Law v. State, 97-0776
Decision Date | 16 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-0776,97-0776 |
Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly D222 Joshua LAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Maximillian J. Changus, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Joshua Law (defendant) appeals his sentences which were imposed by the trial court. We affirm.
After the defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to the charges of burglary of a dwelling and petit theft, 1 the trial court sentenced him as a youthful offender to a term of two years' imprisonment followed by five years' probation. As a condition of probation the court directed the defendant to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program. The court also directed him to pay restitution, but the court reserved jurisdiction to later determine the amount which was owed to the victims of the defendant's crime. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from this sentencing order.
The defendant first challenges the trial court's decision to enter a restitution order. Specifically, the defendant argues that the restitution order must be stricken because the police have already returned the stolen items to the victims and therefore the victims are not entitled to receive restitution. This argument must be rejected as meritless because the instant record does not demonstrate that the victims have recovered the entire loss incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct. In fact, the only documents in the record pertaining to this issue are police reports which indicate that some of the stolen property was recovered by the police. However, there is no indication that the victims recovered all of the losses caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offenses as provided by section 775.089(1)(a)1-2 of the Florida Statutes (1995).
The defendant also argues that, in any event, the trial court is now without authority to enter an award of restitution in this case because more than sixty days have elapsed from the date the sentencing order was entered. Rule 3.800(c) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a trial court to modify a defendant's sentence for a period of sixty days after the date the sentence is imposed. See also § 948.03(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995). However, our supreme court has explained that "[i]f an order of restitution has been entered in a timely manner, a court can determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period." State v. Sanderson, 625 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1993). Here, since the trial court's order of restitution was entered timely, this claim of error is rejected as meritless.
The defendant also raises two challenges to his probation order. Specifically, he first argues that the condition of probation which requires him to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program must be stricken...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Connor v. State
...trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period in rule 3.800(c)."); Law v. State, 705 So.2d 632 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Hence, as the court in Sanderson explained, the determination of the amount of restitution is not controlled by the time ......
-
A.M.B. v. State, 5D05-795.
...delinquent. We agree. A condition of probation must be related to the crime of which the offender was convicted. Law v. State, 705 So.2d 632, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Grate v. State, 623 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). "A special condition of probation is invalid if a condition ......
-
Carter v. State
...discretion has led to a punitive result or is so broad as to usurp an essentially judicial function. Id. at 1372. In Law v. State, 705 So.2d 632, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), this Court, relying on standard set out in Larson, dismissed a challenge to a probationary condition "requiring [the def......