Lavallee v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company
| Decision Date | 11 March 1889 |
| Parties | Paul A. Lavallee, Administrator, v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action brought in the district court for Ramsey county, to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate, caused as alleged, by defendant's negligence. At the trial before Brill, J., and a jury, it appeared that on June 27 1887, the decedent, who was employed as a boiler-maker's helper in defendant's shops at St. Paul, was directed by the boiler-maker to pick up some rubbish lying near a "dead" locomotive then standing on a track which ran into the boiler-shop. While so engaged, the smoke-stack of the locomotive (which two men were engaged in removing) fell upon him, inflicting the injuries of which he died. At the close of the plaintiff's testimony, the action was dismissed, on defendant's motion, on the ground that the negligence, if any, which occasioned the accident was that of the decedent's fellow-servants, and that the case was not within Laws 1887, c. 13. A motion for a new trial was heard by Wilkin and Brill, JJ., and denied, and the plaintiff appealed.
Order affirmed.
Henry C. James, for appellant.
M. D Grover and Flandrau, Squires & Cutcheon, for respondent.
The plaintiff cannot recover, unless under chapter 13, Laws 1887. The deceased and the persons through whose negligence he received the injury from which he died were fellow-servants, and the injury occurred from their negligence, and no other cause, so that upon the principles of the common law there could be no recovery against defendant. Chapter 13 reads: "Every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in this state shall be liable for all damages sustained by any agent or servant thereof, by reason of the negligence of any other agent or servant thereof, without contributory negligence on his part, when sustained within this state; and no contract, rule, or regulation between such corporation and any agent or servant shall impair or diminish such liability: provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to render any railroad company liable for damages sustained by any employe, agent, or servant while engaged in the construction of a new road, or any part thereof, not open to public travel or use."
The question is whether this statute includes all employes, agents, and servants of a railroad corporation, without regard to the character of the business in which they are employed. Taken literally, it does. But it is evident that in some respects, at least, it cannot be taken literally; for, as the court below in its memorandum, in deciding the motion for a new trial, aptly says: "According to its terms, the company is liable without regard to whether the employe is injured in the course of his employment or not." Of course, that could not have been intended. The plaintiff insists that the act applies to all employes; the defendant, that it applies only to those whose employment subjects them to the peculiar hazards pertaining to operating a railroad.
From the authorities we get very little help in determining the question. Decisions from four states having statutes nearly similar to ours have been cited, to wit, Georgia, Wisconsin Iowa, and Kansas. In Thompson v. Central R. R. and Banking Co., 54 Ga. 509, the supreme court held that the statute was not limited to any class of employes; and in Georgia R. Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499, when asked to reconsider its former decision, and the point was for the first time made that the act, if given unlimited operation, would be unconstitutional, the court adhered (much on the principle stare decisis) to its former decision, and also held the law constitutional. In Ditberner v. Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 47 Wis. 138, (2 N.W. 69,) the supreme court of that state held the statute of that state to be constitutional, and not to be limited to those employed in operating railroads. In Iowa, under the original act, (of 1862,) the supreme court in McAunich v. Miss. & Mo. R. Co., 20 Iowa 338, held the act valid, on its assumption that it embraced only those employed in the business of operating a railroad; and in the case of Deppe v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. Co., 36 Iowa 52, the court emphasized its previous construction of the act, saying: The supreme court of Kansas, in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35, and Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 33 Kan. 416, (6 P. 571,) holds the act of that state, adopted from Iowa, to be valid, and gives it the same construction. In Herrick v. Minn. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 11, (16 N.W. 413,) this court held that the Iowa statute did not violate that clause in the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States which declares that "no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;"...
To continue reading
Request your trial