Lawrence v. Lawrence's Ex'x

• Decision Date: 31 January 1857
• Citation: 24 Mo. 269
• Parties: LAWRENCE, Defendant in Error, v. LAWRENCE'S EXECUTRIX, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

24 Mo. 269

LAWRENCE, Defendant in Error,

v.LAWRENCE'S EXECUTRIX, Plaintiff in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1857.

1. The title to a slave may be transferred by deed without actual delivery.

2. A. conveyed by deed and delivered a slave to B. in trust to appropriate the hire of the slave during the life of A. to his, A.'s, benefit, the slave to be delivered by B., upon the death of A., to C., a son of A. Held, that C. acquired an interest under this conveyance that could not be destroyed by any arrangement entered into between A. and B.; that A. could not, as against C., and without his consent, resume the entire ownership of the slave.

Error to Callaway Circuit Court.

This was an action for the possession of a negro slave, named Sam. Plaintiff relied for proof of title upon a deed executed by defendant's testator. By this deed Edward Lawrence, defendant's testator, sold and conveyed said negro boy, Sam, to one Rice, “in trust, however,” so the deed proceeds to declare, “for the uses hereinafter mentioned, viz: said negro slave is to be by said Rice taken into immediate possession, and hired out, and the proceeds of said hire to be applied to my benefit during my natural life, and immediately after my death said slave is to be by said Rice delivered over to my said son, James M. Lawrence, at which time said trust ceases,” etc.

Defendant admitted the execution of this deed, and the delivery of the negro under it to Rice; but set up as a defense that the grantor, defendant's testator, resumed possession of said slave as his own property, and canceled the gift by the consent of the said Rice; that the said deed was voluntary and without consideration; that plaintiff had no knowledge of, and gave no assent to, the conveyance, or to the delivery of the negro to Rice, until after the grantor had canceled said gift, and had resumed possession of the slave; that after he, the defendant's testator, had resumed possession of said slave, he continued to hold possession of him, adverse to Rice and the plaintiff, for more than six years before his death, and that in consequence all claim of plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations.

The portion of the answer of which the above is an abstract was stricken out on motion of the plaintiff. Upon the trial defendant offered evidence to prove the truth of those portions of the answer so stricken out. This testimony was ruled out.

Ansell and Gardenhire, for plaintiff in error.

I. The court erred in striking out parts of defendant's answer. The gift was incomplete and was revocable, and was revoked by the donor's taking the negro back. The plaintiff was no party to it, nor did he know of it or assent to it until it was revoked. It was testamentary in its character.

II. The court below erred in striking out that portion of the answer setting up the statute of limitations as a bar.

III. The court erred in giving judgment for the negro, when his value only was sued for.

Morrow and Jones, for defendant in error.

SCOTT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

Slaves, by our laws, are personal estate. It is said in the books that a gift by deed of chattels will pass the property, though there is no delivery of the thing given--the deed operating by way of estoppel. (Schwartz v. Chappell, 19 Mo. 304.) When the deed under which the plaintiff claims was executed, the statute requiring all gifts of slaves to be by will or deed duly proved or acknowledged and recorded was repealed. This case then stands on the effect of the deed at common law. In Morrow v. Williams, 3 Dev., N. C., 263, it is held that a deed will pass a title to a slave by way of gift, although there is no delivery of the subject of the gift. The law cited on the part of the defendant relative to the...