Laval v. Staffel

• Decision Date: 29 May 1885
• Docket Number: Case No. 5462.
• Citation: 64 Tex. 370
• Parties: CELINE LAVAL v. BERTHA STAFFEL.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

64 Tex. 370

CELINE LAVAL

v.BERTHA STAFFEL.

Case No. 5462.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 29, 1885.

APPEAL from Bexar. Tried below before the Hon. Geo. A. Noonan.

The opinion states the case.

L. N. Walthall, for appellant, cited: 1 Jarman on Wills, 821; Travis v. Morrison, 28 Ala., 498; Roper on Legacies, 557; Mackell v. Winter, 3 Ves., 542; Doe dem.Norfolk v. Hawke, 2 East, 481; Brooks v. Evetts, 33 Tex., 742;Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex., 193;Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex., 42;Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S., 716.

No briefs on file for appellee.

WILLIE, CHIEF JUSTICE.

The property in controversy was devised by Celine Phaneuf in the third clause of her will, which reads as follows:

“I give and bequeath to my son, Alcide Francois Phaneuf, the store and lot which I own in the city of San Antonio, on the north side of the Main street, and on the south of the San Antonio river, between lots belonging to Mr. August Nette, druggist (on the east and west). This legacy is made with the following restrictions, namely: That before my said son shall have completed his twenty-fifth year, he shall have no other right over the real estate and fixtures which I bequeath to him than to receive and dispose of the revenue thereof, without having the right in any manner to incumber, mortgage or sell the said property before he shall have completed the twenty-fifth year of his age; and if my said son should leave this world (which God forbid) before having reached that age, in that case the lot, house, or store aforesaid shall pass in full right and free from all charges in full property to my aforesaid daughter, Maria Reine Celine Phaneuf.”

Alcide Francois Phaneuf mortgaged the house and lot to F. E. Grothaus, and died before arriving at the age of twenty-five years. Grothaus administered upon his estate, and, under order of the county court duly obtained, sold the property in satisfaction of the mortgage, and the appellee became the purchaser. Celine Laval, who is the Maria Reine Celine Phaneuf mentioned in the will, brought this suit to recover the premises of Bertha Staffel, the appellee. The district judge, to whom the cause was submitted upon an agreed case, rendered judgment in favor of Bertha Staffel, and from that judgment this appeal is taken.

The intention of the testator is the first and great object of inquiry in the construction of wills, and it must govern, provided it be not inconsistent with the rules of law. 4 Kent, Com., 534; 1 Redf. on Wills, 419; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex., 193.

There is no difficulty in ascertaining the intention of the testatrix in making the above cited provision in her will. She clearly intended what her words import, viz., to create a fee-simple title in Alcide Phaneuf, without power of alienation or incumbrance till he arrived at the age of twenty-five, and in case of his death before the happening of that event, that the property should pass to the appellant to be held by her in fee-simple.

The only question then is, Was the devise one which the testatrix could lawfully make? for, if it was, her wishes as expressed in her last will and testament must be respected and enforced.

We are not informed as to the grounds upon which the court below held that this will vested in Alcide Phaneuf a fee-simple title which he could alienate or incumber before reaching the age of twenty-five, and thereby deprive the appellant of her right to the property in case of his death before the happening of that event. To have arrived at this conclusion the court must have held the conditions of the devise void as being in restraint of alienation, and that an estate in fee-simple could not be limited to commence after another fee had expired by the occurrence of a contingency.

It is, perhaps, settled law, that general restraints upon alienation are void, and the devisee in fee takes the estate free of the restriction. Not so as to a partial restraint, such as a prohibition of sale to particular persons, or before arriving at a named age. As to the validity of such restrictions the authorities differ, some upholding them and others declaring them void. Stewart v. Barrow, 7 Bush, 368;Langdon v. Ingram, 28 Ind., 360;Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush, 623;Mandelbaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich., 78; Roosevelt v. Thurman, 1 Johns. Ch., 120; Twitty v. Camp, Phill. Eq. (N. C.), 61.

We do not think it necessary to canvass the decisions upon this subject, for the purposes of the present case. Suppose that we admit that the...