Lawrence v. Bushart, No. 2004-CA-000123-MR (KY 8/5/2005)
| Decision Date | 05 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-CA-000123-MR.,2004-CA-000123-MR. |
| Parties | Susan LAWRENCE; David Allood; and the Center for Accessible Living, On Behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants v. William BUSHART (Previously Ed Logsdon), in his Capacity as Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles, Transportation Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky; Jonathan Miller (Previously John Kennedy Hamilton), In his Capacity as State Treasurer, Commonwealth of Kentucky; Ann B. Brown, in her Capacity as Oldham County Court Clerk and as Representative of the Class of Clerks of 112 Kentucky Counties with Populations of Less than 70,000; Jack Snodgrass, in his Capacity As Campbell County Clerk; J. Michael Libs, in his Capacity as Daviess County Court Clerk; Donald Blevins, in his Capacity as Fayette County Clerk; Kenneth Tabb (Previously David L. Logsdon), in his Capacity as Hardin County Clerk; Bobbie Holsclaw (Previously Rebecca Jackson), in her Capacity as Jefferson County Clerk; Bill Aylor, in his Capacity as Kenton County Clerk; Lillian Pearl Elliott, in her Capacity as Pike County Clerk; and Dot Owens (previously Yvonne Guy), In her Capacity as Warren County Clerk, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court, Honorable William L. Graham, Judge, Civil Action No. 97-CI-001182.
Phillip J. Shepherd, Frankfort, Kentucky, Stephen R. Senn, Lakeland, Florida, Briefs and Oral Argument for Appellants.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General of Kentucky, D. Brent Irvin, Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, Brief and Oral Argument for Appellees William Bushart (Previously Ed Logsdon), in his Capacity as Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles, Transportation Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Jonathan Miller (Previously John Kennedy Hamilton), in his Capacity as State Treasurer, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Brent L. Caldwell, Stephen G. Amato, Lexington, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee Ann B. Brown, in her Capacity as Oldham County Court Clerk and as Representative of the Class of Clerks of 112 Kentucky Counties with Populations of Less than 70,000.
Jlius Rather, Lexington, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee Donald Blevins, in his Capacity as Fayette County Clerk.
Douglas L. McSwain, Lexington, Kentucky, Brief and Oral Argument for Appellee Kenneth Tabb (Previously David L. Logsdon), in his Capacity as Hardin County Clerk.
Laurence J. Zielke, Janice M. Theriot, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief and Oral Argument for Appellee, Bobbie Holsclaw (Previously Rebecca Jackson), in her Capacity as Jefferson County Clerk.
Before: GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, and MINTON, Judges.
OPINION AFFIRMING, IN PART, AND REVERSING, IN PART, AND REMANDING
This case involves a challenge to the validity of KRS1 189.456, which requires Kentucky's county clerks to charge disabled persons an $8 fee2 to obtain an accessible parking placard. Susan Lawrence, David Allgood, and the Center for Accessible Living filed suit against selected county clerks and various state officials, alleging that the fee was invalid because it limited disabled persons' access to public facilities. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, holding that because Congress "failed to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the various states" under Title II of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the claims were barred by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. We
affirm the circuit court's reasoning, in part. But because we believe the court erred by denying appellant's request for relief from the county clerks, we reverse, in part, and remand.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. By statute, Kentucky provides for the issuance of specially designated handicapped license plates3 and removable handicapped accessible parking placards.4 The license plates are available to qualifying individuals at the same price as other license plates, but the state charges an $8 fee for the removable parking placards.5 The placards are valid for two years and may be renewed every two years thereafter for a total of six years.
The $8 fee is only charged upon the initial application. After that renewals cost $4, and lost or stolen placards may be replaced for $2.6 All 120 Kentucky county clerks are statutorily mandated to issue both the handicapped accessible license plates and the parking placards for a fee.7
Susan Lawrence, who lives in Louisville, initiated this action in the Franklin Circuit Court. Although Lawrence is not herself disabled, her daughter, who died while this case was pending, was severely disabled. Lawrence was required to pay the placard fee for handicapped accessible parking when transporting her daughter.8
Shortly after Lawrence filed suit, David Allgood, who also lives in Louisville, joined as a plaintiff. Allgood is confined to a wheelchair as a result of an accident. He holds a parking placard for which he was required to pay the $8 fee.
Also added to the initial complaint was the Center for Assisted Living (CAL). CAL is a nonprofit disability resource center located in Louisville. As a part of its services, CAL offers transportation for disabled persons; as such, it was also required to pay the $8 fee to obtain an accessible parking placard.
The complaint alleged that the fee charged under KRS 189.456 for the issuance of the parking placard constituted a surcharge in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),9 28 C.F.R. 35.130(f), and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.10 It sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages.
The case was filed against the following state and county officials: Ed Logsdon (now William Bushart), in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV); John Kennedy Hamilton (now Jonathan Miller), in his capacity as Kentucky State Treasurer; Ann B. Brown, in her capacity as Oldham County Clerk and as representative of the class of clerks of 112 Kentucky counties with populations of
less than 70,000; Jack Snodgrass, in his capacity as Campbell County Clerk; J. Michael Libs, in his capacity as Daviess County Clerk; Donald W. Blevins, in his capacity as Fayette County Clerk; David L. Logsdon (now Kenneth Tabb), in his capacity as Hardin County Clerk; Rebecca Jackson (now Bobbie Holsclaw), in her capacity as Jefferson County Clerk; Bill Aylor, in his capacity as Kenton County Clerk; Lillian Pearl Elliot, in her capacity as Pike County Clerk; and Yvonne Guy (now Dot Owens), in her capacity as Warren County Clerk.11
The Franklin Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The court ruled that the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments barred appellants' claims; and because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court ruled that appellants were precluded from suing the state officials. The court also ruled that the DMV Commissioner and the State Treasurer were not proper parties and that appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. This appeal follows.
The parties disagree about whether the disputed parking placard fee implicates the protection afforded by the ADA, or whether these placards are actually mandated by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Uniform System for Parking for Persons with Disabilities (USPPD).12 Some of the county clerks assert that the provisions providing for the issuance of handicapped parking placards were "not created through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather through Congress' spending power." In support of their argument, these clerks cite Public Law 100-64113 and the language of the USPPD.
We agree that the USPPD gives the DOT authority to provide the states with guidelines for the issuance of the parking placards and that Public Law 100-641 permits the DOT to "encourage" states to adopt a placard program. But as the Court found in Duprey v. Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles:
While Public Law 100-641 and the USPPD as set forth in the DOT regulations address reserved disability parking, these provisions are merely guidelines for states to accept or reject as they choose. As one court stated, "Public Law 100-641 has no
enforcement mechanism and is not codified in the United States Code. It `encourages adoption of such system by all the States,' [] but does not mandate compliance."14
In contrast, 15 While "the ADA does not render the USPPD meaningless," it does "prohibit[] the charging of a fee for access to the benefits of the program if the fee results in discriminatory treatment on the basis of disability."16 Even if the USPPD and Public Law 100-641 authorize the DOT to allow states to charge an additional fee for the handicapped parking placards, the fees would violate the ADA's prohibition against surcharges. Therefore, we must reject the clerks' argument that the USPPD and Public Law 100-641 control this issue.
Lawrence, Allgood, and CAL make three main arguments: first, the State Treasurer and DMV Commissioner are proper
parties; second, the Eleventh Amendment does not "protect the county clerks from actions to remedy ongoing violations of Title II"; and, third, the Tenth Amendment does not protect the clerks "from liability for collecting fees in violation of Title II." These are legal issues which we review de novo.
Appellants first contend that the circuit court erred by holding that the DMV Commissioner and State Treasurer were not...
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