Lausen v. Board of Sup'rs of Harrison County

Decision Date01 July 1927
Docket Number38050
Citation214 N.W. 682,204 Iowa 30
PartiesM. C. LAUSEN, Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HARRISON COUNTY et al., Appellees
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Harrison District Court.--H. J. MANTZ, Judge.

An action to enjoin the defendants from putting into operation or acting under Chapter 129, Code of 1924, known as the "Bovine Tuberculosis Law." Plaintiff's petition was dismissed, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

R. J Organ, for appellant.

John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Herbert Huff, Assistant Attorney-general, and Lloyd Harding, County Attorney, for appellees.

ALBERT J. EVANS, C. J., and DE GRAFF, MORLING, and KINDIG, JJ concur.

OPINION

ALBERT, J.

Plaintiff in his petition alleges that the defendant board of supervisors of Harrison County, Iowa, is attempting to put into operation certain provisions of the aforesaid law and amendments thereto, by reason of a petition filed with said board, signed by 51 per cent of the owners of breeding cattle residing in said county; and he claims that Sections 2683 to 2687, inclusive, Code of 1924, are unconstitutional because they contravene the rights of plaintiff guaranteed by Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, because: (a) The law does not provide or permit the plaintiff to object to the establishment of said county-area plan or the assessment of any tax levied thereunder; (b) there is no provision in the law for appeal from the establishment of said county-area plan or the assessment of any tax levied thereunder.

Plaintiff makes the same specific objections to said section of the statute under Section 9, Article I, of the Constitution of the state of Iowa. Under Section 6 of Article I of the state Constitution his objection is that this law grants to a class of citizens (owners of breeding cattle) the privilege which upon the same terms belongs equally to all citizens, for the reason: (a) It grants to the owners of breeding cattle only the option to determine whether or not this law shall be put into operation. (b) This privilege should belong to all citizens, and a delegation to any particular class of citizens constitutes class legislation.

Complaint is further made under Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution of this state, on the ground that the statute delegates legislative authority, contrary to the provisions of said article of the Constitution.

He also further complains under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of this State, on the ground that these statutes delegate judicial authority to the owners of breeding cattle, in contravention of said article.

He further complains that the law is unconstitutional because no discretionary power or authority is conferred upon the board of supervisors to determine whether or not the prayer of the petition should be granted.

He alleges that he is a resident of Harrison County; that he is the owner of farm land in said county, and also the owner of certain breeding cattle; and that he is a taxpayer, subject to the payment of taxes, and will be subject to the payment of taxes levied under this law. He alleges that, unless restrained, the defendant board will establish said county-area-eradication plan, and will levy taxes as provided therein, for the purpose of paying the expense of tests and indemnities, as provided in said chapter.

Under the new procedure rule, the defendants in the case filed a motion to dismiss the amended and substituted petition, the substance of which is above set out; and on submission, the court sustained this motion, and dismissed plaintiff's petition.

Appellant seems to have entirely overlooked the rules of this court governing the filing of briefs and arguments. Rule 30 requires, among other things, that the brief of the appellant shall contain numbered propositions of law, stated concisely and without argument or elaboration, together with the authorities relied upon in support thereof. The paper filed herein designated as "Appellant's Brief and Argument" in no way complies with this rule, as no authorities whatever are cited to support his contention. To our minds this is wholly inexcusable.

In argument, appellant says:

"We do, however, want to impress upon the court the fact that no complaint is made against the Bovine Tuberculosis Law generally, nor to the object or purpose of the legislature in enacting that law. We concede that the law is a public health measure, and is designed to protect the health and lives of the citizens of this state generally. But in this connection we wish to say that the last concession is perhaps the strongest argument in favor of our position. If the law is designed for the benefit of the people generally, does it not follow that the people generally should be the ones to bring it into operation, either directly or through their representative body?"

It is apparent from this statement of the appellant's that no question is raised as to the power of the legislature to enact laws of this general nature. It is conceded by appellant that the same is a public health measure, and designed to protect the health and lives of the citizens of this state. The point made here, if any there be, is that, since it is for the benefit of the people generally, any of such people ought to have a voice in bringing this law into operation, and plaintiff says, "either directly or through their representative body." Just what is meant by this complaint we do not understand. Some light, however, is thrown on this proposition by the next statement of counsel in argument, when he says: "The complaint of plaintiff is that the legislature had no constitutional right to delegate to a particular class of people the option--for that is what is amounts to--to say whether this public health measure shall be brought into operation for the benefit of the public generally, or whether, because such a class does not desire to do so, they shall be deprived of the benefits of such public health measure."

Plaintiff himself stands, under his pleadings, as one of the persons or as one of the "class," as he calls it, of persons on whom this power is conferred, he being the owner of breeding cattle. Were he without this class, he would be in a position to complain, if there be any merit in such complaint; but, since he is...

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