Lawrence v. Lawrence
Decision Date | 21 May 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 5454,5454 |
Citation | 628 P.2d 542 |
Parties | Thomas Dwight LAWRENCE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Lori Ann LAWRENCE, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Jack R. Gage of Hanes, Gage & Burke, P. C., Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellant.
Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellee.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
Appellant-plaintiff appeals from that portion of a divorce decree which awarded custody of the 18-month-old son of the parties to appellee-defendant, the wife.
We affirm.
Appellant words the issues for review on this appeal as follows:
Such issues and appellant's argument upon them are founded on the contention that the award of child custody was here made on a presumption that the wife is entitled to custody if the relative fitness of the parties are the same. Appellant describes the system for determining custody in Wyoming as being a "mud-slinging" contest rather than a "no fault" system as was intended by the legislature in a 1977 amendment of § 20-2-113(a). 1 He contends that the trial courts improperly continued to apply a "maternal presumption" articulated in Butcher v. Butcher, Wyo., 363 P.2d 923, 924 (1961) that, "ordinarily the care and custody of young children should be awarded to the mother"; that of the recognition by the mother of this attitude of the courts tends to encourage her to seek a divorce rather than expending more effort toward a successful marriage; and that a "matriarchal" society results in which many children are raised only by their mothers. He argues that the father has a heavier burden of proof than does the mother in that he must show his fitness and the mother's unfitness to prevail whereas the mother can prevail upon the showing of her own fitness only. This, he says, is a denial of equal protection of the laws.
These policy and philosophical arguments 2 have no pertinency to the facts of this case. Appellant points to finding of fact number 32 made by the trial court, i. e., "(t)hat both the plaintiff and the defendant are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of said minor child," to support his contention that the child custody award was made on an improper and illegal assumption that such custody is ordinarily to be that of the mother. Appellant completely disregards the other findings of fact made by the court which reflect consideration given by it to all aspects of the relationship in an effort to make the award which would be in the best interests of the child.
The following findings of fact and conclusions of law as made by the trial court indicate the consideration given by the court to factors other than one "solely" on gender of the parents as required by § 20-2-113(a) in making the determination of child custody:
The ultimate goal in awarding child custody is to accomplish the best interests of the child. This is expressed in § 20-2-113(a), supra. In its opinion letter, the trial court said that in making the award to appellee in this case, it:
" * * * found on the balancing of all of the testimony and evidence in the case that it would be in the best interests of said minor child to so award custody in this case."
There is no basis for appellant's contention that a "maternal presumption" was applied in this case. Therefore, he cannot support error with reference to issues, a, c and d here presented for review.
In support of his argument that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were not supported by the evidence (issue b), appellant refers to testimony adverse to appellee's "fitness" to be awarded custody of the child and to testimony such as that of a psychologist who testified that in her opinion sex should not be a determining factor in awarding custody and that "with two parents being equal in the majority, then I would...
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