on the ground of uncondoned adultery. The chancellor ordered the sale of the marital home and stipulated that the cost of the sale and the mortgage be paid in full with the proceeds. Helen was awarded the equity from the sale of the home. Helen was also awarded primary physical and legal custody of the three minor children; child support in the amount of $600 per child for a total of $1,800 per month; $4,200 per month in periodic alimony; and, $19,391.95 for attorney's fees.
¶ 5. Frank appeals this ruling and submits four issues for our review, and on cross-appeal, Helen submits three issues for our review. For the sake of clarity, the issues will be addressed in the following order.
¶ 6. Frank argues the chancellor erred in failing to make the required finding of facts and conclusions of law in his distribution of marital assets and liabilities and in failing to address all the marital assets that were subject to equitable distribution such as Helen's IRA.
¶ 7. The chancellor ordered the parties to sell their marital home, directing the costs of the sale and the mortgage be paid out of the proceeds. The chancellor further directed Helen to receive one-half (½) of the net sales proceeds, with the remaining one-half (½) of the net sales proceeds to be tendered into the registry of the Court. Upon dividing the marital assets of the parties, the Chancellor stated:
The only marital asset Helen and Frank have is the money deposited into the registry of the Court from the sale of their home. Based upon Frank's conduct and Helen's financial and domestic contribution toward Frank's career, the Court finds Helen should receive those funds and the Clerk is authorized to pay them over to her.
(emphasis added). The chancellor also recognized that Frank had significant debt for student loans, credit cards and unfulfilled contracts. The chancellor determined that Frank would be solely responsible for this debt.
¶ 8. This finding by the chancellor is not sufficient to meet the Ferguson standard:
Given the development of domestic relations law, this Court recognizes the need for guidelines to aid chancellors in their adjudication of marital property division. Therefore, this Court directs the chancery courts to evaluate the division of marital assets by the following guidelines and to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law for purposes of appellate review. Although this listing is not exclusive, this Court suggests the chancery courts consider the following guidelines, where applicable, when attempting to effect an equitable division of marital property:
1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows:
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994). Failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Ferguson is reversible error. See Johnson v. Johnson, 823 So.2d 1156, 1161 (Miss.2002)
.
¶ 9. In making an equitable distribution of the marital estate, the property should be classified as a marital or a non-marital asset. Id. See also Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 914-15 (Miss. 1994)
. Assets accumulated during the course of a marriage are subject to equitable division unless they are characterized as separate property. Johnson, 823 So.2d at 1161. "Mississippi courts `assume for divorce purposes that the contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether economic, domestic, or otherwise are of equal value.'" Id. (quoting Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 915).
¶ 10. The chancellor failed to make specific findings as to how the marital property was classified and divided. Therefore, this case is reversed and remanded for clarification consistent with prior case law.
¶ 11. Frank argues the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding alimony to Helen in an amount which was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Frank also argues the chancellor made limited findings of fact and no conclusions of law as to the Armstrong factors required by this Court. In Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278 (Miss.1993), we stated, inter alia:
The following factors are to be considered by the chancellor in arriving at findings and entering judgment for alimony:
618 So.2d at 1280-81. Frank contends the chancellor used the awards of alimony and child support to punish him for his adultery.
¶ 12. Upon remand, the chancellor must reconsider not only the issue of equitable distribution, but also the awards of alimony and child support after he has properly divided the marital assets.
¶ 13. Alimony is considered only after the marital property has been equitably divided and the chancellor determines one spouse has suffered a deficit.
Division of marital assets is now governed under the law as stated in Hemsley and Ferguson First, the character of the parties' assets, i.e., marital or non-marital, must be determined pursuant to Hemsley. The marital property is then equitably divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines, in light of each parties' non-marital property. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse's non-marital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party's non-marital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony based on the value of non-marital assets should be considered.
Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.1994) (emphasis added). Like alimony, child support must be considered collectively with all property division.
All property division, lump sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual obligations for child support should be...
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