Lawrence v. King

• Decision Date: 17 March 1930
• Docket Number: 156
• Citation: 299 Pa. 568,150 A. 169
• Parties: Lawrence v. King, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

150 A. 169

299 Pa. 568

Lawrence v. King, Appellant

No. 156

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 17, 1930

Argued February 4, 1930

Appeal, No. 156, Jan. T., 1930, by defendant, from decree of C.P. Delaware Co., Dec. T., 1927, No. 1193, for plaintiff, on bill in equity, in case of Mordecai Lawrence v. Edwin J King. Reversed.

Bill to cancel deeds and for reconveyance of real estate. Before MACDADE, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Decree for plaintiff sustained by the court in banc, FRONEFIELD P.J., BROOMALL, J. and MACDADE, J., with opinion by MACDADE, J. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, inter alia, was decree, quoting record.

The decree is reversed and the bill is dismissed at the cost of appellee.

J. B. Hannum, Jr., of Hannum, Hunter, Hannum & Hodge, with him S. Edward Hannestad and J. Allen Hodge, for appellant. -- The intention of a grantor in a deed is to be gathered from the language of the deed itself, and, where it is attempted to show that the grantor did not intend to make an absolute conveyance, the burden of showing this is on him who alleges it, and the burden is not a light one: Meyers v. Robinson, 74 Pa. 269; Loughran v. Kummer, 297 Pa. 179; Lingenfelter v. Richey, 62 Pa. 123; Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58.

No confidential relationship was shown to exist between plaintiff and defendant: Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22; Grace v. Moll, 285 Pa. 353; Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58; Hamilton v. Fay, 283 Pa. 175; Moorhead v. Scovel, 210 Pa. 446; Weber v. Kline, 293 Pa. 85; Pusic v. Salak, 261 Pa. 512.

Plaintiff had independent legal advice: Knowlson v. Fleming, 165 Pa. 10; Hollenback's App., 121 Pa. 322; Neal v. Black, 177 Pa. 83.

There was no such conduct on the part of defendant as to constitute a constructive fraud on plaintiff, from which a constructive or resulting trust in favor of the latter arose or resulted by implication, construction or operation of law.

The evidence to establish a resulting trust must be "clear, precise and indubitable": Earnest's App., 106 Pa. 310; Robinson v. Powell, 210 Pa. 232; Walker v. Walker, 254 Pa. 220.

A trust ex maleficio can arise only before or at the inception of the title, and the evidence in support of it must be clear, precise and convincing: Jourdan v. Andrews, 258 Pa. 347; Johnson & Johnson v. Shrawder, 80 Pa.Super. 125; Turney v. McKown, 242 Pa. 565.

William C. Alexander, for appellee. -- In view of the age of plaintiff at the time the deeds here involved were signed, his physical and mental condition and all the circumstances under which the conveyance was made, as well as the undisputed relationship of principal and agent, the law imposes on defendant the burden of showing that he took no undue advantage of plaintiff: Hetrick's App., 58 Pa. 477; Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22; Potter's Est., 6 Pa.Super. 627; Stepp v. Frampton, 179 Pa. 284; Darlington's Est., 147 Pa. 624; Light v. Light, 221 Pa. 136; Matthaei v. Pownall, 235 Pa. 460; Corrigan v. Conway, 269 Pa. 373; Allegheny ByProduct Co. v. Hillman, 275 Pa. 191; Quell v. Boyajian, 90 Pa.Super. 386; Brew v. Hastings, 206 Pa. 155; Com. v. Shirley, 152 Pa. 170; Clegg v. Casting Co., 34 Pa.Super. 63.

The written instruction for transfer of the property constituted a direction to convey for a specific purpose and not as a gift.

The court properly ordered reconveyance on the ground of fraud and undue influence regardless of whether the conveyance was intended as a gift or for a specific purpose only: Harrison v. Welsh, 295 Pa. 501; Longenecker v. Church, 200 Pa. 567; Hasel v. Beilstein, 179 Pa. 560.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SADLER:

A history of the events leading up to the present litigation is detailed in an earlier proceeding which was the subject of consideration by this court, and will be found set forth in the opinion reported in Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58. A brief resume, however, of the relations of the parties now before us must be given so that the present matter in dispute may be understood. Lawrence, the father of eight children, died in 1885, leaving real property, since largely increased in value. Three of them, Mordecai, J. Lewis and Elizabeth, resided for many years in the family homestead until the death of the latter in 1915. The nearest relatives to the three mentioned were nephews and nieces, living at other places. The two surviving brothers, with whom the sister had spent her life, were, by her will, given life estates in her property, the remainder being devised to the other blood relations. Dissatisfaction was expressed by both, asserting, as they did, that this disposition of her estate was contrary to an understanding between them, and a contest of Elizabeth's will was threatened, or begun, prior to the death of Lewis, and the dispute was not adjusted at the time the deed questioned in the present case was executed. The two brothers, in July, 1921, executed mutual wills, each leaving his share in their father's property to the survivor, and devised the remainder to one Swartz, the tenant of the property where they resided, so that the nephews and nieces, whom they accused of exercising undue influence on Elizabeth, should receive nothing.

Mordecai and Lewis were bachelors, living together, and the necessary care of the house was performed by paid housekeepers. Ultimately, they became dissatisfied with their tenant Swartz, and solicited King, the present defendant, to move with his family from Philadelphia, and take charge. They had known him from boyhood, and apparently deemed the suggested arrangement to be to their advantage. In 1923, at inconvenience and some financial loss to himself, the defendant, accompanied by his wife and children, came to the Delaware County farm, and King remained there until the present dispute arose. In 1922, shortly before his arrival, new wills were executed by the brothers. In both instances the nephews and nieces, from whom the old gentlemen were estranged, were ignored as legatees, each being given only the nominal sum of one dollar. By the testament of Lewis, King was named a devisee if he survived Mordecai, and he was designated as executor. In the first will of Mordecai, Swartz was named remainderman, but in the second, executed later, he substituted King, as appears by testimony of record. In 1923, Lewis, the older of the brothers, then aged eighty-one, died. A caveat was filed against the probate of his will by the nephews and nieces, averring testamentary incapacity and undue influence by Mordecai, who was asserted to have held a confidential relation, and taken advantage of his position to secure its execution, which was claimed to be unnatural, as indicated by the devise to King of the remainder of the estate, if he survived the testator's brother. For the reasons given, the lower court sustained the contention of contestants, but its ruling was reversed, and the orphans' court was directed to probate the paper: Lawrence's Est., supra. What was there said as to the relations of the various parties here concerned, and particularly as to those of Mordecai and King is illuminating. In closing the opinion in that case, it was observed on page 72: "As the property now stands Mordecai can dispose of it as he sees fit; it is highly probable, if treated fairly, he will deal equitably and justly with those of his own blood."

The will case was decided on March 15, 1926, and naturally Mordecai had become even more embittered towards those who had endeavored to prove their charge of wrongful conduct influencing the preparation of the will of Lewis, with whom he lived. Hon. Francis Shunk Brown, former attorney general of Pennsylvania, appeared as counsel for proponent in the will contest, and was successful in defending against the assertions made by the contestants. After the decision of this court, Mordecai called upon his attorney, in the late spring or early summer, for the purpose of procuring a conveyance of certain interests in the real estate to King. At the time, he fully explained his desires and intentions, stating his reasons for deeding a part of his property. The effect of his proposed action was fully made known to him, but the court has found that Mordecai was not able to mentally grasp the situation and the result of his contemplated conveyance, -- a mere deduction, without any support in the evidence of record. So that due consideration might be given, and no step taken until after proper reflection, he was advised to put his thoughts in writing, and this he did. On October 20, 1926, the instructions were presented to his counsel, with the request that a deed be prepared to King for a fractional interest in the land which he owned, so that the grantee and his family should have the title to the property described, and be placed as well in a position to defend any legal attack the nephews and nieces might make to set aside the transfer.

King was no stranger, having known the brothers from boyhood, and he moved to the farm, at their request, in 1923, so as to furnish them aid and assistance. Though he disbursed their funds, by direction, and used, also, the proceeds of certain Philadelphia property, then owned by him, in maintenance and improvement of the Lawrence homestead, yet he could not be said to have been their confidential adviser. Even if so, it was shown, under the facts here disclosed, that he exercised no undue influence in securing the grant to him. He had assisted Lewis until he died, and, thereafter, aided Mordecai, though the latter continued to control his own affairs, executing leases and collecting rents. King managed the household from the time of his arrival in 1923, making outlays on behalf of the...