Law v. Meadows

• Decision Date: 17 February 1948
• Docket Number: (No. 9974)
• Citation: 131 W.Va. 132
• Parties: Hays Law v. Elsie W. Meadows, et al.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

131 W.Va. 132

Hays Law

v.Elsie W. Meadows, et al.

(No. 9974)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 21, 1948.

Decided February 17, 1948.

1. Mortgages

The right of redemption vested in a mortagor at the date a mortgage is executed, continues so long as the secured debt remains unsatisfied by payment or otherwise; and the mortgagee, his heirs or assigns, may not change the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee while the debt secured by the mortgage remains unsatisfied, except by a fair contract, and upon adequate consideration moving to the mortgagor.

2. Descent and Distribution

In a division of the estate of a decedent among his heirsat-law or distributees, a conveyance, or other transfer thereof, does not vest in such heirs or distributees a greater interest in the property conveyed or transferred than that vested in the decedent at the date of his death.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Raleigh County.

Suit in equity by Hays Law against Elsie W. Meadows and others, heirs at law and personal representative of D. C. Meadows, deceased, for a decree that a deed to the deceased be declared a mortgage to secure certain indebtedness originally due from the plaintiff to the grantor. From an adverse decree, the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

J. W. Maxwell, for appellant.

Grover C. Trail, Clay S. Crouse and Anthony J. Sparacino, for appellees.

Fox, Judge:

This is a suit in equity instituted in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County by Hays Law, against Elsie W. Meadows, and others, heirs at law and personal representatives of D. C. Meadows, deceased, seeking a decree that a deed from one Mattie Saunders to D. C. Meadows, dated September 8, 1936, and absolute on its face, be declared a mortgage to secure certain indebtedness originally due from Hays Law to Mattie Saunders. From a decree of the circuit court, entered on the 22nd day of May, 1947, denying relief to the plaintiff, and dismissing his bill, this appeal is prosecuted by him. The parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants, the positions they occupied in the trial court.

There is little dispute as to the facts. On May 22, 1933, Hays Law, being the owner of a tract of 4.02 acres of land in Raleigh County, conveyed the same to Mattie Saunders, in consideration of $10.00 cash in hand paid, and other good and valuable considerations, but the said deed contains the following paragraph:

"It is understood and agreed by the parties to this deed and the same to be-inding upon the heirs, personal representatives and assigns of the respective parties hereto, that the grantor herein shall have the privilege of repurchasing this property within one year for whatever sum remains unpaid of certain notes and interest thereon, said notes this day executed by the party of the first part payable to the party of the second part."

The matter drifted until January 3, 1936, on which date Mattie Saunders reconveyed said land to Hays Law. On the same day, and apparently as a part of the same transaction, Hays Law conveyed the property to Harry F. Payne, trustee, to secure to Mattie Saunders the payment of $932.46, represented by forty-seven negotiable promissory notes of even date therewith, one for $12.46 and the other forty-six notes for $20.00 each, executed by Hays Law, and payable to the order of the said Mattie Saunders in from one to forty-seven months, with interest at six per cent. The record shows that these notes represented purchase money which had been paid for the said land, and which had been loaned to Hays Law by Mattie Saunders. On August 19, 1936, Harry F. Payne, trustee, conveyed the said land to Mattie Saunders, following a trustee's sale under the deed of trust aforesaid. It is alleged in the bill, and there is some evidence in support, that this sale was one mutually agreed upon between parties concerned, and that Mattie Saunders continued to hold the notes secured by the deed of trust aforesaid. On September 8, 1936, Mattie Saunders conveyed said land to D. C. Meadows, by deed absolute on its face, subject only to certain reservations of mineral which had been reserved in former conveyances. Subsequent to this deed, and in a partial division of the estate of D. C. Meadows, who died in August, 1939, said tract of 4.02 acres of land was conveyed by the heirs-at-law of D. C. Meadows, other than the grantee in said deed, to Elizabeth Ferguson, a child and heir-at-law of the said D. C. Meadows.

The question presented on this appeal is whether D. C. Meadows acquired the legal title to the said land, subject to an equity of redemption vested in Hays Law, treating him as a mortgagor, and under which he is entitled to redeem the same, by the payment of the mortgage debt. This requires some discussion of the facts and circum- stances leading up to the final transaction by which D. C. Meadows acquired title to the land involved in this controversy.

We think it quite plain that the original conveyance from Hays Law to Mattie Saunders was in fact a mortgage. The existence of indebtedness from Law to Saunders is evidenced by the deed itself, and, as we construe the provisions of the deed, quoted above, it means that upon the payment of this indebtedness the property was to be reconveyed to Hays Law. It specifically provides that Law should have the privilege "of repurchasing" the property within one year upon payment of certain notes. That we think is sufficient to justify the court in holding, as we do, that this deed, though absolute on its face, was, in fact, intended to be a mortgage.

Continuing to the next step in respect to this indebtedness, we find that on January 3, 1936, the parties then concerned evidently desired to make a change in the handling of the same, and, probably with the idea of making more definite provisions, and fixing the exact dates on which it should be paid, Mattie Saunders reconveyed the said land to Hays Law, for a nominal consideration, and on the same day Hays Law executed the deed of trust conveying the same land to Harry F. Payne, trustee, to secure the payment of certain definitely described notes. Following the execution of this deed of trust, the said land was sold by the trustee, purchased by Mattie Saunders, and conveyed to her by Harry F. Payne, trustee, on August 19, 1936.

If the dealings between the parties with respect to the original mortgage indebtedness had ended at that time, and there had been no further recognition of the existence of a debt due from Hays Law to Mattie Saunders, we would be inclined to hold that the parties, having a right to contract on fair terms in respect thereto, they, by the execution of the deed by Mattie Saunders to Hays Law, and the execution of the deed of trust by Hays Law to Harry F. Payne, trustee, the subsequent sale of the land under such deed of trust, its purchase by Mattie Saunders, and its conveyance to her by the trustee, effectively destroyed the right of redemption theretofore vested in Hays Law, whether under the original mortgage, or the deed of trust. But it is clear from the record that, whatever may have induced Mattie Saunders to enforce the deed of trust, and to repurchase the said land, and have it conveyed to her by the trustee, she, subsequent to the latter conveyance, recognized that she held the property as security for an indebtedness due to her from Hays Law represented by the notes she continued to hold, and that she was willing to convey the property to any person for the amount of such indebtedness, provided Hays Law was consulted, and agreed. In her testimony, she states that, immediately prior to her conveyance to D. C. Meadows, the sum of $975.00 was the amount Hays Law owed her; that her understanding was that Meadows was purchasing the land, not because he wanted the property, but to help Law; that Law owed her at that time, and that if he paid her the amount due she would have conveyed the property to him, and...